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DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE
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The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD
DISTINCTION 3

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Pars. I.

Cap. I.

De cognitione Creatoris per creaturas in quibus Trinitatis vestigium apparet.

Apostolus namque ait,[1] quod *invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur* [conspiciuntur], *sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas*. Per *creaturam mundi* intelligitur homo « propter excellentiam, qua excellit inter alias creaturas, vel propter convenientiam, quam habet cum omni creatura ». Homo ergo invisibilia Dei intellectu mentis conspicere potuit vel etiam conspexit *per ea quae facta sunt*, id est, per creaturas visibiles vel[2] invisibiles. A duobus enim iuvabatur, scilicet a natura, quae rationalis erat, et ab operibus a Deo factis, ut manifestaretur homini veritas. Ideo Apostolus dixit:[3] *quia Deus revelavit illis*, scilicet dum fecit opera, in quibus artificis aliquatenus relucet indicium.

Part I

Chapter I

On the cognition of the Creator through the creatures, in which the vestige of the Trinity appears

For the Apostle also says,[1] that *the invisible (things) of God by the creature of the world through those things which have been made, being understood, are perceived* [conspiciuntur] *(as are) also His sempiternal virtue and Divinity*. By *the creature of the world* there is understood man « on account of the excellence, by which he excels among the other creatures, and/or on account of the encounter [convenientiam], which he has with every creature ». Therefore man could by the understanding of (his) mind perceive the invisible things of God and/or did also perceive (them) *through those things which have been made*, that is, through creatures visible and/or[2] invisible. For from the two he is helped, that is from nature, which was rational, and from the works wrought [facit] by God, to manifest truth to man. For that reason the Apostle said:[3] *that God revealed to them*, that is while He wrought the works, in which the evidence of the Craftsman [aritificis] glittered to some extent.

Nam sicut ait Ambrosius:[4] « Ut Deus, qui natura invisibilis est, etiam a visibilibus posset sciri, opus fecit, quod opificem visibilitate sui manifestavit, ut per certum incertum posset sciri, et ille Deus omnium esse crederetur, qui hoc fecit, quod ab homine impossibile est fieri ». Potuerunt

For as (St.) Ambrose says:[4] « So that God, who is by nature invisible, might also be able to be known by visible (things), He wrought a work, which manifested the Worker by its own visibility, that the uncertain might be known through the certain, and that He might be believed to be

ergo cognoscere sive cognoverunt, ultra omnem creaturam esse illum qui ea fecit, quae nulla creaturarum facere vel destruere valet.[5] Accedat, quaecumque vis, creatura et faciat tale caelum et talem terram, et dicam, quia Deus est. Sed quia nulla creatura talia facere valet, constat, super omnem creaturam esse illum qui ea fecit; ac per hoc, illum esse Deum, humana mens cognoscere potuit.

the God of all, He who made this, which by man is impossible to be wrought ». Therefore they could cognize or they did cognize, that beyond every creature is He who made those (things), which none of the creatures has the strength [valet] to do and/or destroy.[5] Let the creature, howsoever strong [quaecumque vis], approach and let it make such a heaven and such an earth, and I will say, that it is God. But because no creature has the strength [valet] to make such (things), it is established, that He who made them is above every creature; and through this (line of reasoning) the human mind could cognize, that He is God.

Alio etiam modo Dei veritatem ductu rationis cognoscere potuerunt vel etiam cognoverunt. Ut enim Augustinus ait in Libro de Civitate Dei:[6] « Viderunt summi philosophi nullum corpus esse Deum, et ideo cuncta corpora trascenderunt, quaerentes Deum; viderunt etiam, quidquid mutabile est non esse summum Deum omniumque principium, et ideo omnem animam mutabilesque spiritus transcenderunt; deinde viderunt, omne, quod mutabile est, non posse esse nisi ab illo, qui incommutabiliter et simpliciter est. Intellexerunt ergo, eum et omnia ista fecisse et a nullo fieri potuisse ».

They could also in another manner cognize and/or they did also cognize the truth of God under the leading of reason.. For as (St.) Augustine says in the Book On the City of God:[6] « The highest philosophers saw that no body is God, and for that reason they transcended all other bodies, seeking God (as they did); they also says, that whatever is mutable is not the most high God and principle of all (things), and for that reason they transcended every soul and the mutable spirits; then they saw, that everything, which is mutable, cannot be except by Him, who incommutably and simply is. Therefore they understood, that He both had made all these (things) and that He could come to be [fieri] from none (of them) ».

« Consideraverunt etiam, quidquid est in substantiis vel corpus esse vel spiritum, meliusque aliquid spiritum esse quam corpus, sed longe meliorem qui spiritum fecit et corpus ».

« They also considered, that whatever is in substances is a body and/or a spirit, and that any spirit is better than a body, but better by far Him who made spirit and body ».

« Intellexerunt etiam, corporis speciem esse sensibilem et spiritus speciem intelligibilem, et intelligibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus, quae visu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt, intelligibilia, quae conspectu mentis intelligi.[7] Cum ergo in eorum conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent; si autem omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent: viderunt esse aliquid, quo illa speciosa facta sunt, ubi est prima et incommutabilis species, ideoque incomparabilis; et illud esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset, et ex quo cuncta facta

« They also understood, that the appearance [species] of a body is sensible and the appearance of a spirit is intelligible, and they preferred the intelligible appearance to the sensible. We call sensibles, what can [queunt] be sensed by the sight or touch of a body, intelligibles, what (can) be understood by the sight [conspectu] of the mind.[7] Therefore since in their sight [conspectu] both the body and the human spirit [animus] were more and less apparent [speciosa]; but if they could lack every appearance, they would be entirely nothings [nulla]: they saw that there is a Something, by which those

essent ». Ecce tot modis potuit cognosci veritas Dei. Cum ergo Deus una sit et simplex essentia, quae ex nulla diversitate partium vel accidentium consistit, pluraliter tamen dicit Apostolus: *invisibilia Dei*, quia pluribus modis cognoscitur veritas Dei per ea quae facta sunt. Ex perpetuitate namque creaturarum intelligitur Conditor aeternus; ex magnitudine creaturarum omnipotens; ex ordine et dispositione sapiens; ex gubernatione bonus. Haec autem omnia ad unitatem Deitatis pertinent monstrandam.

(things) are made apparent, where there is a first and incommutable Appearance, and for that reason incomparable; and that It is the principle of things they did most rightly believe, because It had not been made, and (because) all other (things) had been made from It ». Behold in so many manners the truth of God could be cognized. Therefore though [cum] God is the one and simple essence, which consists of no diversity of parts and/or of accidents, the Apostle says, however, in the plural: *the invisible (things) of God*, because the truth of God is cognized in very many manners through those (things) which have been made. For from the perpetuity of creatures the eternal Founder is understood; from the magnitude of creatures the Omnipotent One; from (their) order and disposition the Wise One; from (His) governance (of them) the Good One. Moreover all these (things) tend ultimately [pertinent] to manifest the unity of the Deity.

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[1] Rom. 1, 20; Vulgata: *Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura . . .* Glossa ordinaria, qua Magister, paucis variatis, mox utitur, verbum *a creatura* sic interpretatur: *Ab homine per excellentiam, quia excellit inter alias craturas, vel propter convenientiam, quam habet cum omnibus creaturis*. Tum Vulgata *eius virtus* pro *virtus eius*, quod nostri mss. et edd. summo consensu exhibent.

[2] Codd. C D E *et*.

[3] Respicit ad Rom. 1, 19: *Quod notus est Dei, manifestum est in illis. Deus enim illis manifestavit*. — Vat. cum aliis edd. *ideoque* contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 8.

[4] In Epist. ad Rom. c. 1, 19, paucis a Magistro mutatis et omissis. In fine huius textus ante *impossible est* Vat. sola repetit supervacanee: *ait Ambrosius*.

[5] Mss. B D E *potest*. Tum in Vat. sola: *quaecumque vis creaturae*; in textu accipe *vis* a velle et *quaecumque* ut neutrum in plurali. Subinde eadem Vat. cum plerisque excusis ante *terram* praetermittit *talem* contra codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8.

[6] Libr. VIII. c. 6, nonnullis transpositis et omissis. Etiam infra tertia et quarta ratio inde sumtae sunt. Paulo ante solus cod. D *potuerunt et* pro *potuerunt vel etiam*.

[7] Edd. contra codd. nostros et ed. Augustini, ponendo punctum ante *intelligibilia*, praemittunt hic *possunt*.

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[1] Rm 1:20; the Vulgate reads: *For the invisible (things) of him by the creature . . .* [Invisibilia enim ipius a creatura]. The Glossa Ordinaria, which Master (Peter), with a few words varied, now uses, interprets the word *by the creature* [a creatura] thus: *By man through excellence, because he excells among the other creatures, and/or on account of the encounter* [convenientiam] *which he has with all creatures*. [Trans. note: It should be noted that the Latins, neglecting to refer to the Greek original of this passage, understood a creatura [apo ktisews] as *by the creature* rather than the more literal, and intended, *from the act of the creating*, i.e. *from the foundation*]. Then the Vulgate has *His virtue* [eius virtus] in place of *the virtue of Him* [virtus eius], which our manuscripts and editions exhibit in complete agreement. [Trans. note: Here *For ... also* (namque) refers to what has just been said in d. 2, ch.5]

[2] Codices C D and E have *and* [et].

[3] A reference to Rm 1:19 : *What is known of God, has been made manifest unto them. For God has manifested it to them* [Quod notus est Dei, manifestum est in illis. Deus enim illis manifestavit]. — The Vatican edition together with the other editions has *And therefore* [ideoque], against all the codices and editions 1 and 8.

[4] In the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 1, v. 19, with a few things changed and omitted by Master (Peter). At the end of this text before *it is impossible* [impossibile est] the Vatican edition alone superfluously repeats: *(St.) Ambrose said* [ait Ambrosius].

[5] Manuscripts B D and E have *can* [potest]. Then in the Vatican edition alone there is read: *the creature, whatever ones you wish* [quaecumque vis

creaturae], understanding vis as a form of velle and quaecumque as a neuter plural. Immediately after the same the Vatican edition prefaces *earth* [terram] with *such* [talem], having left out the other many things, against the codices and editions 1, 6 and 8.

[6] Book VIII, ch.6, with not a few things transposed and omitted. Also, below, the third and fourth reason have been taken from there. A little before this only codex D has *they could . . . and they did* [potuerunt et] in place of *they could . . . and they did also* [potuerutn vel etiam].

[7] The editions against our codices and Augustine's edition, by putting a period before *intelligibles*, and adding *can* [possunt] has *Intelligibles, which can* [Intelligibilia quae . . . possunt].

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Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt aliquod Trinitatis vestigium vel indicium exiguum[1] haberi potuerit. De hoc Augustinus in libro sexto de Trinitate ait: « Oportet, ut Creatorem per ea quae facta sunt intellectu conspicientes, Trinitatem intelligamus. Huius enim Trinitatis vestigium in creaturis apparet. Haec enim omnia,[3] quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Nam quodque horum creatorum et *unum* aliquid est, sicut sunt naturae corporum et animarum, et aliqua *specie* formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates corporum ac doctrinae vel artes animarum, et *ordinem* aliquem petit aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera vel collocationes corporum et amores vel delectationes animarum; et ita in creaturis praelucet vestigium Trinitatis. In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est omnium rerum et perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio ». « Summa autem origo, ut Augustinus ostendit in libro de Vera Religione,[4] intelligitur Deus Pater, a quo sunt omnia, a quo Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris, nulla ex parte ei dissimilis, quam[5] cum ipso et in ipso Patre veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt et ad unum referuntur, quae tamen omnia nec fierent a Patre per Filium neque suis finibus salva essent, nisi Deus summe bonus esset, qui et nulli naturae, quae[6] ab illo bona esset, invidit, et

Now there remains to show, whether through those (things) which have been made anything could be regarded a vestige or scanty [exiguum][1] evidence of the Trinity. On this (St.) Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity says: « It is proper, that perceiving the Creator with (our) intellect [intellectu] through the (things) which have been made, we understand the Trinity. For the vestige of this Trinity appears [apparet] in creatures. For all these (things),[3] which have been made by the Divine Art, both show a certain unity in themselves and an outward-appearance [species] and an order. For each of these creators is also some *one* [unum aliquid], as are the natures of bodies and of souls, and (each) is formed by some *species* [species], as are the figures and/or qualities of bodies and the doctrines and/or arts of souls, and (each) seeks or holds some *order*, as are the weights and/or positions [collocationes] of bodies and the loves [amores] and/or delectations of souls; and thus does the vestige of the Trinity shine forth in creatures. For in that Trinity there is a Most High Origin of all things [omnium rerum] and a Most Perfect Beauty [pulcritudo] and a Most Blessed Delectation ». « But the Most High Origin », as (St.) Augustine shows in the book On the True Religion,[4] « is understood to be God the Father, from whom are all things [omnia], from whom (is) the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Most Perfect Beauty is understood (to be) the

ut in bono ipso maneret, alia quantum vellet, alia quantum posset, dedit; quae bonitas intelligitur Spiritus sanctus, qui est donum Patris et Filii. Quare ipsum donum Dei cum Patre et Filio aeque incommutabile colere et tenere nos convenit. Per considerationem itaque creaturarum unius substantiae Trinitatem intelligimus, scilicet unum Deum Patrem, a quo sumus, et Filium, per quem sumus, et Spiritum sanctum, in quo sumus, scilicet principium, ad quod recurrimus, et formam quam sequimur, et gratiam qua reconciliamur: unum scilicet, quo auctore conditi sumus, et similitudinem eius, per quam ad unitatem reformamur, et pacem, qua Unitati adhaeremus: scilicet Deum, qui dixit:[7] *fiat*; et Verbum, per quod factum est omne, quod substantialiter et naturaliter est; et Donum benignitatis eius, qua placuit quod ab eo per Verbum factum est et reconciliatum est auctori, ut non interiret ». Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis aliquatenus imago Trinitatis indicatur; non enim per creaturarum contemplationem sufficiens notitia Trinitatis potest haberi vel potuit sine doctrinae vel interioris inspirationis revelatione. Unde illi antiqui philosophi quasi per umbram et de longinquo viderunt veritatem, deficientes in contuitu Trinitatis, ut magi Pharaonis in tertio signo.[8] Adiuvamur tamen in fide invisibilium per ea, quae facta sunt.

Son, that is the Truth of the Father, dissimilar to Him from no vantage point [nulla ex parte], which[5] we venerate with and in the Father Himself [cum ipso et in ipso Patre], which is the Form of all, which has been made from the One and are referred to the One, which all, however, would neither have come to be from the Father through the Son nor would have been safe in their confines [suis finibus], unless God was the most highly Good, who both envies no nature, which[6] is good from Him, and grants that the one as much as it wants, the other as much as it can, remain in the Good itself; which goodness is understood (to be) the Holy Spirit, who is the Gift of the Father and the Son. Wherefore it is fitting that the very Gift of God, equally incommutable with the Father and the Son, take care of us [colere] and hold us. And thus through a consideration of creatures we understand the Trinity (to be) of one substance, that is one God the Father, from whom we are, and the Son, through whom we are, and the Holy Spirit, in whom we are, that is the Principle, back to which we run, and the Form which we follow, and the Grace by which we are reconciled: that is God, who said:[7] *Let there be*; and the Word, through which there is made everything, which substantially and naturally is; and the Gift of His benignity, who was pleased that what was wrought by Him through the Word and reconciled to the Author, might not perish ». Behold it has been shown, how among creatures to some extent the image of the Trinity is indicated; for through the contemplation of creatures a sufficient knowledge [notitia] of the Trinity cannot be had nor [vel] could it without the revelation of doctrine and/or of interior inspiration. Whence those ancient philosophers as if through a shadow and from afar saw the truth, deficient (as they were) in the contuition of the Trinity, like [ut] the magi of the Pharaoh at the third sign.[8] We, however, are helped to believe invisible things [in fide invisibilium] through those (things), which have been made.

Pars. II.

Part II

Cap. II.

De imagine et similitudine Trinitatis in anima humana.

Nunc vero « ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in mente humana, quae novit Deum vel potest nosse, Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus ». Ut enim ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate:[9] « Licet humana mens non sit eius naturae, cuius Deus est, imago tamen illius, quo nihil melius est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est, quo natura nostra nihil habet melius, id est in mente. In ipsa enim[10] mente, etiam antequam sit particeps Dei, eius imago reperitur; etsi enim, amissa Dei participatione, deformis sit, imago tamen Dei permanet. Eo enim ipso imago Dei est mens, quo capax eius est eiusque particeps esse potest. Iam ergo in ea Trinitatem, quae Deus est, inquiramus. Ecce ergo[11] mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum, sed imaginem Dei. Hic enim quaedam apparet trinitas memoriae, intelligentiae et amoris ». Haec ergo tria potissimum tractemus, memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem ». « Haec igitur tria, ut Augustinus ait . . .

Chapter II

On the image and similitude of the Trinity in the human soul

But now « let us come presently [iam] to that disputation, where in the human mind, which knows God and/or can know (Him), we discover the image of the Trinity ». For as (St.) Augustine says in the fourteenth book <u>On the Trinity</u>:[9] « Though the human mind is not of that nature, of which God is, however the image of Him, better than whom nothing is, is to be sought and found there, better than whom our nature has nothing, that is, in the mind. For[10] in the mind itself, even before it is a partaker of God, His image is discovered; for even if, having lost the participation in God, it be deformed, the image of God, however, remains throughout [permanet]. For the image of God is for this very reason a mind, because [quo] it is capable of Him and can be a partaker of Him. Therefore let us now search in it for the Trinity, which is God. Therefore[11] behold: the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves [diligit] itself; if we discern [cernimus] this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed the God, but the image of God. For here there appears a certain trinity of memory, intelligence and love [amoris] ». These three, therefore, let us treat with most of all [potissimum]: memory, intelligence, will » « Therefore these three », as (St.) Augustine says . . .

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[1] Cod. A omittit *exiguum*; Codd. B C D E et ed. 1, omisso *vestigium* et transpositis verbis, satis bene legunt *Trinitatis indicium vel exiguum*, accepto *vel* pro *saltem* vel pro *etiam*.

[2] Cap. 10. n.. 12, sed transposito ordine propositionum. — In initio huius textus Vat. et ed. 4 male legunt *intellecta* pro *intellectu*; ed. Augustini *intellectum*.

[3] Omnes codd. et edd. praeter Vat. omittunt *omnia*, quod tamen et ed. Augustini et ipse S. Bonav. infr dub. 3 habent. — Paulo post codd. C E cum textu Augustini *quidquid horum* pro *quodque horum*. Deinde Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7 cum textu Augustini ante *animarum* adiiciunt *ingenia*, quod deest in codd. omnibus et aliis edd.

[4] Ex cap. 55. n. 113. passim collecta. — In prima propositione huius textus post *omnia* solus cod. C addit particulam *et*.

[5] Vat. et alia edd. contra ed. 6 et omnes codd. *quem* pro *quam* et mox contra eosdem codd. et edd. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 *qui forma* pro *quae forma*. Lectio nostra confirmatur textu Augustini, qui habet: Quare ipsam quoque veritatem nulla ex parte dissimilem, in ipso

[1] Codex A omits *scanty*[exiguum]. Codices B C D and E and edition 1, having omitted *vestige* [vestigium]and transposed the words, reads well enough *evidence of the Trinity even a meager one* [vel exiguum], having read *and/*or [<u>vel</u>] for *at least* [saltem] or for *even* [etiam].

[2] Chapter 10, n. 12, but with a transposition of the propositions. — At the beginning of this text the Vatican edition and edition 4 read badly *which have been made understood* [intellecta] in place of *with (our) intellect* [intellectu]; Augustine's edition has *the Creator understood through those things* [intellectum].

[3] All the codices and editions, besides the Vatican edition, omit *all . . .things* [omnia], which however both Augustine's edition and St. Bonaventure, below in dubium n. 3, have. — A little after this codices C and E together with the text of (St.) Augustine have *whatever of these* [quidquid horum] in place of *each of these* [quodque horum]. Then the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6 and 7, together with the text of (St.) Augustine inserts *the natural qualities* [ingenia] before *of souls* [animarum], which is lacking in all the

et cum ipso veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt. — Paulo post cod. C *ab ipso* et edd. 5, 6 *ab initio* loco *ab uno*. Deinde cod. D *quae omnino non fierent* pro *quae tamen omnia nec fierent*

[6] Codd. A B C E satis bene *quod*, sed refragantibus edd. et textu Augustini. Immediate post codd. A B et edd. 9, 10 *bono* pro *bona*.

[7] Gen. 1, 3. — Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 7, 8 et codd. D E post *fiat* male addit *lux*, refragantibus ceteris edd. et codd. nec non textu Augustini.

[8] Exod. 8:18.

[9] Cap. 8. n. 11, unde etiam accepta sunt, quae praecedunt, ab illis verbis: *Nunc vero*, sed de more non paucis omissis vel additis.

[10] Vat. et alia edd., exceptis 1, 8, minus bene: *In ipsa etiam mente antequam*.

[11] Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1, 6 legit *enim*; et paulo post edd. 2, 3, 7 ante *si cernimus* habent *haec* pro *hoc*.

codices and other editions.

[4] Gathered from chapter 55, n. 113 passim. — In the first proposition of this text after *all (things)* [omnia] only codex C adds the particle *and* [et].

[5] The Vatican edition and the other editions against edition 6 and all the codices has *whom* [quem] in place of *which* [quam] and the against the same codices and editions 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, have *who* [qui] in place of *which* [quae]. Our reading is confirmed by the text of (St.) Augustine, who has: Wherefore that truth, dissimilar in no way [nulla ex parte] we also venerate in Him and with Him, (that truth) which is the Form of all (things), which have been made by the One. — A little after this codex C has *by Him* [ab ipso] and editions 5 and 6 *from the start* [ab initio] in place of *from the One*. Then codex D has *which would not at all* [omnino] *have come to be* in place of *which all, however, neither would have come to be* [quae tamen omnia nec fierent].

[6] Codices A B C and E have well enough *because it* [quod], but disagreeing with the editions and the text of (St.) Augustine. Immediately after this codices A and B and editions 9 and 10 have *from the Good itself* [ab ipso bono] in place of *good from Him* [ab ipso bona].

[7] Gn. 1:3. — The Vatican edition together with editions 4, 5, 6 and 8 and codices D and E adds *light* [lux] badly after *Let there be* [fiat], by disagreeing with the rest of the editions and codices and also the text of (St.) Augustine.

[8] Ex 8:18.

[9] Chapter 8, n. 11, whence there are also understood, what precedes (this), from the words: *But now* [Nunc vero], but as is usual with not a few things omitted and/or added.

[10] The Vatican edition and the other editions, except 1 and 8, have less well: *Even in that mind before* [In ipsa etiam mente antequam].

[11] The Vatican edition against the codices and editions 1 and 6 reads *for* [enim]; and a little after this editions 2, 3 and 7 before *if we discern* [si cernimus] have *these things* [haec] in place of *this* [hoc].

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in libro decimo de Trinitate,[1] non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens, una essentia. Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid, et intelligentia et voluntas sive dilectio similiter ad aliquid dicitur; vita vero dicitur ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. Haec igitur tria eo sunt unum, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo vero tria sunt, quo ad se invicem referuntur ».

in the tenth book On the Trinity,[1] « there are not three lives, but one life, nor three minds, but one mind, one essence. But "memory" is said regarding something, and "intelligence" and "will" or "dilection" similarly is said regarding something; but "life" and "mind" and "essence" is said regarding itself. Therefore these three for this reason are one, because (there is) one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else those each [singula] are said (to be) regarding themselves, they are at the same time also said, not in the plural, but in the

singular. But for this reason they are three, because they are referred to one another [se invicem] ».

« Aequalia etiam sunt non solum singula singulis, sed etiam singula omnibus; alioquin non se invicem caperent; se autem invicem capiunt. Capiuntur[2] enim et a singulis singula et a singulis omnia. Memini enim, me habere memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem; et intelligo, me intelligere et velle atque meminisse; et volo, me velle et meminisse et intelligere ».

« They are also equal not only each to each [singula singulis], but also each to all [singula omnibus]; otherwise they would not seize one another; but they do seize one another. For they are grasped[2] both each by each and all by each. For I remember, that I have a memory and intelligence and a will; and I understand, that I understand and will and remember; and I will, that I will and remember and understand ».

« Totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem simul memini. Quod enim memoriae meae non memini, illud non est in memoria mea; nihil autem tam in memoria est, quam ipsa memoria: totam ergo[3] memini. Item, quidquid intelligo, intelligere me scio, et scio, me velle quidquid volo; quidquid autem scio memini. Totam ergo intelligentiam totamque voluntatem meam memini ».

« And I remember at once my whole memory and intelligence and will. For what I do not remember of my memory, that is not in my memory; but nothing is so in the memory, as the memory itself: therefore[3] I remember the whole. Likewise, whatever I understand, I know [scio] that I understand, and I know, that I will whatever I will; but whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember my whole intelligence and whole will. ».

« Similiter, cum haec tria intelligo, tota simul intelligo. Neque enim quidquam intelligibilium est, quod non intelligam, nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro, nec memini nec volo. Quidquid igitur[4] intelligibilium non intelligo, consequenter etiam nec memini nec volo. Quidquid ergo intelligibilium memini et volo, consequnter intelligo ».

« Similarly, when I understand these three, I at once understand the whole. For neither is there anything belonging to intelligibles, which I do not understand, unless I am ignorant of it. But because I am ignorant, I neither remember nor will. Therefore[4] whatever of intelligibles I do not understand, I also consequently do not remember nor will. Therefore whatever of intelligibles I remember and will, I consequently understand ».

« Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque memoriam meam capit, dum utor toto eo quod intelligo et memini. Cum itaque invicem a singulis et omnia et tota capiantur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum, una vita, una mens, una essentia ». « Ecce illius summae Unitatis atque Trinitatis, ubi una est essentia et tres personae, imago est humana mens, licet impar ».[5] Mens autem hic pro animo ipso accipitur, ubi est illa imago Trinitatis; « proprie vero mens dicitur, ut ait Augustinus,[6] non ipsa anima, sed quod in ea

« The will also seizes my whole intelligence and my whole memory, while I use the whole of what [toto eo quod] I understand and remember. And so since by each [a singulis] in turn there are seized both every one and each entirely [omnia et tota], each entirely [tota singula] is equal to each entirely and each entirely at the same time (is equal) to all entirely; and these three (are) one, one life, one mind, one essence ». « Behold of that most high Unity and Trinity, where one is the Essence and three the Persons, the human mind is the image, though not the peer [impar] ».[5] But the

est excellentius », qualiter saepe accipitur. Illud etiam sciendum est, quod memoria non solum est absentium et praeteritorum, sed etiam praesentium, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate,[7] alioquin non se caperet.

mind is here accepted for the human spirit [animo] itself, where there is that image of the Trinity; « but properly the mind means », as (St.) Augustine says,[6] « not the soul itself, but what in it is the more excellent », in which manner it is often accepted. That also one must know, that the memory is not only of absent (things) and past (things), but also of present ones, as (St.) Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity,[7] otherwise it would not seize itself.

Hic attendendum est diligenter, ex quo sensu accipiendum sit quod supra dixit, illa tria, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem esse unum, unam mentem, unam essentiam. Quod utique non videtur esse verum iuxta proprietatem sermonis. Mens enim, id est spiritus rationalis, essentia est spiritualis et incorporea. Illa vero tria naturales proprietates seu vires sunt ipsius mentis et a se invicem differunt, quia memoria non est intelligentia vel voluntas, nec intelligentia voluntas sive amor.

Here it must be attended to diligently, in [ex] which sense there must be accepted what is said above, that the three, that is the memory, intelligence and the will are one, the mind one, the essence one. Because, even so, it does not seem to be truth according [iuxta] to the property of speech [sermonis]. For the mind, that is the rational spirit, is an essence, spiritual and incorporeal. But those three natural properties or strengths [vires] belong to the mind itself and differ from one another [a se invicem], because memory is not intelligence and/or will, nor intelligence will or love [amor].

« Et haec tria etiam ad se ipsa referuntur », ut ait Augustinus in nono libro de Trinitate:[8] « Mens enim amare se ipsam vel meminisse non potest, nisi etiam noverit se: nam quomodo amat vel meminit quod nescit »? Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis; et tamen eorum singulum et simul omnia una essentia est, cum et relative dicantur ad invicem.

« And these three also are referred to themselves », as (St.) Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity:[8] « For the mind cannot love and/or remember itself, unless it also knows [noverit] itself: for in what manner does it love and/or remember what it does not know [nescit] »? And so in a wonderful manner those three are inseparable from their very selves [semetipsis]; and yet [tamen] each of them and all together are one essence, since they are also said in a relative manner [relative] regarding one another.

Sed iam videndum est, quo modo haec tria dicantur una subtantia; ideo scilicet, quia in ipsa anima vel mente substantialiter existunt, non sicut accidentia in subiectis, quae possunt adesse et abesse. Unde Augustinus in libro nono de Trinitate[9] ait: « Admonemur, substantialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, quia etsi relative dicuntur[10] ad invicem, singula tamen substantialiter sunt in sua subtantia ». Ecce ex quo sensu illa tria dicantur esse

But presently [iam] it must be seen, in what manner these three are said (to be) one substance; for that reason that is, because in the soul itself and/or in the mind they exist substantially, not as accidents in subjects, which can be present [adesse] and absent. Whence (St.) Augustine in the ninth book On the Trinity[9] says: « We are admonished, that (they are there) substantially, not as in a subject, as color in a body, because even if they are said[10] in a

unum vel una substantia. « Quae tria, ut Augustinus ait in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate,[11] in mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci (reminiscitur enim per memoriam, intuetur per intelligentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem), profecto reperit illius summae Trinitatis imaginem ».

relative manner regarding one another, they are, however, each [singula] in their own substance ». Behold in what sense those three are said to be one and/or one substance. « Which three », as (St.) Augustine says in the fifthteenth book On the Trinity,[11] « having been divinely instituted in the mind naturally, one ascertains in a lively manner [vivaciter perspicit], as well as [et] how there is among them (something) great, whence even the sempiternal and immutable Nature can be reflected upon [recoli], plainly seen, (and) completely desired [concupisci] {for It is called to mind through memory, intuited through intelligence, embraced through dilection}, (and) having progressed thus far [profecto] one discovers the image of that most high Trinity ».

Cap. III.

De similitudine creantis et creatae trinitatis.

« Verumtamen caveat, ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam ita ei comparet, ut omnino existimet similem, sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magna quoque dissimilitudinem cernat ».[12]

« Quod breviter ostendi potest. Homo unus per illa tria meminit, intelligit, diligit, qui nec memoria est nec intelligentia nec dilectio, sed haec habet. Unus ergo homo est, qui habet haec tria, non ipse est haec tria. In illius vero summa simplicitate naturae, quae Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae / sunt . . .

Chapter III

On the similitude of the creating and created trinity

« However let one still beware, lest he compare the image made from the same Trinity so to himself, that he estimates himself entirely similar, but rather in that similitude however great let him discern [cernat] also the dissimilitude ».[12]

« Which can briefly be shown. One man through those three remembers, understands, loves [diligit], who is neither memory nor intelligence nor dilection, but has them. Therefore one man is he, who has these three, he is not these three. But in the most high simplicity of that nature, which is God, although God is one, however there are three persons, . . .

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[1] Cap. 11. n. 17. 18. Ex eodem capite sumta sunt omnia, quae sequuntur usque ad: *Ecce illius summae Unitatis*.

[2] Vat. et ed. 9 corrupte *Capiunt*. Immediate post codd. D E *etiam* pro *enim*, sed contra textum Augustini et alios codd. et omnes edd.

[3] Codd. et textus Augustini *igitur*. Paulo post contra contextum et originale plures codd. et edd. habent *memini scio* pro *scio memini*.

[4] Edd. *ergo*; Augustinus *itaque*.

[5] Libr. X de Trin. c. 12. n. 19: « cuius impar imago est humana mens, sed tamen imago »; sed prima pars propositionis est ex libr. XV. de Trin. c. 7. n. 11. — Antea Vat. omittit *est* post *ubi una*. Paulo post cod. D *anima ipsa* pro *animo ipso*.

[6] Libr. XI. de Trin. c. 7. n. 11. — Secundum sensum.

[7] Cap. 11. n. 14, ubi longiore discursu hanc

[1] Chapter 11, nn. 17 and 18. From the same chapter are taken all those, which follow upto: *Behold of that most high Unity* [Ecce illius summae Unitatis].

[2] The Vatican edition and edition 9, corrupted, have *they seize* [Capiunt]. Immediately before this codices D and E have *also* [etiam] in place of *for* [enim], but against the text of Augustine and the other codices and all the editions.

[3] The codices and the text of Augustine have *therefore* [igitur] instead of *therefore* [ergo]. A little after this against the context and the original very many codices and editions have *I remember I know* [memini scio] in place of *I remember I know* [scio memini].

[4] The editions have *therefore* [ergo] instead of *therefore* [igitur].

[5] On the Trinity, Book X, ch. 12, n. 19: « of whom

sententiam a S. Bonaventura receptam probat (cf. hic. p. Ii. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.).
[8] Cap. 3. n. 3, sed de suo addidit Magister quae ad memoriam referuntur, nempe *vel meminisse* et *vel meminit*.* Verba praecedentia *Et haec tria*, iam supra citata, occurrunt libr. X de Trin. c. 11, ubi edd. 1, 6, 8 habent *ad se invicem* pro *ad se ipsa*.
[9] Cap. 4. n. 5. Sed mulo fusius Augustinus. Paulo ante pro *et abesse* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 legit *vel abesse*.
[10] Cod. B et ed. 2 *dicantur*.
[11] Cap. 20. n. 39, ubi post *reminiscitur* deest *enim*, quod et a mss. B C D abest; ceterum, etiam omisso *enim*, verba *reminiscitur per memoriam* etc. parenthesis esse videntur.
[12] Ibid., sed cum nonnullis adiunctis.

* [Trans. nota: Hic in nota editorum Quaracchiorum originaliter perperam legitur sic: *vel meminisses et vel meminerit*.]

the human mind is the uneven [impar] image, but nevertheless an image »; but the first part of the proposition is from Book XV, ch. 7, n. 11. — Before this the Vatican edition omits *there is* [est] after *where*. A little after this codex D has *the soul itself* [anima ipsa] in place of *the human spirit itself* [animo ipso].
[6] On the Trinity, Book XV, ch. 7, n. 11, according to its sense.
[7] Chapter 11, n. 14, where in a longer discourse he proves this sentence received by St. Bonaventure (cf. here in p. II, a. 1. q. 1. at n. 3).
[8] Chapter 3, n. 3, but as he does Master (Peter) has added those which are referred to the memory, namely *and/or remember* [vel meminisse] and *and/or remember* [vel meminit].* The preceding words *And these three* [Et haec tria], already cited above, occur in Book X, ch. 11, where editions 1, 6 and 8 have *to one another* [ad se invicem] in place of *to themselves* [ad se ipsa].
[9] Chapter 4, n. 5. But much more fully in (St.) Augustine. A little before this in place of *and absent* the Vatican edition together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 reads *and/or absent* [vel abesse].
[10] Codex B and edition 2 have the subjunctive *they are said* [dicantur].
[11] Chapter 20, n. 39, where *for* [enim] is lacking before *It is called to mind* [reminiscitur], and it is absent also from manuscripts B C and D; the rest, having also omitted it, the words *It is called to mind through memory* [reminiscitur per memoriam] etc. seem to be a parenthesis.
[12] Ibid., but with not a few things adjoined.

* [Trans. note: Here -(s) and -(er)- have been removed, respectively, from the Latin forms of memini which are erroneously written in the Quaracchi note].

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sunt, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus »,[1] et hae tres[2] unus Deus. « Aliud est itaque Trinitatis res ipsa, aliud imago Trinitatis in re alia; propter quam imaginem etiam illud in quo sunt haec tria, imago dicitur, scilicet homo. Sicut imago dicitur et tabula et pictura, quae est in ea; sed tabula nomine imaginis appellatur propter picturam, quae in ea est ».[3]

there are three Persons, / the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit »,[1] and these Three[2] (are) the One God. « And thus the one is the reality [res] itself of the Trinity, the other the image of the Trinity in another thing [re]; on account of which image even that in which these three are, is said (to be) an image, that is man. As the image is said (to be) both tablet [tabula] and the picture, which is in it; but the tablet is called by the name image on account of the picture, which is in it ».[3]

« Rursus ista imago, quae est homo habens illa tria, una persona est. Illa vero Trinitatis non una persona est, sed tres personae, Pater Filii et Filius Patris et Spiritus Patris et Filii. Itaque in ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, sed unius hominis sunt. In illa vero summa Trinitate, cuius

« Again that image of Him, which is the man having those three, is one person. But that of the Trinity is not one person, but three persons, the Father of the Son and the Son of the Father and the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. And thus in this his [ista] image of the Trinity, these three are not one

haec imago est, non unius Dei sunt illa tria, sed unus Deus; et tres sunt illae, non una persona ».[4] « Illa enim tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt vel in homine sunt. Sed nunquid possumus dicere, Trinitatem sic esse in Deo, ut aliquid Dei sit, nec ipsa sit Deus »?[5] Absit ut hoc credamus. Dicamus ergo, in mente nostra imaginem Trinitatis,[6] sed exiguam et qualemcumque esse, quae summae trinitatis ita gerit similitudinem, ut ex maxima parte sit dissimilis. Sciendum vero est, quod « haec Trinitas mentis, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate,[7] non propterea tantum imago Dei est, quia sui meminit mens et intelligit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intelligere et amare illum, a quo facta est ».

man, but are of one man. But in that most high Trinity, whose image this is, those Three are not of one God, but (are) the one God; and those are three, not one person ».[4] « For those three are not one man, but are of a man and/or or in a man. But could we ever [nunquid] say, that the Trinity is so in God, that is is something of God, or that It is God »?[5] Far be it that we believe this. Therefore let us say, that there is in our mind an image of the Trinity,[6] but (that it is) a scanty one and of some kind [qualemcumque], which so bears a similitude of the most high Trinity [trinitatis], that for the most part [ex maxima parte] it is dissimilar. But it must be known, that « this trinity [Trinitas] of the mind », as (St.) Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity,[7] is not on that account only an image of God, that (as) a mind remembers itself and understands and loves itself, but that it can also remember and understand and love Him, by whom it was made ».

Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus distingui trinitas in anima, quae est imago illius summae et ineffabilis Trinitatis. Ut enim ait Augustinus in nono libro de Trinitate:[8] « Mens et notitia eius et amor tria quaedam sunt. Mens enim novit se et amat se; nec amare se potest, nisi etiam noverit se. Duo quaedam sunt mens et notitia eius; item duo quaedam sunt mens et amor eius ». « Cum ergo se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas, scilicet mens, amor et notitia ». « Mens autem hic accipitur non pro anima, sed pro eo quod in anima excellentius est ». Haec autem tria, cum sint distincta a se invicem, dicuntur tamen esse unum, quia in anima[9] substantialiter existunt.

There can also be distinguished in another manner and by other names the trinity in (that) soul, which is the image of that most high and ineffable Trinity. For as (St.) Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity:[8] « Mind and its knowledge [notitia] and love [amor] are a certain three. For mind knows [novit] itself and loves itself; nor can it love itelf, unless it also knows itself. A certain two are the mind and its knowledge; likewise a certain two are the mind and its love ». Therefore when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a trinity, that is the mind, love and knowledge ». « But the mind is here accepted not for the soul, but for that which is the more excellent in the soul ». But these three, though they be distinct from one another, are, however, said to be one, because they exist substantially in the soul.[9]

Et est ipsa mens quasi parens, et notitia eius quasi proles eius. « Mens enim cum se cognoscit, notitiam sui gignit et est sola parens suae notitiae. Tertius est amor, qui de ipsa mente et notitia procedit, dum mens cognoscens se diligit se; non enim posset se diligere, nisi cognosceret se. Amat etiam

And the mind itself is a quasi parent, and its knowledge the quasi offspring of it. « For the mind when it cognizes itself, begets knowledge [notitiam] of itself and is the only parent of its own knowledge. The third is the love [amor], which proceeds from the mind itself and (its) knowledge, while the

placitam prolem, id est notitiam suam; et ita amor quidam complexus est parentis et prolis ».[10]

mind cognizing itself loves [diligit] itself; for it cannot love itself, unless it cognizes itself. It also loves [amat] its pleasing offspring, that is its knowledge; and thus love is indeed a certain embrace [complexus] of parent and offspring ».[10]

« Nec minor est proles parente, dum tantam se novit mens, quanta est; nec minor est amor parente et prole, id est mente et notitia, dum tantum se diligit mens, quantum se novit et quanta est ».[11]

« For is the offspring less than the parent, while the mind knows itself (to be) as great [tanta], as it is; nor is love less than the parent and the offspring, that is than mind and knowledge, while the mind loves itself as much [tantum], as it knows itself and as much as it is ».[11]

« Sunt etiam haec singula in se ipsis, quia et mens amans in amore est, et amor in amantis notitia, et notitia in mente noscente est ».[12] Ecce in his tribus qualecumque Trinitatis vestigium apparet.

« These are also each [singula] in themselves, because the mind loving is also in love, and love in knowledge of the one loving, and knowledge is in the mind knowing ».[12] Behold among these three there appears a vestige, of some kind [qualecumque], of the Trinity.

Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria et illam unam essentiam, in qua ista sunt, extendit se ad contemplationem Creatoris et videt unitatem in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate. Intelligit enim, unum esse Deum, unam essentiam, unum prinicipium. Intelligit enim, quia si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret; quia si aliquid deeset uni, quod haberet alter, non esset ibi summa perfectio; si vero nihil uni deesset, quod haberet alter, cum in uno essent omnia, alter superflueret. Intellexit ergo, unum esse Deum, unum[13] omnium auctorem, et vidit, quia absque sapientia non sit, quasi res fatua; et ideo intellexit, eum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est; et quia sapientiam suam diligit, intellexit etiam, ibi esse amorem.

And thus the rational mind, considering these three and that one essence, in which these of his [ista] are, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator and sees unity in trinity and trinity in unity. For it understands, that there is one God, one Essence, one Principle. For it understands, that if there were two, each would be insufficient, and/or one of the two would be superfluous; that if anything is lacking to the one, which the other had, there would not be a most high perfection there; but if there were lacking to the one nothing, which the other had, since in the one would be all things [omnia], the other would be superfluous. Therefore it understood, that there is one God, one[13] Author of all, and it sees, that He is not without wisdom, as if (He were) a foolish thing [res fatua]; and for that reason it understood, that He has a wisdom, which is begotten from Himself; and because He loves [diligit] His own wisdom, it also understood, that there is a Love [amorem] there.

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[1] Loc. cit. c. 22. n. 42., secundum sensum. — Pro *per illa tria* Vat. cum nonnullis edd. *per ista tria*, et infra edd. 1, 8 post *non* addunt *tamen*. Denique Vat. et plurimae edd. ante *simplicitate* legunt *summa* pro *summae*.

[2] Vat. cum multis edd. explicando addit *personae*

[1] Loc. cit., ch. 22, n. 42, according to the sense. — In place of *through those three* [per illa tria] the Vatican edition and not a few of the editions has *through those three of his* [per ista tria], and below editions 1 and 8 after *not* [non] add *however* [tamen]. Then the Vatican edition and very many of the editions read

sunt.
[3] Ibid. n. 43.
[4] Loc. cit. — Edd. omnes, dempta 1, in fine textus post *sunt illae* adiiciunt *personae* contra codd. et originale. Paulo ante modernae editiones Augustini, omisso *non*, legunt *est, unius Dei sunt*, sed haec lectio importat locutionem falsam nec correspondet contextui et tollit antithesim. Nam tria illa, scil. memoria, intellectus, voluntas, per appropriationem sumta pro tribus personis, *stricte* didi non possunt esse *unius Dei*, sed sunt *Deus and unus Deus*, quia inter personas et essentiam non datur realis distinctio. Recte itaque Augustinus negat peritatem inter imaginem creatam et increatam. Nam unius hominis *sunt* illa tria, cum potentiae hominis non *sint* homo, sed *habeantur* ab homine. Tres vero personae stricto sensu *sunt* unus Deus. Ita ipse Augustinus in sequenti textu. — Vide infra dub. 10, ubi Seraphicus Doctor negantem particulam non solum cum Magistro admittit, sed defectu ipsius propositionem fieri simpliciter falsam ostendit.
[5] Loc. cit. c. 7. n. 11, sed multo diffusius.
[6] Codd. B C D E et A (prima manu) et ed. 1 *imaginis trinitatem*, quae lectio nec in se commendatur nec cum verbis *sed exiguam et qualemcumque* bene cohaeret. Vat. sola immediate adiungit *ita*. — Haec conclusio Magistri quoad sensum invenitur in Augustino, loc. cit. c. 22. n. 43.
[7] Cap. 12. n. 15. — Cod A B D E et ed. 1 omittunt *est* post *Sciendum vero*. Mox in ipso textu Augustini codd., excepto D, et plurimae edd. incongrue legunt *meminerit* pro *meminit*.
[8] Cap. 4. n. 4: « Sicut autem quaedam sunt mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt mens et notitia eius, cum se novit. Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt ». Quae sequuntur sumta sunt ex c. 5. n. 8; de ultimo textu vide supra nota 6. p. 64.
[9] Codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 *animo*.
[10] August., IX. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18, ubi autem multa adiecta et mutata leguntur. In quo textu cod. C verbo *procedit* praemittit *eius*. Mox Vat. cum paucis aliis edd. pro *cognoscens se diligit* habet *cognoscit se et diligit*. Paucis interiectis, codd. A D E pro *Amat etiam* legunt *Amat enim*, sed contra contextum, cum duplex distinguatur amor mentis, scil erga se et suam prolem.
[11] Loc. cit.
[12] August., libr. cit. c. 5. n. 9.
[13] Abest in Vat. et paucis aliis edd. *unam*. Et paulo infra post *absque sapientia* Vat. contra auctoritatem codd. et edd., omissa particula *non* et inde variato sensu, *absque sapientia sit quasi res fatua*. In nostra et vera lectione supple *esset* post *fatua*. In fine capituli codd. A B D *ibi etiam* pro *etiam ibi*, quae lectio confirmat sensum nostra interpunctione insinuatum.

the simplicity of that most high Nature [summae simplicitate naturae].
[2] The Vatican edition together with many editions adds *persons are* [personae sunt] by way of explanation.
[3] Ibid., n. 43.
[4] Loc. cit.. — All the editions, except 1, at the end of the text after *those are three* [sunt illae] inserts *persons* [personae] against the codices and the original. A little before this the modern editions of (St.) Augustine, having omitted *not* [non], read *is, are of the one God* [est unius Dei sunt], but this reading conveys a false expression and it both does not corresponds to the context and removes the antithesis. For those three, that is the memory, the intellect, the will, through an appropriation taken for the three Persons, *strictly* cannot be said to be *of the one God*, but are *God* and *the one God*, because among the Persons and the Essence there is [datur] no real distinction. And so rightly does (St.) Augustine deny the parity of the created and uncreated image. For those three *are* of one man, since the powers of a man *are not* a man, but *are had* by a man. But the three Persons in the strict sense *are* the one God. This (St.) Augustine himself in the following text. — See below in dubium n. 10, where the Seraphic Doctor not only admits with Master (Peter) the negative particle, but shows that the proposition is simply false by its defect.
[5] Loc. cit., ch. 7, n. 11, but much more at length.
[6] Codices B C D E and A (by the primary hand) and edition 1 have *a trinity of image* [imaginis trinitatem], which reading is neither commended in itself nor well coherent with the words in the accusative *but a scanty one and of whatever a kind* [sed exiguam et qualemcumque]. The Vatican edition alone immediately adjoins *thus* [ita]. — This conclusion of Master (Peter) is found, according to its sense, in (St.) Augustine, loc. cit., ch. 22, n. 43.
[7] Chapter 12, n. 15. — Codex A B D and E and edition 1 omit *be* [est] in *It must . . . known* [Sciendum vero]. Then in the same text of (St.) Augustine the codices, except D, and very many of the editions incongruously has the subjunctive form of *remembers* [meminerit] instead.
[8] Chapter 4, n. 4: « But just as there are a certain mind and its love, when it loves itself; so a certain two are the mind and its knowledge, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself and the love and its knowledge are a certain three, and these three are one thing [unum], and when they have been perfected, they are equals ». Those which follow have been taken from ch. 5, n. 8; concerning the last text see above in footnote 6, on p. 64.
[9] The codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9 have *the human spirit* [animo].
[10] (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk IX, ch. 12, n. 18, where there is read, moreover, many things that have been adjoined and changed. In which text codex C has *its* [eius] before *knowledge* [procedit]. Then the Vatican edition together with a few other editions has *cognizes itself it also loves* [cognoscit se et diligit] in place of *cognizing itself loves* [cognoscens se diligit]. With a few things

interjected, codices A D and E read *For it loves* [Amat enim] in place of *It also loves* [Amat etiam], but against the context, since a twofold love of the mind is being distinguished, that is "toward itself" and "toward its offspring".

[11] Loc. cit.

[12] (St.) Augustine, loc. cit, ch. 5, n. 9.

[13] Absent in the Vatican edition and a few other of the editions is *one* [unam]. And a little below this at *without wisdom* [absque sapientia] the Vatican edition against the authority of the codices and editions, having omitted the particle *not* and hence varied the sense, has *He is without wisdom like* [quasi] *a foolish thing*. In our and the true reading understand *He were* [esset] before *a foolish thing* [fatua: which order is reversed in the Latin].
At the end of the chapter codices A B and D have *it understood in this, that there is also* [intellexit ibi, etiam esse], which reading confirms the sense implied in our punctuation of the text.

Cap. IV.

De Trinitatis unitate.

« Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem, ut ait Augustinus in libro nono de Trinitate,[1] credamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum, universae creaturae conditorem et rectorem; nec Patrem esse Filium, nec Spiritum sanctum vel Patrem esse vel Filium, sed Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem personarum ». Ut enim ait ipse in libro de Fide ad Petrum:[2] « Una est natura sive essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, non una persona. Si enim sic esset una persona, sicut est una substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, veraciter trinitas non diceretur. Rursus quidem trinitas esset vera, sed unus Deus Trinitas ipsa non esset, si quemadmodum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti ». « Fides autem Patriarcharum, Prophetarum atque Apostolorum num Deum praedicat esse Trinitatem ».[3] « In illa igitur sancta Trinitate unus est Deus Pater, qui solus essentialiter de se ipso Filium unum genuit; et unus Filius est, qui de uno Patre solus essentialiter natus; et unus Spiritus sanctus, qui solus essentialiter a Patre Filioque procedit. Hoc autem totum non potest una persona, id est, gignere se et nasci de se et procedere de se ». Ut enim ait Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate:[4] « Nulla res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit ».

Chapter IV

On the unity of the Trinity

« Wherefore in accord with this consideration of his », as (St.) Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity,[1] « let us believe, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, the Founder and Ruler of each and every [universae] creature; that the Father is not the Son, nor that the Holy Spirit is the Father and/or the Son, but that (there is) a Trinity of Persons related to one another ». For as he himself says in the book On the Faith to Peter:[2] « One is the nature or essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, not one the person. For if there were one person thus, as there is one substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, truly it would not be called a trinity. Again it would be a true trinity indeed, but the one God would not be the Trinity itself, if in accord with the manner the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by the property of the persons, they had also been thus separated [discreti] by a diversity of natures ». « But did not the Faith of the Patriarch, Prophets and Apostles preach that God is the Trinity »?[3] « Therefore in that Holy Trinity one is God the Father, who essentially alone begot from Himself one Son; and one the Son, who from the one Father (is) alone born essentially; and one the Holy Spirit, who alone essentially proceeds from the Father and

the Son. But this Whole cannot be one person, that is, begetting itself and being born from itself and proceeding from itself ». For as (St.) Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity:[4] « There is no thing, which begets itself, to be ».

[1] Cap. 1. n. 1.
[2] Cap. 1. n. 4. — Auctor huius libri, S. Fulgentius, multo fusius de his tractat, in quo textu codd. C D E addendo *non* et mutando *sed* in *si* sic legunt: *Rursus quidem Trinitas non esset vera, si unus Deus Trinitas non esset: si quemadmodeum . . . Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti*. Sed haec lectio duplicem suppositionem et argumentationem confundit. In fine textus Vat. *fuissent quoque naturae* pro *fuissent naturarum quoque*.
[3] Loc. cit.; auctoritas sequens ibid. n. 6.
[4] Cap. 1. n. 1.

[1] Chapter 1, n. 1.
[2] Chapter 1, n. 4. — The author if this book. St. Fulgentius (of Ruspe), treats of this much more broadly, in which text codices C D and E by adding *not* and by changing *but* [sed] into *if* [si] thus read: *Again the Trinity would not indeed be a true one, if the one God were not the Trinity: if in accord with the manner . . . the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by the property of persons, they had also been thus separated from on another by a diversity of natures*. But this reading confounds a twofold supposition and argumentation. At the end of the text the Vatican edition has *they had also been . . . of nature* [fuissent quoque naturae] for *they had also been . . . of natures* [fuissent naturarum quoque].
[3] Loc. cit.; the following authority is ibid., n. 6.
[4] Chapter 1, n. 1.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. I.
De cognitione Dei per simillitudines longinquas.

ARTCULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio I.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART I.
On the cognition of God through distant similitudes

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 66-71.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 66-71.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Apostolus namque ait, quod invisibilia Dei etc.

For the Apostle also said, that the invisible things of God etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Superius egit Magister de sancta *Trinitate* et *Unitate*,[1] in quantum creditur. In hac secunda parte agit de ipsa, in quantum intelligutur. Et haec pars dividitur in tres partes, in quarum prima ad intelligendum Trinitatem adducit congruas similitudines et rationes. In secunda solvit emergentes dubitationes, infra distinctione quarta in principio: *Hic oritur quaestio satis necessaria. Constat* etc. In tertia, illis dubitationibus solutis, determinat Trinitatis et Unitatis proprietates et conditiones, infra distinctione Unitatis proprietates et conditiones, infra distinctione octava: *Nunc de veritate sive proprietate*[2] etc.

Item prima pars habet duas. In *prima* adducit similitudines longinquas; in *secunda* similitudines propinquas sive expressas, quae attenduntur in imagine, ibi: *Nunc vero iam ad eam perveniamus disputationem*.

Item *prima* pars habet duas partes. In prima ostendit Unitatem, in secunda Trinitatem, ibi: *Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt* etc. Prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima probat auctoritate Apostoli ad Romanos primo,[3] quod Deus est cognoscibilis per creaturam. In secunda vero adducit varios modos cognoscendi et rationes, ibi: *Nam sicut ait Ambrosius*. In tertia dicit, illos modos in auctoritate Apostoli implicari, ibi: *Ecce tot modis*. In quarta tangit, quid per praedictas rationes possit probari, scilicet essentiae unitas, non trinitas, ibi: *Haec autem omnia ad unitatem* etc.

Nunc[4] *restat ostendere, utrum* etc. Supra ostendit Magister per rationes divinae

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the Holy *Trinity* and *Unity*,[1] inasmuch as It is believed. In this second part he deals with It, inasmuch as It is understood. And this part is divided into three parts, in the first of which to understand the Trinity he adduces congruent similitudes and reasons. In the second he solves emerging doubts, below in the fourth distinction at the beginning: *Here there rises the sufficiently necessary question. It is established* etc.. In the third, having solved those doubts, he determines the properties and conditions of the Trinity and Unity, below in the eighth distinction: *Now concerning the truth or property*[2] etc..

Likewise the first part has two (parts). In *the first* he adduces distant similitudes; in *the second* near or express similitudes, which are tended towards in the image, there (where he says): *But now let us come presently to that disputation*.

Likewise *the first* part has two parts. In the first he shows the Unity, in the second the Trinity, there (where he says): *Now it remains to show, whether through those things which have been made* etc.. The first part has four smaller parts. In the first he proves by the authority of the Apostle in the first (chapter of the Letter) to the Romans,[3] that God is cognizable through a creature. But in the second he adduces various manners of cognizing and reasons, there (where he says): *For as (St.) Ambrose said*. In the third he says, that those manners are implied in the authority of the Apostle, there (where he says): *Behold in so many manners*. In the fourth he touches upon, what through the aforesaid reasons it can be proven, that is the unity of the essence, not the trinity, there (where he says): *Moreover all these things tend ultimately to manifest the unity* etc..

Now[4] *it remains to show, whether* etc.. Above Master (Peter) shows through

essentiae unitatem sive entitatem. In hac secunda parte ostendit Trinitatem similitudine longinqua, quae attenditur in vestigio, et habet hoc capitulum quatuor particulas. In prima ostendit Magister rationem vestigii in creatura. In secunda ostendit, quid respondeat vestigio in Creatore, quoniam trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet originis, pulchritudinis et delectationis, ut singula reddantur singulis, ibi: *In illa enim Trinitate summa*.

reasons the Unity or Entity of the Divine Essence. In this second part he shows the Trinity by a distant similitude, which is tended towards in the vestige, and this chapter has four smaller parts. In the first Master (Peter) shows the reason for the vestige in the creature. In the second he shows, what responds to the vestige in the Creator, since the trinity of appropriators, namely of origin, beauty and delectation, as singulars are rendered to singulars, there (where he says): *For in that Most High Trinity*.

[1] Absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. *et Unitate*.
[2] Cod. O hic addit: *Item prima pars habet duas partes, in quarum prima ostendit Magister, quod Deus est trinus et unus; in secunda, quia rationes et similitudines, quas adducit non sunt sufficientes ad plene intelligendum Trinitatem et Unitatem in divinis, concludit, hoc esse in dubio, in fine istius distinctionis: quapropter iuxta istam considerationem*.
[3] Vers. 20.
[4] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omissis verbis *Nunc restat* usque ad *entitatem* et mutata constructione, prosequitur: *Similiter secunda pars, in qua ostendit Trinitatem per similitudinem longinquam, quae attenditur in vestigio, habet quatuor particulas.*

[1] Without the authority of any manuscript or edition 1, the Vatican edition omits *and Unity*
[2] Here codex O adds: *Likewise the first part has two parts, in the first of which Master (Peter) shows, that God is triune and one; in the second, because the reasons and similitudes, which he adduces, are not sufficient to fully understand the Trinity and Unity in the divine, he concludes, that this is in doubt, at the end of that distinction of his: wherefore in accord with this consideration of his*.
[3] Verse 20.
[4] The Vatican edition against the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, having omitted the words *Now it remains . . . entity* and having changed the construction, proceeds: *Similarly the second part, in which he shows the Trinity through a distant similitude, which is tended towards in the vestige, has four smaller parts.*

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In tertia docet contemplari in Deo trinitatem per considerationem vestigii in creatura, ibi: *Per considerationem itaque creaturarum* etc., ubi ostendit trinitatem appropriatorum in Deo et quantum ad actum conditionis, et quantum ad actum reformationis. In quarta autem particula ostendit, quod consideratio Trinitatis per vestigium non est sufficiens, sed longinqua, ibi: *Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis*.

In the third he teaches one to contemplate the Trinity in God through a consideration of the vestige in the creature, there (where he says): *And so through a consideration of creatures* etc., where he shows the Trinity of Appropriators in God both as much as regards the act of condition, and as much as regards the act of reformation. But in the fourth smaller part he shows, that the consideration of the Trinity through the vestige is not sufficient, but distant, there (where he says): *Behold it has been shown, how among creatures*.

Nunc vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem. Haec[1] est secunda pars istius distinctionis, in qua Magister probat Trinitatem et Unitatem per similitudinem *propinquam* et expressam, cuiusmodi est *imago*. Et dividitur haec pars in duas: in

But now let us come presently to that disputation. This[1] is the second part of that distinction of his, in which Master (Peter) proves the Trinity and Unity through a *near* and express similitude, of which manner is *the image*. And this part is divided into two:

prima ostendit trinitatem et unitatem in Creatore per trinitatem et unitatem consideratam in potentiis animae; secunda vero in habitibus, ibi: *Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus*.

in the first he shows the Trinity and Unity in the Creator through the trinity and unity considered among the powers of the soul; but in the second among (its) habits, there (where he says): *There can also be distinguished in another manner and by other names*.

Prima iterum pars habet quatuor[2] particulas. In quarum prima ostendit, ubi quaerenda sit imago in anima, quoniam in parte superiori et in[3] tribus potentiis eius, scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate. In secunda vero tangit imaginis conditiones, quae sunt trinitas, unitas et aequalitas, ibi: *Haec ergo tria, ut ait Augustinus*. In tertia vero movet et solvit dubitationem, quae oritur ex praedictis: utrum scilicet anima sit suae potentiae, ibi: *Hic attendendum est diligenter*. In quarta autem docet cavere errorem, qui posset causari vel[4] oriri ex ostensione trinitatis creatae, quod omnimoda similitudo esset ad increatam; ubi ostendit, quod maxima est dissimilitudo imaginis ad Deum, ibi: *Verumtamen caveat*.

Again *the first* part has four[2] smaller parts. In the first of which he shows, where the image is be sought in the soul, since (it is) in the superior part and in[3] its three powers, that is in the memory, intelligence, and will. But in the second he touches upon the conditions of the image, which are trinity, unity and equality, there (where he says): *Therefore these three, as (St.) Augustine says*. But in the third he moves and solves the doubt, which rises out of the aforesaid: that is whether the soul is its powers, there (where he says): *Here it must be attended to diligently*. But in the fourth he teaches one to beware of the error, which can be caused and/or[4] rise from showing, that the created trinity [trinitatis creatae quod] is in every way a similitude to the uncreated; where he shows, that there is the greatest dissimilitude of the image to God, there (where he says): *However let one still beware*.

Potest etiam alio modo aliisque etc. Haec est *secunda* pars partis secundae huius distinctionis,[5] in qua intendit investigare Magister imaginem in habitibus animae secundum quod possibile est, et dividitur haec pars in quatuor particulas. *Primo* enim illa tangit, in quibus imago Trinitatis attenditur, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. *Secundo*, illis praetactis, ostendit, quod in his attenditur imago propter consubstantialitatem, ordinem et aequalitatem, ibi: *Haec autem tria cum sint* etc. *Tertia* ostendit, quomodo mens rationalis in contemplatione trinitatis creatae proficit ad videndam et cognoscendam Trinitatem increatam in Unitate, ibi: *Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria*. *Quarto* vero breviter recolligit quae supra sunt demonstrata, ibi: *Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem*.

There can also be distinguished in another manner and in other etc.. This is *the second* part of the second part of this distinction,[5] in which Master (Peter) intends to investigate the image in the habits of the soul according to what is possible, and this part is divided into four smaller parts. For *first* he touches upon those things, among which the image of the Trinity is tended towards, which are the mind, knowledge [notitia] and love [amor]. *Second*, having already touched upon them [praetactis], he shows, that in these the image is tended towards on account of consubstantiality, order and equality, there (where he says): *But these three, though they be* etc. *Third* he shows, in what manner the rational mind makes progress in the contemplation of the created trinity to see and cognize the uncreated Trinity in Unity, there (where he says): *And thus the rational mind, considering these three*. But *fourth* he

briefly recollects those things which have been demonstrated above, there (where he says): *Wherefore in accord with that consideration of his*.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae in hac parte prima praesentis distinctionis tanguntur, quatuor quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.

Secundum est, utrum sit cognoscibilis per creaturam.

Tertium est, utrum modus cognoscendi per creaturam conveniat homini quantum ad omnem statum, scilicet statum innocentiae, statum naturae lapsae et statum naturae glorificatae.

Quartum est, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturam.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For an understanding of those things which are touched upon in this first part of the present distinction, four things are asked.

The first is, whether God is cognizable by a creature.

The second is, whether He is cognizable through a creature.

The third is, whether the manner of cognizing (Him) through a creature befits [conveniat] man as much as regards his every state, namely the state of innocence, the state of fallen nature and the state of glorified nature.

The fourth is, what concerning God is cognizable through a creature.

ARTICULUS UNICUS

De cognoscibilitate Dei.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.

CIRCA **PRIMUM**, quod non sit Deus cognoscibilis a creatura, ostenditur:

1. Per *auctoritatem* Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus:[6] « Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est ».

2. Item ostenditur *ratione* per quadruplicem suppositionem, quam necesse est esse in cognitione, scilicet *proportionem*, *unionem* sive receptionem, *iudicium* et[7] *informationem*. Intellectus enim non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod sibi aliquo modo unitur, et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies intelligentiae informatur.

Ex *prima* suppositione arguitur sic: necesse est, esse proportionem cognoscentis ad cognoscibile;[8] sed Dei ad intellectum non est proportio, quia Deus / est infinitus, . . .

ARTICLE SOLE

On the cognizability of God

QUESTION I

Whether God is cognizable by a creature.

ABOUT **THE FIRST**, that God is not cognizable by a creature, is shown:

1. Through *the authority* of Dionysius (the Areopagite) On the Divine Names:[6] « It is possible neither to say nor to understand (what) God (is) ».

2. Likewise it is shown *by reason* through a fourfold supposition, which must necessarily be [quam necesse est esse] in cognition, that is *proportion*, *union* or reception, *judgment* and[7] *being informed* [informationem]. For the intellect does not understand except what is proportionable to it, and what is united to it in some manner, and of which it judges, and by which the insight [acies] of the intelligence is informed.

From *the first* supposition it is argued thus: it is necessary, that there be a proportion of the one cognizing to the thing cognizable;[8] but there is no proportion of God to the intellect, because God / is infinite, . . .

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[1] Vat. seiungendo duas praesentis distincitonis partes, sequentem expositionem litterae infra in

[1] The Vatican edition by separating the two parts of the present distinction, transposes the following

principio secundae partis huius distinctionis affert, sed contra mss. Immediate post Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 *huius* loco *istius*.

[2] Cod. O *habet sex particulas* et singulas enumerando, ubi de tertia agit, legit: *In tertia ad evidentiam dictorum docet, quomodo in dicta assignatione imaginis accipiatur mens et memoria, ibi: Mens autem hic pro animo*, deinde sub quarta et quinta exhibet tertiam et quartam in textu positam, ac demum addit: *In sexta particula docet, respectu cuius obiecti attenditur imago in dictis potentiis, ibi: Sciendum vero, quod haec trinitas mentis*.

[3] Vat. contra unanimem consensum mss. et ed. 1 omittit *in* et *eius*.

[4] Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *et* pro *vel*.

[5] Vat., omissi verbis Magistri variataque constructione, sic: *Similiter secunda pars, in qua . . . possibile est, dividitur in quatuor*; sed contra miss. et ed. 1.

[6] Cap. 1. circa medium: Quem neque intelligere poossiblie est neque dicere (ed Migne iuxta transl. Scoti Erigenae).

[7] Omittitur contra codd. et ed. 1 in Vat. *et*.

[8] Aristot., VI Ethic. c. 1: Si quidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis (scil. potentiis animae). — Paulo infra post *intellectum* subaudi *creaturae* sive *humanum*. Mox / codd. et edd. inter se dissident; multi codd. ut A F G K M S T W X Z bb ee post *infinitus* omittunt minus bene *et intellectus finitus*; plures ut H Y ff cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ponunt *sed* pro *et*, cod. R *vero*; tandem cod. ee post *intellectus* addit *noster*; nihil duximus immutandum. — Aristot., I de Caelo, text. 52 (c. 6): Ratio autem nulla est infiniti ad finitum.

exposition of the text below in the beginning of the second part of this distinction, but contrary to the manuscripts. Immediately after this the Vatican edition against the testimony of the codices and edition 1 has *of this* [huius] in place of *of this . . . of his* [istius].

[2] Codex O reads *has six smaller parts* and enumerating them singly, where it deals with the third, it reads: *In the third he teaches to evidence what is said, how in the aforesaid assignment of the image the mind and memory are interpreted, there (where he says): But the mind is here accepted for the human spirit* [animo], then under the fourth and fifth it exhibits the third and fourth points in the text, and finally adds: *In the sixth smaller part he teaches, in respect of which object the image is tended towards in the said powers, there (where he says): But it must be known, that this trinity of the mind*.

[3] The Vatican edition against the unanimous consensus of the manuscripts and edition 1 omits *in* and *its*.

[4] The Vatican edition, opposing the manuscripts and edition 1, in place of *and/or* [vel] has less well *and* [et].

[5] The Vatican edition, having omitted the words of Master (Peter) and varied the construction of the sentence, reads: *Similarly the second part, in which . . . is possible, is divided into four*; but this is against the manuscripts and edition 1.

[6] Chapter 1. about the middle of the text: Whom it is neither possible to understand nor speak of (Migne's ed., according to the translation of Scotus Erigena).

[7] In the Vatican edition *and* [et] is omitted contrary to the codices and edition 1.

[8] Aristotle, Ethics, Bk VI, ch. 1: If indeed out of a certain similitude and affinity cognition exists by them (scil. the powers of the soul). — A little below after *intellect* understand *of the creature* or *human*. [trans.: what follows pertains to the text on p. 68] Then / the codices and the editions disagree among themselves; many codices such as A F G K M S T W X Z bb and ee after *infinite* omit less well *and the finite intellect*; very many such as H Y ff together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 put *but* [sed] in place of *and* [et]; codex R has *but* [vero] at this point; following this codex ee before *intellect* adds *our*; we judge that nothing is to be changed. — Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, Bk. I, text. 52 (ch. 6): But there is no reckoning of the infinite to the finite.

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est infinitus, et intellectus finitus: ergo etc. *Praeterea*, si est aliqua proportio, videtur quod non sit sufficiens, quia plus distat verum increatum ab intellectu humano, quam quodlibet creatum intelligible a sensu.[1] Sed sensus, qui est perceptivus

is infinite, and the intellect finite: ergo etc.. *Furthermore*, if there is any proportion, it seems that it is not sufficient, because the truly uncreated is more distant from the human intellect, than any created intelligible (is) from sense.[1] But sense,

sensibilis, nunquam elevatur ad cognitionem intellegibilis creati: ergo nec intellectus unquam elevabitur ad cognitionem intelligibilis increati.

which is perceptive of the sensible, is never elevated to the cognition of the created intelligible: therefore neither shall the intellect ever be elevated to the cognition of the uncreated intelligible.

3. Item, ex *secunda* suppositione sic: necesse est, esse unionem cognoscibilis ad cognoscentem, ita quod unum sit in altero;[2] sed cognoscens non est in cognoscibili, sed e converso; sed impossibile est, infinitum capi ab ipso finito: ergo impossibile est esse in illo: ergo Deum esse in intellectu est impossibile, cum sit infinitus.

3. Likewise, thus from *the second* supposition: it is necessary, that there be a union of the cognizable and the one cognizing, so that one is in the other; [2] but the one cognizing is not in the cognizable, but just the opposite [e converso]; but it is impossible, that the infinite be seized by the finite itself: therefore it is impossible that it be in it: therefore that God is in the intellect is impossible, since He is infinite.

4. Item, ex *tertia* suppositione sic: ad cognitionem necesse est, esse in cognoscente iudicium de cognito; sed omne iudicans habet posse super iudicatum;[3] finitum autem non habet posse super infinitum: ergo de illo non iudicat; sed ad cognitionem requirebatur iudicium: ergo intellectus finitus non cognoscit Deum infinitum, super quem non habet posse.

4. Likewise, from *the third* supposition thus: for cognition it is necessary, that there be in the one cognizing a judgment of the cognized; but everything judging has an ability [posse] over the thing judged;[3] but the finite does not have an ability over the infinite: therefore it does not judge of it; but for cognition there was required judgment: therefore the finite intellect does not cognize the infinite God, over whom it has no ability.

5. Item, ex *quarta* sic: necesse est, intellectum cognoscentem informari a cognito;[4] sed omne quod alterum informat, aut informat per *essentiam*, aut per *similitudinem*; sed Deus non informat per essentiam, quia nulli unitur ut forma, nec per similitudinem abstractam, quia similitudo abstracta est spiritualior eo a quo abstrahitur; Deo autem nihil est spiritualius nec potest esse: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, from the *fourth* thus: it is necessary, that the cognizing intellect be informed by the cognized;[4] but everything which informs another, either informs through (its own) *essence*, or through a *similitude* (of it); but God does not inform (the intellect) through (His) essence, because as a form He is united to nothing, nor through an abstract similitude (of it), because an abstract similitude is more spiritual than that from which it is abstracted; but nothing is more spiritual than God nor can it be: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Anima rationalis est ad imaginem Dei. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate, et est in littera praesentis distinctionis:[5] « Eo mens est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest ». Capere autem non est secundum substantiam vel essentiam, quia sic est in omnibus creaturis: ergo per cognitionem et amorem: ergo Deus potest cognosci a

On the contrary: 1. The rational soul is (made) to the image of God. But as (St.) Augustine says in (his) book <u>On the Trinity</u>, and (as) it is (quoted) in the text of the present distinction:[5] « For that reason the mind is the image of God, by which it is able to seize [capax] God and can be a partaker (in Him) ». But seizing [capere] is not (here said) according to substance and/or

creatura.

2. Item, *ratione* ostenditur sic: omnis cognitio spiritualis fit ratione lucis, et ratione lucis increatae, ut dicit Augustinus in Soliloquiis; [6] sed lux est maxime cognoscibilis, et Deus est summa lux: ergo maxime est cognoscibilis ipsi animae: ergo etc.

3. Item, cum sit[7] cognitio aliquorum per praesentiam, aliquorum per similitudinem, illa cognoscuntur verius, quae cognoscuntur per praesentiam, ut dicit Augustinus;[8] sed Deus est unitus ipsi animae per praesentiam: ergo Deus verius cognoscitur quam alia, quae cognoscuntur per similitudinem.

4. Item, sicut se habet summa bonitas ad dilectionem, sic summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed summa bonitas est summe amabilis ab affectu: ergo[9] summa veritas est summe cognoscibilis ab intellectu.

5. Item, unumquodque efficacius potest in id ad quod naturaliter ordinatur;[10] sed intellectus noster naturaliter ordinatur ad cognitionem summae lucis: ergo illa maxime cognoscibilis est.

essence, because in this manner [sic] they are in all creatures: therefore (it is said) through cognition and love [amorem]: therefore God can be cognized by a creature.

2. Likewise, it is shown by *reason* thus: every spiritual cognition comes into being [fit] by reason of light, and by reason of uncreated light, as (St.) Augustine says in the Soliloquies;[6] but light is the most cognizable, and God is most high Light: therefore He is most cognizable to the soul itself: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, since there is[7] cognition of some things through presence, (and) of some things through similitude, those are more truly cognized, which are cognized through presence, as (St.) Augustine says;[8] but God is united to the soul itself through presence: therefore God is more truly cognized than other things, which are cognized through similitude.

4. Likewise, as most high Goodness is related to [se habet ad] goodness, so most high Truth (is) to cognition; but most high Goodness is most highly lovable by the affection [affectu]: therefore[9] most high Truth is most highly cognizable by the intellect.

5. Likewise, anything whatsoever [unumquodque] can be more efficacious unto that toward which it is naturally ordered;[10] but our intellect is naturally ordered to cognition of the most high light: therefore that (light) is most highly cognizable.

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[1] Ex mss. I X Z pro *sensibili*, quod Vat. cum plurimis mss. habet, substituimus *sensu*, quod contextui magis correpsondet formamque argumenti completiorem reddit ac confirmatur ex Richardo Med., hic a. 1. q.1 et Petro a Tar., hic q. 1, qui idem argumentum eodem modo proponut. Paulo ante cod. K *creato* pro *humano*. — De propositione minore huius argumenti cfr. Boeth., V. de Consol. Prosa 4.
[2] Colligitur ex eo, quod cognitio sit *acta immanens*, de qua vide Aristot., IX Metaph. text. 16 (VIII. 8.); et cupponitur ab Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 6. et 37-39. (c. 4 et 8.), ubi dicit, animam esse *locum formarum*, ipsam cognoscendo *quodammodo esse omnia*, in ipsa non esse *ipsas res, sed formas earum*

[1] From manuscripts I X and Z we have substituted in place of the *sensible*, which the Vatican edition has along with very many of the manuscripts, *sense*, which more corresponds to the context and renders the form of the argument more complete, and is confirmed from Richard of Middletown's (text), here at a. 1. q. 1, and from (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, who likewise expound the argument in the same manner. A little before this codex K has *created* place of *human*. — Concerning the minor proposition of this argument, cf. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V., Discourse 4.
[2] It is gathered from this, that cognition is an *immanent act*, concerning which see Aristotle,

intellectumque esse *formam formarum*.

[3] August., de Vera Relig. c. 29. n. 53: Iudicare de corporibus non sentientis tantum vitae, sed etiam rationcinantis est... I am vero illud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse iudicantem, quam ill ares est, de qua iudicatur. — Cod. X hic addit *sicut dicit Augustinus*.

[4] Textus Aristot. de hac re vide supra in arg. ex secunda suppositione. — De duplici modo informationis, scil, *per essentiam* et *per similitudinem* cfr. infra fundam. 3. — Mox post *Deus non informat* supple sum cod. R *intellectum*.

[5] Cap. 2 circum initium. In ipso textu Augustini mss. cum ed. 1 habent *et* pro *eiusque*, quod habet Vat. cum originali. — Paulo infra post *autem* cod. O addit *hic*.

[6] Sensus, non verba Augustinis allegantur ex I. Sollioq. c. 8, ubi sic habetur: Credendum est, ea (intelligibila disciplinarum spectamina) non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustremur (qui sol, ut ex ibi sequentibus patet, ipse *secretissimus Deus est*). — Vat. hoc argumentum mutilate exhibet, omittendo scilicet in propositione maiore *et ratione lucis*, et in minore *Deus est summa lux, ergo maxime est cognosciblis*.

[7] Substituimus ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *sit* pro *fiat*.

[8] Forte repiciuntur illa quae X. de Trin. c. 8-11. habentur, ubi ostentidur, animam eo ipso, quod sibi sit praesens, certiorem cognitionem habere de se quam de rebus exterioribus, quas per imagines sive similitudines percipit; vel etiam haec VIII. de Trin. c. 8 n. 12: Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere, quam fratrem; plane notiorem, quia praesentiorem, notiorem, quia interiorem, notiorem, quia certiorem. Quae verba S. Bonaventura infra d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. tali explicat modo, qui sensum huius argumenti illustrat. Cfr. etiam libr. de Magistro, c. 12. n. 39. 40 et de Videndo Deo, c. 16. n. 38, ubi et duplex cognoscendi modus, scilicet per praesentiam et per similitudinem proponitur. — Plures antiquiorum mss. ut C I M S T V Y etc. post *cognoscuntur*, licet non falso, tamen propter argumenti formam minus bene *per essentiam* loco *per praesentiam*; melius codd. L O *per essentiam vel praesentiam*. Paulo post cod. Y *illa* pro *alia*.

[9] Ed. 1 satis bene addit particulam *et*.

[10] Cfr. Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11. — Cod. C hanc propositionem ita exhibet; *unumquodque est efficacius, quando potest in id*. In fine argumenti cod. X addit *ipsi animae*; melius placeret *intellectui nostro*.

Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 16 (VIII. 8.); and it is supposed from Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 6 and 37-39. (c. 4 and 8), where he says, that the soul is *a place of forms*, by cognizing that *it is in a certain sense all things*, (and that) in it there are not *things themselves, but forms of them* and that the intellect is *the form of forms*.

[3] (St.) Augustine, On the True Religion, c. 29, n. 53: To judge of the bodies not only of sentient life, but also of reasoning is . . . But it is already very easy to see that, more present is the one judging, than is that thing, of which it is judged. — Codex X here adds *as (St.) Augustine says*.

[4] See the text of Aristotle on this matter above in the argument from the second supposition. — Concerning the twofold manner of informing, namely, *through essence* and *through similitude*, cf. below at the bottom of 3. — Then after *God does not inform* supply with codex R *the intellect*. [5] About the beginning of chapter 2. In the text itself of (St.) Augustine the manuscripts together with edition 1 have *and* [et] in place of *and . . . of Him* [eiusque], which the Vatican edition together with the original has. — A little below, after *But* codex O adds *here*.

[6] The sense, not the words of (St.) Augustine chosen from his Soliloquies, Bk. I, ch. 8, where it is had thus: It must be believed, that those things (the intelligible considerations of the disciplines) cannot be understood, unless we be brightened by something like our sun (which sun, as is clear from what follows here, *is God* Himself *most secret*). — The Vatican edition has this text in mutilated from, that is, by omitting in the major proposition *and by reason of the light*, and in the minor *God is the most high Light, therefore He is most cognizable*.

[7] We have substituted, as a support from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, *is* [sit] in place of *becomes* [fiat].

[8] Perhaps these words refer to those which are hand in On the Trinity, Bk. X, ch. 8-11, where it is shown, that the soul by itself, because it is present to itself, has a more certain cognition of itself than of exterior things, which it perceives through images or similitudes; and/or also to those which are had in On the Trinity, Bk. VIII, ch. 8, n. 12: Behold one can already have God more known [notiorem] (to him), than a brother; plainly more known, because more present, more known, because more interior, more known, because more certain. Which words St. Bonaventure explains in this manner below in d. 17. p. I., dub. 2, as he illustrates the sense of this argument. Cf. also his book On the Teacher, ch. 12, n. 39 and 40 and On Seeing God, ch. 16, n. 38, where there is also proposed (this) twofold manner of cognizing, namely through presence and through similitude. — Very many of the more ancient manuscripts, as C I M S T V Y etc. after *are cognized*, though not incorrectly, have, however, what is not as good on account of the form of the argument, placing *through essence* for *through presence*; codices L and O have the better *through essence and/or presence*. A little after this codex Y has *those* in place of *other things*.

[9] Edition 1 adds *and* well enough.

[10] Cf. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, Discourse 11. — Codex C exhibits this proposition thus: *anything is more efficacious, when it can be unto that*. At the end of the argument codex X adds *to the soul itself*; it would be more pleasing to say *to our intellect*.

CONCLUSIO

Deus, in se summe cognoscibilis, etiam nobis esset summe cognoscibilis, si non esset defectus ex parte intellectus nostri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus in se tanquam summa lux est summe cognoscibilis; et tanquam lux summe intellectum nostrum complens,[1] et quantum est de se, esset summe cognoscibilis etiam nobis, nisi esset aliquis defectus a parte virtutis cognoscentis; qui quidem non tollitur perfecte nisi per deiformitatem gloriae. Concedendae sunt igitur rationes,[2] quod Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura et etiam clarissime cognoscibilis, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid esset impediens vel deficiens ex parte intellectus, sicut post patebit.[3]

1. Ad obiecta in contrarium dicendum, quod est cognitio per *comprehensionem* et per *apprehensionem*. Cognitio per apprehensionem consistit in manifestatione veritatis rei cognitae; cognitio vero comprehensionis consistit in inclusione totalitatis.[4] Ad *primam* cognitionem requiritur proportio convenientiae; et talis est in anima respectu Dei, quia « quodam modo est anima omnia »,[5] per assimilationem ad omnia, quia nata est cognoscere omnia, et maxime est capax Dei per assimilationem, quia est imago et similitudo Dei. Quantum ad cognitionem *comprehensionis* requiritur proportio aequalitatis et aequiparantiae; et talis non est in anima respectu Dei, quia anima est finita, sed Deus est infinitus; et ideo hanc non habet; et de hac intelligit Dionysius, et de illa currit[6] obiectio, de alia vero non.

CONCLUSION

God, most highly cognizable in Himself, would be also most highly cognizable to us, if it were not for a defect on the part of our intellect.

I respond: It must be said, that God in Himself as the most high Light is most highly cognizable; both as the Light most highly completing our intellect,[1] and as much as it concerns Him [est de se], He would be most highly cognizable even to us, unless there were some defect on the part [a parte] of the virtue of the one cognizing; which indeed is not borne away perfectly except through the deiformity of glory. Therefore the reasons must be conceded (which prove): [2] that God is cognizable by a creature and also most clearly cognizable, as much as it concerns Him, unless there was some impediment and/or deficient (thing) on part of the intellect, as will be clear afterwards.[3]

1. To the objections in the Contrary it must be said, that there is cognition through *comprehension* and through *apprehension*. Cognition through apprehension consists in the manifestation of the truth of a thing cognized; but cognition of comprehension consists in the inclusion of the totatilty.[4] For the *first* cognition there is required a proportion of convenience; and such is in the soul in respect to God, because « in a certain manner the soul is all things »,[5] through assimilation to all things, because it has been born [nata est] to cognize all things, and it is most able to seize [capax] God through assimilation, because it is the image and similitude of God. As much as regards the cognition of *comprehension* there is required a proportion of equality and comparison [aequiparantiae]; and such is not in the soul in respect to God, because the soul is finite, but God is infinite; and for

that reason it does not have this; and this is what Dionysius understands, and what the objection is speaking [currit] about,[6], but not about the other.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia intelligibilis et sensibilis; dicendum, quod[7] est distantia secundum rationem *entis*, et secundum rationem *cognoscibilis*. Primo modo est maior distantia; secundo modo non, quia utrumque est intelligibile, scilicet Deus et anima. Non sic est de intellectu et sensu; quia sensus est potentia determinata,[8] sed intellectus non.

2. To that which is objected concerning the distance of the intelligible and the sensible; it must be said, that there is[7] distance according to the reckoning of *being* [entis], and according to the reckoning of the *cognizable*. In the first manner there is greater distance; in the second manner not (so), because each of the two is intelligible, that is God and the soul. Not so it is concerning the intellect and the sense; because the sense is a determinate potency,[8] but the intellect not (so).

3. Ad illud, quod infinitum non capitur a finito; dicunt aliqui, quod capere infinitum est dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad *essentiam*; et sic capitur; et quantum ad *virtutem*;[9] et sic non capitur, sicut punctus a linea totus attingitur secundum substantiam, sed non totaliter secundum virtutem. Sed ista solutio non videtur solvere, quia in Deo idem est essentia quod virtus, et utraque est infinita.

3. To that, that the infinite cannot be seized by the finite; some say that to seize the infinite is (spoken of) in a twofold manner, that is as much as regards *essence*; and thus (the infinite) is seized; and as much as regards *virtue*;[9] and thus it is not seized, as a point as a whole is touched by a line according to substance, but not totally according to virtue. But that solution of theirs does not seem to solve (the matter), because in God that which is the virtue is the same as the essence, and each of the two is infinite.

Ideo dicendum, quod duplex est infinitum: unum, quod se habet per oppositionem ad simplex; et tale non capitur a finito, quale est infinitum molis; aliud est, quod habet infinitatem cum simplictate, ut Deus; et tale infinitum , quia *simplex*, est ubique totum, quia *infinitum*, in nullo sic est, quin extra illud sit. Sic intelligendum est in cognitione Dei. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si cognoscitur totus, quod comprehendatur, quia intellectus eius totalitatem non includit, sicut nec creatura[10] immensitatem.

For that reason it must be said, that twofold is the infinite: one, which has itself through opposition to the simple; and such is not seized by (that) finite, which is an infinite mass [molis]; the other is, what has infinity together with simplicity, as God (does); and such an infinite, because (it is) *simple*, is everywhere whole, because (as an) *infinite*, it is thus in nothing, which it is not outside of. So it must be understood in the cognition of God. And for that reason it does not follow, that if the whole is cognized, that it is comprehended, because the intellect does not include His totality, just as the creature (does) not (contain[10] His) immensity.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: Iudicans habet posse etc.; dicendum, quod iudicare de aliquo est dupliciter: primo[11] modo *discernendo*, utrum sit vel non sit; et hoc modo convenit iudicium omni intellectui cognoscenti respectu omnis obiecti; alio modo *approbando* vel reprobando, utrum ita debeat esse; et sic non iudicat de veritate, sed secundum ipsam de aliis, sicut dicit

4. To that which is objected: The one judging has an ability etc.; it must be said, that to judge of anything is (spoken of) in a twofold manner: in the first[11] manner by *discerning*, whether it is and/or is not; and in this manner judgment befits every intellect cognizing in respect to every object; in another manner by *approving* and/or reproving, whether it ought to be

Augustinus de Vera Religione,[12] quod iudex non iudicat de lege, sed secundum ipsam iudicat de aliis ». Et de hoc modo verum est quod dicit Augustinus, quod « nullus de illa veritate iudicat, nullus tamen sine illa iudicat ». Et de hoc secundo[13] modo verum est quod opponit, quod iudicans potest super iudicatum; de primo vero non est verum, quod possit super; potest tamen dirigi ut in obiectum adminiculo illius.

«thus [ita]; and so it does not judge of truth, but of other things according to it, as (St.) Augustine says On the True Religion,[12] that « a judge does not judge of the law, but judges of other things according to it ». And of this manner it is true what (St.) Augustine says, that « no one judges of that truth, no one, however, judges without it ». And of this second[13] manner it is true that it opposes (the thesis), that the one judging can (be) above the thing judged; but of the first it is not true, that it can be above; however it can be directed as unto an object for its support.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de informa- / -tione

5. To that which is lastly objected concerning informa- / -tion:

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[1] Hoc est, illuminando perficiens. — Immediate post Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omitit *et*, sed minus bene; et paulo post substituit *deiformationem* pro *deiformitatem*.
[2] Supple cum codd. N V *quae probant*. Paulo infra VAt. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *aliud* loco *aliquid*, sed minus apte.
[3] In duabus seqq. qq. et II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.
[4] August., de Videndo Deo, c. 9. n. 21. ait: Aliud est enim videre, aliud et totum videndo comprehendere. Quandoquidem id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur: totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt.
[5] Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).
[6] Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *currit* pro *certat*.
[7] Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit Vat. *duplex*.
[8] Hoc est, propter alligationem ad organum seu propter materialitatem est ad unum obiectorum genus percipiendum limitata. De hac sensus et intellectus differentia vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3-6. (c. 4).
[9] Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *virtuositatem*.
[10] Cod. R hic addit *eius*
[11] Ed. 1 *uno*. Mox cod. O post *non sit* addit *et quod hoc sit*.
[12] Cap. 31 n. 58: Sicut in istis temporalibus legibus, quamquam de his homines iudicent, cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institutae atque firmatae, non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas. — Loco citato inveniuntur etiam verba, quae immediate post S. Doctor ex Augustino affert: Ut enim nos et omnes animae rationales secudnum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus, sic de nobis, quando ei cohaeremus, sola ipsa veritas iudicat . . . ita etiam quantum potest lex ipsa, etiam ipse (homo spiritualis et Deo coniunctus) fit, secundum quam iudicat omnia, de qua iudicare nullius potest. — Plures codd. ut H W Y, omissa particula *de*, legunt *Et hoc modo*.
[13] Posuimus in textu *hoc secundo modo* et paulo post *de primo modo non est verum*, licet alii codd. ut D G H Y etc. pro *hoc secundo modo* habeant *de hoc primo modo*, alii ut F T bb *de primo modo*, alii ut A

[1] That is, perfecting by illuminating. — Immediately after this the Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and six first editions, omits *and* [et], but less well; and a little after this it substitutes *deiformation* [deiformationem] for *deiformity* [deiformitatem].
[2] Supply together with codices N and V *which prove* [which prove]. A little below this the Vatican edition not trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 has *another thing* [aliud] in place of *something* [aliquid], but less aptly.
[3] In the two following questions and in Sent., Bk. II. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
[4] (St.) Augustine, On Seeing God, ch. 9, n. 21, says: For it is one thing to see, and another to comprehend the whole by seeing. Since when that, which is in whatever manner [utcumque] sensed as present, is seen: the whole, however, is comprehended by seeing, because it is seen to such a degree [ita], that nothing of it lies hidden (to) the one seeing it, or that the ends of it can be circumspected.
[5] Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 37, (ch. 8).
[6] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted the idiomatic *is speaking* [currit] for *disputes* [certat].
[7] Not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican edition adds here *a twofold*.
[8] That is, on account of its binding to an organ or on account of its materiality it is limited to perceiving one genus of objects. On this difference of sense and intellect see Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 3-6, (ch. 4).
[9] The Vatican edition against the codices and edition 1 has *virtuosity* [virtuositatem].
[10] Codex R adds here *His* [eius].
[11] Edition 1 has *one* [uno]. Then codex O after *is not* adds *and what it is*.
[12] Ch. 31, n. 58: As is those temporal laws of theirs, although men judge of them, when they have instituted them, however when they have been instituted and made firm, it will not be licit for a judge to judge of them, but according to them. — In the place cited there are also found the words, which the Seraphic Doctor quotes from (St.) Augustine

cum Vat. *de hoc modo* et paulo post omnes codd. legant *de secundo vero non est verum*. Ex contextu siquidem constat, lectiones codicum esse erroneas; quod confirmatur etiam ex Augustino loc. cit. circa finam, ubi iisdem fere verbis eadem proponit ac S. Bonaventura. Scriptores in errorem videntur esse inducti ex eo, quod isti duo numeri ponendi sint ordine inverso. — Codd. aa bb satis bene *posse habet* loco *potest*. Circa finem huius responsionis post *dirigi* supplevimus ex mss. et sex primis edd. *ut*.

immediately afterwards: For as we and all rational souls rightly judge, according to the truth, of inferior things, so of us, when we cleave to it, truth itself alone judges . . . thus as much as it can also (be) a law, (the man who is spiritual and conjoined to God) also himself becomes (that), according to which he judges all things, of which (law) he can judge of nothing. — After this passage, very many codices as H W and Y, having omitted the particle *of*, read *And in this manner*.

[13] We have placed in the text *this second manner* and a little after this *of the first manner it is not true*, though other codices as D G H and Y etc. have *of this first manner* for *this second manner* (sic), others as F T and bb have *of the first manner*, others as A together with the Vatican edition have *of this manner* and a little after this all the codices read *but of the second it is not true*. Even if from the context it is established, that the readings of the codices are erroneous; this is also confirmed from (St.) Augustine loc. cit., near the end, where in nearly the same words he proposes the same thing as St. Bonaventure. The writers seem to have been lead into error from this, that those two numbers have been placed in inverse order. — The codices aa and bb have in the last sentences of this paragraph *has an ability to* [posse habet] in place of *can*, well enough. Near the end of this response after *be directed* we have supplied from the manuscripts and the six first editions *as* [ut].

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informa- / -tione; dicendum, quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso absrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen,[1] dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velutis similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem. Et hoc dicit Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo undecimo:[2] « Quemadmodum, cum per sensus coporum discimus corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro: ita cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei; illa notitia tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est ».

information; it must be said, that God is present to the soul itself and to every intellect through truth; for that reason it is not necessary, that there be abstracted from Him a similitude, through which He is cognized; nevertheless, however,[1] while He is cognized by the intellect, the intellect is informed by a certain knowledge [quadam notitia], which is as a certain similitude, not abstracted, but impressed, inferior to God, because it is inferior in nature, superior, however, to the soul, because it makes it better. And this (St.) Augustine says in the ninth (book) On the Trinity, in chapter eleven:[2] « In accord with the manner, when through the sensation [sensus] of bodies we learn about bodies, there comes into being [fit] some similitude of them in our soul: thus when we know [novimus] God, there comes into being some similitude of God; that knowledge [notitia], however, is inferior, because it is inferior in nature ».

SCHOLION.

I. Verba S. Doctoris in 2 fund., quod ratione

SCHOLIUM

I. The words of the Seraphic Doctor at the

lucis increatae fit omnis spiritualis cognitio, et infra ad 5, quod Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem, aliaque similia plurima, quae praesertim in Itinerario mentis in Deum et in Hexaemeron leguntur, a Malebranche aliisque multis ita intellecta sunt, ut S. Bonaventuram cum ipsis docere putaverint, intellectum humanum videre res intelligibiles obscure quidem, sed immediate in Verbo sive in rationibus aeternis. Sed haec sententia, sicut non postes conciliari cum Decreto S. Congr. Inquisitionis (18. Sept. 1861), quo reprobatur propositio: « Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem est ipsum lumen intellectuale »; ita etiam manifeste contradicit exploratae nostri Doctoris doctrinae. Ipse enim docet, nec hominem in statu innocentiae, nec ipsos Angelos naturalibus suis viribus *immediatam* aliquam Dei visonem sive cognitionem habere posse. Quoad Angelos cfr. II. S. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, ubi inter alia dicit: « Divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccesibilis viribus omnis creaturae »; quoad homines in statu integritatis cfr. II. Sen. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, qui locus est omnino peremptorius. Reiectis enim variis opinionibus, diffuse ibi docetur, in solo statu *gloriae* videri Deum immediate et in sui substantia et sine obscuritate; « in statu vero innocentiae et naturae lapsae videtur Deus *mediante speculo*, sed differenter, quia in statu innocentiae videbatur Deus *per speculum clarum*; nulla enim erat in anima peccati nebula; in statu vero miseriae videtur per speculum obscuratum per peccatum primi hominis; et ideo nunc videtur *per speculum et in aenigmate* ». Reprobatur ibi etiam sententia eorum, qui saltem « exilem » quendam gradum immediate Deum videndi viris contemplativis pro hac vita a Deo concedi putarunt. Concludit his verbis valde notandis: « Unde si quae auctoritates illud dicere inveniantur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videatur *in sua essentiae, sed quod in aliguo effectu inferiori cognoscitur* »* etc. — Idem docetur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 3 et simul refutatur distinctio, quam quidam faciunt inter *claritatem* Dei eiusque *naturam*, quia « ipsa

bottom of On the Contrary, n. 2, that every spiritual cognition comes into being by reason of the uncreated light, and below in reply n. 5, that God is present to every intellect through truth, and the other, very many, similar (words) which are read chiefly in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum and the Hexaëmeron, have been understood by Malebranche and many others in such a way, that they thought St. Bonaventure was teaching with them, that the human intellect indeed sees intelligible things obscurely, but immediately in the Word or in eternal reasons. But this sentence, as one cannot reconcile it with the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition (Sept. 18, 1861), by which there is reproved the proposition: « The immediate cognition of God, at least habitually, is essential to the human intellect, so that without this it cannot cognize anything, even if it is the intellectual light itself »; (which) also so manifestly contradicts the established [exploratae] doctrine of our Doctor. For he himself teaches, that not man in the state of innocence, nor the Angels themselves by their own natural powers can have any *immediate* vision or cognition of God. In regard to the Angels cf. II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, where among other things he says: « The divine light on account of its own eminence is inaccessible to the powers of every creature »; in regard to men in the state of integrity cf. II. Sent., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, which passage entirely refutes (the said proposition). For having rejected various opinions, there is taught there at great length, that only in the state of *glory* is God seen immediately and in His substance and without obscurity; « but in the state of innocence and of fallen nature God is seen *by means of a mirror*, but differently, because in the state of innocence God was seen *through a clear mirror*; for there was no cloud of sin in the soul; but in the state of misery He is seen through a mirror obscured through the sin of the first man; and for that reason He is now seen *through a mirror and in an enigma* [aenigmtate] ». There is also reproved there the sentence of those, who think that there is at least conceded by God in this life to contemplative men a certain, exilic grade of seeing God immediately. He concludes with

natura est claritas et claritas natura », et « non differt essentia luminis et actus lucendi ». Et q. 2. dicitur, quod Deus, si immediate cognoscitur, « iam non secundum partem, sed totus cognoscitur ». Cfr etiam I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. aliique loci passim. Plura vide apud Em. Card. Zigliara: Della Luce intellettuale II. c. 14-18; P. Lepidi: Examen. philos. theol. de Ontologismo c. 17; et ex nostris, P. Ludovicus a Castroplanio: Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae, Romae 1874. p. 61. et seqq.

these words (which) must be strongly noted: « Whence if there is found authorities which say this, that God is seen and distinguished [cernit] by man in the present (life), they are not to be understood, that He is seen *in His essence, but that in some inferior effect He is cognized* »[*] etc. — The same is taught in III. Sent., d. 14, a. 1, q. 3 and there is at the same time refuted the distinction, which certain ones make between the *clarity* of God and His *nature*, because « the very nature is the clarity and the clarity the nature » and « the essence of the light does not differ from the act of lighting ». And in q. 2 there is said, that God, if He is immediately cognized, « now not accord to a part, but the whole is cognized » Cf. also I. Sent., d. 17, p. I, dubium n. 2, and other places passim. See the many things said in Cardinal Zigliara's, Della Luce intellecttuale, II. c. 14-18; Father Lepidus', Examen. philos. theol. de Ontologismo, ch. 17; and among our own, Father Luigi of Castroplanio's, Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae, Rome 1874, p. 61 ff.

S. Doctor omnino contrarius est etiam errori Averroistarum, qui unitatem intellectus agentis in omnibus hominibus statuebant. Affirmat enim, quod « hic error destruit totum ordinem vivendi et agendi » (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III. col. 475.), et manifestissime docet, in anima humana, quae ad imaginem Dei creata est, essentialiter esse potentiam intellectualem, quae propriam et activam virtutem ad eliciendos varios actus intellectuales habet; unde lumen quoddam creatum apte vocari potest. Hoc docet II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4; et p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi dicit, quod « ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum leges eternas, sed etiam habet iudicare secundum lumen proprium et secundum lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum ». Cfr. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, et passim; cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2 et p. II. q. 69. m. 2. a. 3.

The Seraphic Doctor is also contrary to the error of the Averroists, who supported the unity of the agent intellect in all men. For he affirms, that « this error destroyed the whole order of living and acting » (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III. col. 475.), and he most manifestly teaches, that in the human soul, which has been created to the image of God, there is essentially an intellectual potency, which has its own proper [propram] and active virtue to elicit various intellectual acts; whence it can be aptly called a certain [quoddam] created light. This he teaches in II. Sent., d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4; and p. II, a. 1, q. 1, where he says, that « the superior reason does not only have to judge according to eternal laws, but it also has to judge according to its own [proprium] light and according to the light acquired by itself from the lesser (intellect) ». Cf. d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6; Hexaëmeron. Serm. 12, ff; cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 27, m. 1, a. 2 and p. II, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3.

Licet ergo *immediatum* et *proximum* principium actuum intellectualium sit animae potentia, sive lumen creatum naturaliter menti inditum, tamen iuxta

Therefore, though the *immediate* and *proximate* principle of intellectual acts is the potency of the soul, or a created light naturally conferred by the mind, however in

sententiam scholasticorum communem veritas, *certitudo* et *infallibilitas* cognitionis humanae refundi debet in primam et increatum veritatem, quae est omnium rerum et intellectuum prima causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis. Unde recte dicitur, quod intellectus creatus omnia vera cognoscat *in rationibus aeternis*, non ut *in obiecto prius cognito*, sed ut in *cognitionis principio*, sive ut verbis Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1 ad 1.) utamur, non *in* rationibus, sed *per* eas. Ita S. Thom., S. I. q. 84. a. 5; q. 88. a. 3. ad 1; a. 12. a. 11. ad 3; q. 16. a. 6. ad 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 7. ad 9; S. c. Gent. III. c. 47; de Veritate q. 1. a. 4; q. 10. a. 11. ad 12; Quodl. 10. q. 4. a. 7. et alibi. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. ad 1. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. a. 4. praesertim n. 18-23. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 4; aliiquie multi.

accord with the sententia communis of the scholastics, the *truth*, *certitude* and *infallibility* of human cognition ought to be traced back [refundi] into the prime and uncreated Truth, which is the first efficient, exemplar, and final cause of all things and intellects. Whence it is rightly said, that the increated intellect cognizes all truth things *in eternal reasons*, not as in *an object cognized beforehand*, but as in *the principle of cognition*, or in the words of Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1 reply to n. 1), not *in* reasons, but *through* them. Thus St. Thomas, Summa, I., q. 84, a. 5; q. 88, a. 3, reply to n.1; q. 12, a. 11. reply to n. 3; q. 16, a. 6, reply to n. 1; IV. Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 7, reply to n. 9; Summa contra Gentiles III., ch. 47; de Veritate, q. 1, a. 4; q. 10, a. 11, reply to n. 12; Quodlibetales Quaestiones, n. 10, q. 4, a. 7, and elsewhere. — Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III., q. 27, m. 1, a. 2, reply to n. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, I. Sent., d. 3, a. 4, chiefly nn. 18-23. — Richard of Middleton, II. Sent., d. 24, a. 2, q. 4; and many others.

Fundamentalis huius doctrinae ratio, quae communiter ab antiquis scholasticis proponitur, haec est, quod increatae Veritatis lux secundum similitudinem refulget in *veritate creata*, sive haec accipiatur in sensu obiectivo, sive subiectivo. De veritate creata in sensu obiectivo dicit S. Bonav. (Hexaem. Serm. 12.): « In qualibet creatura est refulgentia divini exemplaris, sed cum tenebris permixta ». In sensu subiectivo veritas creata est ipsum mentis lumen creatum, quod est impressio quaedam primae veritatis, cuius similitudo refulget in intellectu nostro, qui, ut imago Dei, « fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini » (S. Bonav. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1; cfr. St. Thom. Expos. in Psal. 34; S. I. q. 105. a. 3.).

The *fundamental* reason for this doctrine, which is commonly proposed by the ancient scholastics, is this, that the light of the uncreated Truth according to a similitude glitters in *created truth*, either this is accepted in the objective sense, or in the subjective (sense). Of created truth in the objective sense St. Bonaventure says (Hexaëmeron, Sermon 12): « in every creature there is a refulgence of the divine exemplar, but thoroughly mixed together with shadows ». In the subjective sense created truth is the created light itself of the mind, which is a certain [quaedam] impression of prime truth, whose similitude glitters in our intellect, which as the image of God, « bears in itself from its origin the light of the divine countenance » (St. Bonaventure, II. Sent d. 16, a. 1, q. 1; cf. St. Thomas, Expositio in Psalmis, ps. 34; Summa I., q. 105, a. 3).

Ratio secunda est , quod Deus non tantum lumen intellectus ad exemplar divinum creat et conservat, sed etiam ad actus eiusdem concurrit, dum immediate eum movet et dirigit. Etiam hac ratione actus intellectuales a Deo dependere et in eum debere aliquo modo refundi, est sententia communis antiquorum scholasticorum; cfr.

The second reason is, that God not only creates and conserves the light of the intellect according to the divine exemplar, but also concurs to its acting, while He immediately moves and directs it. Even by this reckoning, that the intellectual acts depend from God and ought in some manner be traced back [refundi] into Him, is

S. Thom., S. I. q. 105. a. 3; I. II. q. 10. a. 4. — Scot., pluribus in locis, collectis ab Hieron. de Montefortino in Sum. Scoti, Romae, 1728, p. I. q. 105. a. 3-5. — Iste concursus divinus non immerito quaedam illuminatio Dei immediata vocari potest, uti bene docent Em. Card. Zigliara in opere: Philosophie der Vorzeit t. I. 1. Abth. n. 60; cfr. etiam S. Thom. in Ian. c. 1 lect. 3. n. 2; S. III. q. 5. a. 4. ad 2; S. I. q. 79. a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5. ad 9; Opusc. 73 supra Boeth. q. 1. et alibi.

the sententia communis of the ancient scholastics; cf. St. Thomas, Summa I., q. 105, a. 3; I. II., q. 10, a. 4. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in the very many places, collected by Jerome of Montefortino in Summa Scoti, Romae, 1728, p. I. q. 105. a. 3-5. — That divine concursus can not unworthily be called a certain immediate illumination of God, as his Eminence Cardinal Zigliara teaches in the work: Philosophie der Vorzeit t. I. 1. Abth. n. 60; cf. also St Thomas, in Ioannem ch. 1, reading 3, n. 2; Summa III., q. 5, a. 4, reply to 2; Summa I., q. 79, a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima, a. 5, reply to n. 9; Opuscula 73 on Boethius, q. 1. and elsewhere.

Hanc cooperationem divinam sive illuminationem multum urgent et S. August. et S. Bonav. Mens Doctoris Seraphici de / hac re,

The mind of both St. Augustine and the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure, greatly stress this divine cooperation or illumination concerning / this point,

[1] Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus *tamen*.
[2] Num. 16; in quo textu plures codd. ut A G I T Y Z aa bb cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *discutimus*, codd. F K X *discernimus* loco *discimus*, ac mox plurimi codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S T U V W Y aa ee ff *similitudine* pro *similitudo Dei*.

[1] From the manuscripts and edition 1, 2, 3 and 6 we have added *however*.
[2] Num. 16; in which text very many of the codices as A G I T Y Z aa bb together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have *we discuss*; codex F K and X have *we discern* in place of *we learn*, and just after this very many of the codices as A C F G H K L O R S T U V W Y aa ee and ff have *by some similitude* [aliqua similitudine] for *a similitude of God* [similitudo Dei].

* [Trans.: Id est, in ordine naturale; Christus enim Iesus ipse fruebatur visione beatifica dum viatoris, ex virtute gratia unionis hypostatica; et rursum, est sententia approbata, quod interdum B. Maria Virgo eadem fructa est pro sua vita mortali (cf. B. Maria de Agreda, Civitas Dei). Atque adeo non est irrationabile considerare hoc capitis munus nonnumquam communicatum esse etiam pro hac vita sanctis maximis ut munus gratuitum. Quia brevissimus, et non tensibile nisi in effectibus, habitum fidei non extinguit, sed anima ex desiderio huius vitae elevat, secundum Scripturas, "Oculus non visit, auris non audivit, nec in mentem hominis intravit quod Deus preparavit pro se amantibus", et "Nemo Deum videre potest et vivet," et rursum, "Hoc est vita aeterna: cognoscere te Deum Unicum Verum et Iesum Christum qui missus es."]

* [Trans.: That is, in the natural order; for Christ Jesus Himself enjoyed the beatific vision while still a wayfarer, by virtue of the grace of the hypostatic union; and again, it is an approved opinion that the Blessed Virgin Mary enjoyed the same on occasion during Her own mortal life [cf. Bl. Mary of Agreda, The Mystical City of God]. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to consider that this gift of the Head is also communicated at times during this life to the greatest of the saints as a gratuitous gift. Since it is momentary and cannot be retained except in its effects, it does not destroy the habit of faith, but raises the soul from desire for this life, in accord with the Scriptures, "Eye has not seen, ear has not heard, nor has it even entered into the mind of man what God has prepared for those who love him," and "No man can see God and live," and again, "Eternal life is this, to cognize Thee the Only True God and Jesus Christ whom Thou has sent."]

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hac re, sexcenties breviter expressa, fuse declaratur anecdota quadam quaestione disputata, a P. Fidele a Fanna reperta et quoad partem principalem in lucem edita

this point, having briefly expressed it six hundred times, it is manifested at length by a certain unpublished, disputed question, reported by Father Fidele a Fanna and in

(Ratio nova collectionis etc. Taurini, 1874, p. 222). Hanc quaestionem integram, additis aliis documentis ineditis tum ipsius Bonav., tum trium eiusdem discipulorum, nempe Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Ioan. Pechami et cuiusdam Eustachii, Deo favente, libro speciali proxime in lucem dabimus, quo tum sententiae S. Doctoris penitus declarabitur, tum demonstrabitur, B. Albertum M. aliosque antiquos omnino cum ipso Seraphico consentire, nec S. Thom. in re principali contarium docere.

regards to its principle part, published by Ratio nova collectionis etc., Turin, 1874, p. 222. This entire question, with the addition of other unedited documents both of (St.) Bonaventure himself and of his three disciples, namely Matthew of Aquasparta, John Peckham and a certain Eustasius, God willing, we will publish very soon in a special book, by which both the sentence of the Seraphic Doctor will be thoroughly manifested, and it will be demonstrated that, Bl. (now St.) Albertus Magnus and the other ancients consented entirely with the Seraphic (Doctor) himself, and that St. Thomas did not teach the contrary on the principle point.

II. His praesuppositis, verba: « Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem », nullam faciunt difficultatem, praesertim cum ab ipso S. Doctore interpretatio Ontologistarum explicite reprobetur (II. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et ibid. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. 4.). Egregie sinceram suam sententiam explicat infra d. 17. p. I. q. 4 in corp., ubi cum S. August. distinguit cognitionem per *speciem* a rebus materialibus *abstractam* ab illa cognitione, quae fit *per veritatem*, id est « per similitudinem infusam vel innatam »; et addit: « Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur, dicuntur ab Augustino *cognosci in veritate* » De similitudine vel habitu innato cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Recte S. Doctor (ad 5.) negat, Deum cognosci per similitudinem ab ipso abstractam, quia de Deo non habemus conceptum nisi analogum et aliunde formatum. Etiam S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.) docet: « Non dicimur cognoscere ea (Deum et Angelos) per abstractionem, sed per *impressionem* in intelligentias nostras ». Consentiunt B. Albert. (hic a. 2. ad 2.) et Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 1. ad 4.).

II. Having presupposed these things, the words « God is present to every intellect through truth », cause no difficulty, chiefly when by the Seraphic Doctor himself the interpretation of the Ontologists is explicitly reproved (II. Sent. d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, reply to n. 1, and ibid. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, reply to nn. 3 and 4). He excellently explains his own sincere sentence below in d. 17. p. I. q. 4 in the body, where with St. Augustine he distinguishes cognition through *species* from infused and/or innate (cognition) »; and he adds: « But both, which are so cognized, are said by Augustine *to be cognized in truth* » On the similitude and/or innate habit cf. II. Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2.. — Rightly does the Seraphic Doctor (at n. 5) deny, that God is cognized through a similitude abstracted from Him, because we have no concept of God but one (which is) analogous and formed from elsewhere. Even St. Thomas (I. Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, reply to n. 3) teaches: « We are not said to cognized those things (God and Angels) through abstraction, but through *impression* in our understanding ». (St.) Albertus (Magnus) (here in a. 2, in reply to n. 2) and (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in a. 1, in reply to n. 4) agree.

III. In solut. ad 5. verba: « Intellectus noster informatur quadam *notitia*, quae est veluti similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa », explicari possunt de specie sive impressa sive expressa, quam intellectus format ex *veritate creata* et animae

III. In the solution to n. 5 the words « Our intellect is informed by a certain *knowledge* [notitia], which is like a certain similitude, not abstracted, but impressed », can be explained from the species, either impressed or expressed, which the intellect

essentialiter impressa, de qua S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 17. p. II. q. 4. Non tamen excluditur, quod sub voce *notitia* intelligi possit etiam illa illuminatio divina, de qua supra locuti sumus. Hoc insinuare videntur alii loci S. Bonav., imprimis II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, ubi loquendo de cognitione Angelorum, sic concludit: «Adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scil. per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per *influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti*, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura » etc. Cfr. etiam quae de scientia Christi dicit III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1, 2. In hoc sensu istum locum S. Augustini, a S. Bonav. hic laudatam, intelligit Fr. Eustachius, discipulus , Doctor Parisiensis saec. XIII., uti colligitur ex quadam quaestione anecdota ipsius proxime a nobis in libra supra memorato edenda.

forms from *truth created* and impressed essentially upon the soul, of which the Seraphic Doctor speaks in d. 17, p. II, q. 4. However this does not exclude, that under the term *knowledge* [notitia] one can understand also that divine illumination, of which we have spoken above. Other places in St. Bonaventure's (writings) seem to insinuate this, first of all II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2 in reply to n. 4,, where having spoken of the cognition of the Angels, he concludes thus: « There is still a third manner of cognizing, namely through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through *an influence of connatural light upon the potency of the one cognizing*, which is a certain similitude of God, not abstracted, but infused, inferior to God, because in an inferior nature » etc.. Cf. also what he says of the knowledge [scientia] of Christ in III. Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, in reply to nn. 1 and 2. In this sense Fr. Eustasius, a disciple, a Doctor at Paris in the 13th century, understands that the same passage from St. Augustine is praised here by St. Bonaventure, as is gathered from a certain unpublished question of the same author, soon to be published by us in the above mentioned book.

IV. Hanc et sequentem questionem mire illustrat S. Bonav. in Intiner. mentis in Deum, et Hexaem. Serm. 5. 10. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. seqq. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 12 a. 12. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 15; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 13. m. 1. et q. 14. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 2. q. 9. et d. 3. q. 2. 3.

IV. St. Bonaventure wonderfully illustrated this and the following question in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, and in the Hexaëmeron, Sermon 5 and 10. —Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I., q. 2, m. 1 ff.. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I., q. 12, a. 12. — Bl (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), I. Sent., d. 1, a. 15; Summa ., p. I, tr. 3, q. 13, m. 1, and q. 14, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here principally in q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 33. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, I. Sent. d. 2, q. 9, and d. 3, q. 2 and 3.

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the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. I.
ARTCULUS UNICUS.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 71-74.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit cognosciblis per creaturas. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Quia via ad errorem non est via ad cognitionem; sed cognitio per creaturam est via erroris: ergo etc. Probatio minoris: Sapientiae decimo quarto:[1] *Creaturae Dei sunt in deceptionem et in odium et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium*. *Praeterea*, Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio[2] loquitur de his, qui occupantur in creaturis: « Dorsum ad Te vertentes, in corporali opere tanquam in umbra sua defiguntur ».

2. Item, tenebra vel tenebrosum non est via ad cognoscendum luminosum sive lucem;[3] sed creatura est tenebra, Deus autem est lux: ergo Deus non est cognosciblis per creaturam.

3. Item, medium, per quod cognoscitur

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART I
ARTICLE SOLE

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 71-74.
Notes by the Quarrachi Editors.

QUESTION 2

Whether God is cognizable through creatures.

Second it is asked, whether God is cognizable through creatures. And that (He is) not, it seems:

1. Because the way to error is not the way to cognition; but cognition through a creature is a way of error: ergo etc. Proof of the minor: in the fourteenth (chapter) of Wisdom (it is said):[1] *The creatures of God are as deception and hatred and a mousetrap for the feet of the unwise*. *Furthermore*, (St.) Augustine in On Free Will speaks of those, who are occupied in creatures: « Turning (their) back to Thee, they are fixed upon a corporal work as upon their own shadow ».

2. Likewise, the dark and/or a dark thing is not the way to cognize a luminous thing or the light;[3] but a creature is dark, moreover God is light: therefore God is not cognizable through a creature.

3. Likewise, the medium, through which

aliquid vel probatur de extremo, debet communicare in aliquo cum eo ad quod cognoscendum est;[4] sed Creator et creatura nihil habent commune: ergo Deus non cognoscitur per creaturas.

4. Item, omne medium, per quod ascenditur ad extremum, distat ab illo gradibus finitis;[5] sed omnis creatura quantumcumque nobilis distat a Deo gradibus infinitis, quia quantumcumque duplicatur, nunquam perveniet ad eius nobilitatem: ergo per creaturam non ascenditur in cognitionem Dei.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: Sapientiae decimo tertio:[6] *A magnitudine speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri.* Unde Isidorus de Summo bono:[7] « Ex pulcritudine circumscriptae creaturae pulcritudinem suam, quae circumscribi non potest, facit Deus intelligi ».

2. Item, *ratione* ostenditur sic: contingit non solum effectum cognosci per causam, sed etiam cau- / -sam per effectum: . . .

anything is cognized and/or proven from (its) extreme, ought to communicate in something with that for which it is cognized;[4] but the Creator and the creature have nothing common: therefore God is not cognized through creatures.

4. Likewise, every medium, through which one ascends [ascenditur] to an extreme, is distant from it by finite steps [gradibus];[5] but every creature, howsoever noble, is distant from God by infinite steps, because howsoever it is doubled, (the creature) will never arrive [perveniet] at His nobility: therefore through a creature one does not ascend unto the cognition of God.

Oɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀʀʏ: in the thirteenth (chapter) of Wisdom (there is written):[6] *From the magnitude of the appearance and of the creature the Creator of these can be seen in a cognizable manner* [cognoscibiliter]. Whence (St.) Isidore On the Supreme Good:[7] « From the beauty of the circumscribed creature God makes His own Beauty, which cannot be circumscribed, to be understood ».

2. Likewise, it is thus shown *by reason*: it happens that not only is an effect cognized through (its) cause, but also the cau- /-se through (its) effect: . . .

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[1] Vers. 11, ubi contra mss. et ed. 1 legit Vulgata: Quoniam creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt et in tentationem animabus hominum et in muscipulam etc. Cum hac lectione convenit Vat. eo excepto, quod habet *deceptionem* loco *tentationem*.
[2] Libr. II. c. 16. n. 43: Tanquam enim dorsum ad Te ponentes in carnali opere velut in umbra sua defiguntur.
[3] Aristot., I. Poster. c. 21. (25.): In privativa autem negativa propositio universalis, affirmativa autem negativa prior et notior (per affirmativam enim negativa nota) et prior affirmativa est, sicut esse prius est non esse. Et III. de Anima, text. 25. (c. 6.) docet, privationes non cognosci nisi per contrario, scil. per cognitionem habitus. Cfr. etiam II. de Caelo, text. 18. (c. 3.).
[4] Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7: Nam ex eodem genere oportet esse extrema et media. Idem ait X. Metaph. text. 22. (IX. c. 7.). Et III. de Part. Animal. c. 1: Nam et medium particeps utriusque extremi est. — *Extremum* est nomen logicale significans subiectum vel praedicatum conclusionis, pro quorum nexu cognoscendo *medium* adhibitum vocatur *terminus medius*. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 post *cum eo* minus bene omittit *ad*.
[5] Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 15. seqq. (c. 19. seqq.) ubi simile ostendit respectu ipsius demonstrationis. — Paulo infra ope mss. loco *duplicetur, nunquam*

[1] Verse 11, where contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vulgate reads: Since the creatures of God have become as hatred and as a temptation for the souls of men and as a mousetrap etc.. With this reading the Vatican text agrees, except in this, that it has *deception* in place of *temptation*.
[2] Book II, ch. 16, n. 43: For as they put (their) back to Thee they are fixed upon a carnal work as upon their own shadow.
[3] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 21 (25): On one hand [autem] to privative (propositions) a negative, universal proposition is prior and more known, on the other [autem] to affirmative (propositions) the negative is prior and more known [notior] {for through the affirmative the negative is known} and the affirmative is prior, just as being [esse] is prior to non-being [non esse]. And On the Soul, Bk. III, text 25 (ch. 6), where he teaches, that privations are not cognized except through their contrary, that is through the cognition of their habit. Cf. also On Heaven, Bk. II, text 18 (ch. 3).
[4] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 7: For from the same genus it is proper that there be extremes and means. He says in the same in his Metaphysics, text 22 (Bk. IX, ch. 7). And in The Parts of Animals, Bk. III, ch. 1: For even the means is a partaker of each extreme. — *Extreme* is a name in Logic signifying the subject or predicate of a conclusion,

pervenitur substituimus *duplicatur, nunquam perveniet*; supple creatura. cod. I propositionem maiorem formaliter melius exhibet *Item nullum medium . . . gradibus infinitis*. In conclusione plures codd. ut K T etc. *ad* loco *in*.
[6] Vers. 5.
[7] Sive Sentent. I. c. 4.

for cognizing the union of which the *medium* employed is called a *middle term* [terminus medius]. — The Vatican text against the codices and edition 1 omits *for* [ad] after *with that* [cum eo]. [5] Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 15 ff. (ch. 19 ff.) where he shows (something) similar in respect to this demonstration of his. — A little below this with the help of the manuscripts, in place of *it may be doubled, one never arrives* we have substituted *it is doubled, it will never arrive*; supply "creature". Codex I better exhibits the major proposition formally, *Likewise no medium . . . by infinite steps*. In the conclusion very many codices as K T etc. have *to* [ad] in place of *unto* [in].
[6] Verse 5.
[7] Or Sentences, Bk. I, ch. 4.

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sed etiam cau- / -sam per effectum:[1] ergo si Deus est causa operans secundum suam nobilitatem, et creatura effectus, poterit Deus cognosci per creaturam.

but also the cau- / -se through the effect:[1] therefore if God is the cause operating according to His nobility, and the creature the effect, God can be cognized through a creature.

3. Item, sensibile est via cognoscendi intelligibile;[2] sed creatura sensibilis, Deus intelligibilis: ergo per creaturam est devenire in cognitionem Creatoris.

3. Likewise, the sensible is a way of knowing the intelligible:[2] but a creature (is) sensible, (and) God (is) intelligible: therefore through a creature there is a departure [devenire] unto the cognition of the Creator.

4. Item, contingit simile cognosci per simile;[3] sed omnis creatura est similis Deo vel sicut vestigium, vel sicut imago: ergo per omnem creaturam contingit cognosci Deum.

4. Likewise, it happens that like is cognized through like;[3] but every creature is like to God as vestige, and/or as image: therefore through every creature it happens that God is cognized.

Quaeritur ergo, quae differentia sit inter vestigium et imaginem; et cum in omni creatura sit vestigium, quaeritur, quare non similiter imago, et secundum quid attendatur[4] vestigium.

Therefore it is asked, what is the difference between the vestige and the image; and since in every creature there is a vestige, it is asked, why not similarly an image, and according to what the vestige is tended towards.[4]

CONCLUSIO.

Deus per creaturas naturali rationis lumine cognosci potest.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod, quia relucet causa in effectu, et sapientia artificis manifestatur in opera, ideo Deus, qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur.

CONCLUSION

God can be cognized through creatures by the natural light of reason.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that, because a cause glitters [relucet] in (its) effect, and the wisdom of the craftsman [artificis] is manifested in (his) works, for that reason God, who is the Craftsman and Cause of a

creature, is cognizes through it.

Et ad hoc duplex est ratio, una est propter *convenientiam*, alia propter *indigentiam*: propter *convenientiam*, quia omnis creatura magis ducit in Deum quam in aliquod aliud; propter *indigentiam*, quia, cum Deus tanquam lux summe spiritualis non possit cognosci in sua spiritualitate ab intellectu quasi materiali, indiget anima cognoscere ipsum per creaturam.[5]

And for this there is a twofold reason, one is on account of *fittingness* [convenientiam], the other on account of *indigence*: on account of *fittingness*, because every creature leads more unto God than unto something else; on account of *indigence*, because, since God, as a light most highly spiritual, cannot be cognized in His spirituality by the quasi material intellect, the soul needs [indiget] to cognize Him through a creature.[5]

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio creaturae est via in errorem; dicendum, quod dupliciter est cognoscere creaturam: vel quantum ad *proprietates speciales* et[6] quae sunt imperfectionis, vel quantum ad *conditiones generales*, quae sunt completionis; si autem quantum ad speciales conditiones et *imperfectionis*: aut *attribuendo* Deo, aut *removendo*. Primo modo est via erroris, secundo modo via cognitionis; et sic cognoscitur Deus per ablationem.

1. To that which is objected, that the cognition of a creature is a way unto error; it must be said, that cognizing a creature is (said) in a twofold manner: as much as regards (its) *special properties* and[6] those which belong to imperfection, and/or as much as regards (its) *general conditions*, which belong to completion; but if as much as regards special conditions and (those belonging to) *imperfection*: either *by attributing* (them) to God, or *by removing*. By the first manner there is a way of error, by the second a way of cognition; and so God is cognized through *ablation* [ablationem].

Si autem cognoscatur quoad conditiones *perfectionis*, sic potest esse dupliciter, sicut in pictura dupliciter cognoscitur: aut sicut *pictura*, aut sicut *imago*; unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam tenditur in aliud. Si primo modo, tunc est via deviationis; unde Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio:[7] « Vae his qui nutus tuos pro Te amant et oberrant in vestigiis tuis et derelinquunt Te ducem ». Si *secundo* modo, prout est via in aliud, sic est ratio cognoscendi per superexcellentiam, quia omnis proprietas nobilis in creatura Deo est attribuenda in summo; et sic patet illud.[8]

But if He is cognized in regard to (His) conditions of *perfection*, He can be thus in a twofold manner, as a picture is cognized in a twofold manner: either as *a picture*, or as *an image*; whence either (cognition) stands still [sistitur] in the beauty of the creature, or through this it tends unto another. If by the first manner, then it is a way of deviation; whence (St.) Augustine in (his) book On Free Will:[7] « Woe to those who love Thy noddings [nutus] in place of Thee and wander about [oberrant] among Thy footprints [vestigiis] and forsake Thee as (their) leader. ». If by *the second* manner, insofar as it is a way unto the other, in this manner [sic] there is a reason for cognizing through superexcellence, because every noble property in a creature is to be attributed to God in (its) highest degree [summo]; and thus this is clear.[8]

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenebrosum medium non est via cognoscendi lucem; dicendum quod est oculus bene dispositus et oculus lippus. De oculo bene disposito verum est, sed non de lippo, cui nubes obtegens vel terra suscipiens luminis claritatem est medium videndi solem; sic

2. To that which is objected, that the dark medium is not a way of cognizing the light; it must be said that there is an eye well disposed and a bleary [lippus] eye. Of the well disposed eye it is true, but not of the bleary one, to which the medium for seeing the sun is (as) a concealing [obtegens]

intellectui nostro, qui se habet sicut oculus noctuae ad manifestissima naturae.[9]

cloud and/or a ground snatching up the clarity of a light [terra suscipiens luminis claritatem]; so (it is) for our intellect, which holds itself as the eye of an owl to the most manifest things of nature.[9]

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de defectu communitatis, dicendum, quod[10] non est commune per *univocationem*, tamen est commune per *analogiam*, quae dicit habitudinem *duorum ad duo*, ut in nauta et doctore, vel *unius ad unum*, ut exemplaris ad exemplatum.

3. To that which is objected concerning the defect of community, it must be said, that[10] there is no common thing through *univocation*, there is, however, a common thing through *analogy*, which means a habitude *of two to two*, as in a sailor and a doctor, and/or *of one to one*, as of the exemplar to the *example* [exemplatum].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper sunt infiniti gradus; dicendum, quod ascensus in Deum potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad *aspectum praesentiae*; et sic quaelibet creatura nata est ducere in Deum, nec sic sunt infiniti gradus; aut quantum ad *aequalitatem aequiparantiae*; et sic verum est, quod sunt infiniti, quia bonum creatum, quantum- / -cumque dupilcatum, . . .

4. To that which is objected, that there are always infinite steps; it must be said, that ascent [ascensus] into God can be in two manners: either as much as regards a *looking towards the Presence* [aspectum praesentiae]; and thus every creature is bound to lead (one) unto God, and so there are not infinite steps; or as much as regards an *equality of comparison* [aequalitatem aequiparantiae]; and so it is true, that they are infinite, because the created good, how- / -soever doubled, . . .

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[1] Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 10. (c. 13.) et II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.). — In hac propositione auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addidimus *etiam*.
[2] Cfr. Aristo., III. de Anima, text. 39. (c. 8.): Formis sensibilibus innituntur intelligibilia . . . atque idcirco, qui nihil sentit, nihil discere vel comprehendere potest. — Mox post *creatura* et post *Deus* supple cum Vat. *est*.
[3] Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. (c. 2.) loquendo de metaphora ait: Nam metaphora quodammodo notum facit id quod significatur, *propter* (per) *similitudinem*. Ibidem et hanc definitionem imaginis, de qua S. Bonav. paulo infra agit, invenies: Nam imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est. Cfr. etiam II. Prior. c. 27. et 28. (29. et 30.), ubi Aristot. agit de icosibus (eixos, i. e. simile, verisimile, consentaneum) et *signis*, quae si certissima sint, ab ipso *indicia*, (a Commentatoribus *vestigia* vel *prodigia*) nominantur; et Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 1.
[4] Vat. sibi non constans contra mss. et ed. 1 *attenditur*.
[5] Interpolatam et non aptam Vat. lectionem: *quasi materiali luce indiget anima, ut cognoscat ipsum, scilicet per creaturam* castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1. Cod. O pro *materiali* habet *naturaliter*.
[6] Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post *speciales conditiones* addidimus *et*, pro quo cod. I primo loc habet *id est*, secundo loco *qaue sunt*. Dein codd. O Z *quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt*. Mox mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. post *si* adiiciunt *autem* et post *imperfectionis* omittunt *hoc est dupliciter*.

[1] See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 10 (ch. 13) and Bk. II, ch. 17 (ch. 14). — In this proposition [p.71], on the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have added *also* [etiam].
[2] Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 39 (ch. 8): By sensible forms intelligibles are hinted at . . . and on that account, he who senses nothing, can learn and/or comprehend nothing. — Then after *creature* and after *God* supply with the Vatican text *is*.
[3] Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 1 (ch. 2) speaking of metaphor says: For a metaphor in a certain manner makes known that which is signified, *on account of* (i.e. through) *the similitude*. In the same place you will also find this definition of an image, with which St. Bonaventure deals a little below: For the image is that, of which generation is through imitation. Cf. also *Prior Analytics*, Bk. II, ch. 27 and 28 (chs. 29 and 30), where Aristotle deals with icons (eixos, i. e. the similar, the very similar, the agreeable) and *signs*, which if they are the most certain, are named *evidences* [indicia] by him, {by the Commentators *vestiges* and/or *prodigies*}; and Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1.
[4] The Vatican text, not consistently against the manuscripts and edition 1, has the indicative *is tended towards*.
[5] The Vatican text's interpolated and not apt reading: *as if the soul needed the material light, to cognize Him, that is through a creature* we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. Codex O has *naturally* in place of *material*.
[6] From nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have added here and a little below this after *special*

[7] Lib. II. c. 16. n. 43.
[8] De triplici cognoscendi Deum via, scil. causalitatis, remotionis et superexcellentiae cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 6. et infra dub. 1.
[9] Supple: tenebrosum (seu creatura) est medium cognoscendi lucem sive Deum. De comparatione intellectus cum oculo noctuae cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.): Sicut etiam nocticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sec et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima (ed. Venet. 1489).
[10] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit *si*. Paulo post pauci codd. ut X Y cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 non bene *ductore* pro *doctore*. Cfr. d. 25. a. 2. q. 1 in corp., ubi idem exemplum explicatur, et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1 in corp., ubi exemplum de *nauta et auriga* occurit.

conditions an *and* [et], in place of which codex I in the first place has *that it* [id est], in the second *which belong to* [quae sunt]. Then codices O and Z have *as much as regards general properties and those which are*. Then the manuscripts together with edition1, against the Vatican text, insert *but* [autem] in *but if as much* and after *imperfection* they omit *this is in a twofold manner* [hoc est dupliciter].
[7] Book II, ch. 16, n. 43.
[8] On the threefold way of cognizing God, that is by causality, removing and superexcellence, cf. Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 6, and below in dubium 1.
[9] Supply: the dark thing (or creature) is a medium for cognizing the light or god. On the comparison [comparatione] of the intellect with the eye of an owl cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 1 (Bk. I, ch. 1, in the shorter version): For as the eyes of the ravens of the night [nocticoraceum] hold themselves to the light of day, so also the intellect of our soul to those things which are the most manifest of nature {Venetian edition of 1489}.
[10] The Vatican text, not trusting in the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, adds *if*. A little after this a few of the codices as X and Y together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have not well *leader* [ductore] in place of *doctor* [doctore]. Cf. d. 25, a. 2. q. 1, in the body of the article, where the same example is explained, and Sent., Bk. II, c. 16. a. 1. q. 1 in the body of the article, where the example of the *sailor and the charioteer* occurs.

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quantum- / -cumque duplicatum, nunquam aequiparatur increato.

how- / -soever doubled, is never compared [aequiparatur] to the uncreated (Good).

Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad apsectum praesentiae est in consideratione visibilium, *secundus* in consideratione invisibilium, ut animae vel alterius substantiae spiritualis; *tertius* est ab anima in Deum, quia « imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate coniungitur ».[1]

But *the first* step as much as (it) regards the ascent towards the sight [aspectum] of the Presence is in the consideration of visibles, *the second* in the consideration of invisibles, as (it belongs to) the soul and/or another spiritual substance; *the third* is from the soul unto God, because « the image is formed by the Truth Himself and is immediately conjoined to God ».[1]

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur *de differentia vestigii et imaginis*, quidam assignant,[2] quod vestigium est in sensibilibus, imago in spiritualibus. Sed ista distinctio et positio non valet, quia vestigium est etiam in spiritualibus. Nam unitas, veritas, bonitas, in quibus consistit vestigium, sunt conditiones maxime universales et intelligibiles.

To that which is lastly asked *concerning the difference of the vestige and the image*, certain ones assign,[2] the vestige among sensibles, the image among spirituals. But that distinction and position of theirs is not valid, because the vestige is also among spirituals. For the unity, truth, (and) goodness, in which the vestige consists, are the conditions most universal and intelligible.

Alii[3] dicunt, quod vestigium dicitur, quia repraesentat secundum partem, sed imago secundum totum. Sed haec iterum differentia non valet, quia, cum Deus sit simplex, non habet repraesentans secundum partem; cum iterum sit infinitus, a nulla omnino creatura, etiam a toto mundo non potest repraesentari secundum totum.

Others[3] say, that "vestige" is said, because it represents according to a part, but "image" according to the whole. But again this difference is not valid, because, since God is simple, He does not have (something) representing (Him) according to a part; again, since He is infinite, by entirely no creature, nor even by the whole world can He be represented according to the whole.

Et ideo intelligendum, quod cum creatura ducat in cognitionem Dei per modum *umbrae*,[4] per modum *vestigii* et per modum *imaginis*, differentia eorum *notior*, a qua etiam denominatur, accipitur penes *modum repraesentandi*. Nam *umbra* dicitur, in quantum representat in quadam elongatione et confusione; *vestigium*, in quantum in[5] elongatione, sed distinctione; *imago* vero, in quantum in propinquitate et distinctione.

And for that reason it must be understood, that since the creature leads unto the cognition of God through a *shadow*,[4] through a *vestige* and through an *image*, their *more knowable* [notior] difference, by which they are also denominated, is accepted from within [penes] (their) *manner of representing*. For *shadow* is said, inasmuch as it represents in a certain elongation and confusion; *vestige*, inasmuch as in[5] elongation, but in distinction; but *image*, inasmuch as (it represents) in nearness and distinction.

Ex hac differentia colligitur *secunda*, quae est penes conditiones, in quibus attenduntur haec. Nam creaturae dicuntur *umbra* quantum ad proprietates, quae respiciunt Deum in aliquo genere causae secundum rationem[6] indeterminatem; *vestigium* quantum ad proprietatem, quae respicit Deum sub ratione triplicis causae, efficientis, formalis[7] et finalis, sicut sunt unum, verum et bonum; *imago* quantum ad conditiones, quae respiciunt Deum non tantum in ratione causae, sed et obiecti, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas.

From this difference there is gathered a *second*, which is from within [penes] the conditions, in which these are tended towards. For creatures are said (to be) *a shadow* as much as regards (their) properties, which respect God in some genus of cause according to an indeterminate reckoning;[6] *a vestige* as much as regards (their) property, which respects God under a reckoning of a triple cause, the efficient, the formal[7] and the final, as are the one, the true and the good; *an image* as much as regards (their) conditions, which respect God not only in the reckoning of a cause, but also of an object, which (conditions) are memory, intelligence and will.

Ex his concluduntur *aliae duae* differentiae: quantum ad ea ad quae *ducunt*; nam creatura ut umbra ducit ad cognitionem *communium*, ut *communia*; vestigium in cognitionem *communium*, ut *appropriata*; imago ad cognitionem *propriorum*, ut *propria*.[8]

From these there are concluded *two other* differences: as much as regards those things which *lead*; for the creature as a shadow leads to the cognition of things *common*, as *common*; the vestige unto cognition of things *common*, as *appropriated*; the image to cognition of things *proper* , as *proper*.[8]

Alia differentia est penes ea in quibus

The *other* difference is from within [penes]

reperiuntur. Quoniam enim omnis creatura comparatur ad Deum et[9] in ratione causae et in ratione triplicis causae, ideo omnis creatura est umbra vel vestigium. Sed quoniam sola rationalis creatura comparatur ad Deum ut obiectum, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem: ideo sola est imago.

those things in which *they are discovered*. For since every creature is compared [comparatur] to God both[9] in the reckoning of cause and in the reckoning of a triple cause, for that reason every creature is a shadow and/or a vestige. But since only the rational creature is compared to God as an object, because it alone is able to seize [capax] God through cognition and love [amorem]: for that reason it alone is an image.

SCHOLION.

I. Deum non immediate in se nec a priori a viatoribus cognosci, sed per ea quae ab ipso facta sunt, post Concilium Vaticanum (*de Fide* can 1. de Revelatione) in dubium vocari nequit. Hic canon: Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea quae facta sunt, naturalis rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, a. s., omnino convenit cum doctrina Seraphici Doctoris. — In fine conclusionis iuxta textum a nobis reformatum intellectus humanus vocatur *quasi materialis*, quod intelligendum est in comparatione ad puram spiritualitatem divinam. In hoc sensu S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1 ad 4.) dicit: Nam nihil est omnino spirituale, nisi solus Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus de Moribus Ecclesiae (vel potius Gennadius de Dogm. Eccles. c. 2.): Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet.

SCHOLIUM

I. That God is not cognized immediately in Himself nor a priori by wayfarers, but through those things which have been made by Him, no one after the (First) Vatican Council (*de Fide*, canon 1 on Revelation) can call into doubt. This canon: "If anyone has said, that God the one and true, Creator and Our Lord, through those things which have been made, cannot be certainly cognized by the natural light of human reason, anathema sit," entirely agrees with the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor. — At the end of the conclusion, in accord with the text reformed by us, the human intellect is called *quasi material*, which must be understood in comparison to the pure, divine spirituality. In this sense St. Bonaventure (Sent., Bk. I, d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, at n. 4) says: For nothing is entirely spiritual, except God alone, as (St.) Augustine says On the Customs of the Church (and/or rather Gennadius, On the Dogma of the Church, ch. 2): God alone is incorporeal, because He fills all things.

II. Quod vestigium Trinitatis in omni creatura inveniatur, est sententia communis. Omnis enim creatura, quatenus habet in se *unum* esse, distinctum a quolibet alio, respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; quatenus habet *verum* esse, respicit ipsum ut causam exemplarem; quatenus habet *bonum* esse, respicit eundum ut causam finalem. — Differentiam inter *imaginem* et *vestigium* non omnes eodem modo assignant. S. Doctor, ut ex textu apparet, quadruplicem dat differentiam, cui S. Thomas aliam adiungit (S. I. q. 45. a. 7.). Scotus autem contra verba S. Thomae aliquas difficultates affert (hic. q. 3). De hac doctrina cfr. ipse S. Doctor, hic dub. 3; II. Sent. d. 35. a. 2. q. 1;

II. That the vestige of the Trinity is found in every creature, is the common sentence. For every creature to the extent that is has in itself *one* being [unum esse], distinct from any other, looks back to God as its efficient cause; to the extent that it has a *true* being [verum esse], looks back to Him as (its) exemplar cause; to the extent that it has a *good* being [bonum esse], it looks back to the Same as (its) final cause. — Not all assign the difference between the *image* and the *vestige* in the same manner. The Seraphic Doctor, as he appears from the text, gives a fourfold difference, to which St. Thomas adjoins another (Summa., I. q. 45. a. 7). But (Bl. John Duns) Scotus brings forward some difficulties against the words

Breviloq. p. II. c. 1. 12; Hexaëm. Serm. 12. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 8. per totam et q. 7. m. 7; p. I. q. 18. m. 1. 5. — Scot., hic q. 5. 9. — S. Thom., hic. q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 45. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a. Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. 5. — Biel, hic q. 9.

of St. Thomas (here in q. 3). Of this doctrine cf. the Seraphic Doctor himself, here in dubium 3; Sent., Bk. II, d. 35, a. 2, q. 1; Breviloquium, p. II, c. 1 and 12; Hexaëmeron, sermon 12. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 8, throughout and q. 7, m. 7; p. I, q. 18, m. 1 and 5. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in qq. 5 and 9. — St Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1, 2 and 3; Summa., I, q. 45, a. 7. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here in a. 14 and 18. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here in p. I, q. 4. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in qq. 4 and 5. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 9.

III. Plura de hac quaestione: S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1 et 2. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. q. 3; S. I. a. 2 . . .

III. For more on this question: St. Bonaventure, Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1 and 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in qq. 1, 2, and 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3; Summa., I, q. 2, . . .

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[1] August., 83 QQ. q. 51. n. 2 dicit: Quare cum homo possit particeps esse secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur, et ideo nihil sit Deo coniunctius. Et auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 11: Quae (mens) ita facta est ad imaginem Dei, ut nulla interposita natura ab ipsa veritate formetur.

[2] Addit Vat. claritatis gratia *talem differentiam*, quae tamen verba desunt in mss. et ed. 1.

[3] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit *autem*. Paulo post plures codd. ut S V X bb omittunt *differentia*, pro quo ed 1 habet *distinctio*.

[4] Vat. addit *et*, quod deest in mss.

[5] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 hic et immediate post substituimus *quantum in* pro *quadam*. Mox cod. Q post *sed* addit *cum*.

[6] Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum *causae*.

[7] Intellige de causa formali *extrinseca* sive de exemplari, non de causa formali *intrinseca*. Cfr. infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1 ad 2.

[8] Iuxta sententiam communem attributa divina distinguuntur in communia *ut communia* sive communia simpliciter, quae sunt essentialia, ut esse, vivere, intelligere; communia *ut appropriata*, quae sunt illa essentialia, quae nos uni personae prae alia tribuimus, ut potentiam Patri, sapientiam Filio, bonitatem Spiritui sancto; *propria* sunt parternitas, filiatio et spiratio.

[9] Supplevimus ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 particulam *et*, qua distinctior redditur lectio. Paulo post cod. Z loco *vel* bene ponit *et*.

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[1] (St.) Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 51, n. 2 says: Wherefore since man can be a partaker according to the interior man, he is thus, according to him, as an image, so that he is formed by no interposed nature, and for that reason nothing is more conjoined to God. And the author of the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 11: Which (mind) has been thus made to the image of God, so that it is formed by the Truth itself (and by) no interposed nature.

[2] The Vatican text adds for the sake of clarity *such a difference*, which words, however, are lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.

[3] The Vatican text against the manuscripts and edition 1 adds *But* [autem]. A little after this very many of the codices as S V X and bb omit *difference*, in place of which edition 1 has *distinction*.

[4] The Vatican text adds *and* [et], which is lacking in the manuscripts.

[5] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have here and immediately afterwards substituted *as much as in* [quantum in] for *certain things* [quadam]. Then codex A after *but* [sed] adds *with* [cum].

[6] With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged here what was added by the Vatican text: *of cause*.

[7] Understand this of the formal *extrinsic* cause or of the exemplar cause, not of the formal *intrinsic* cause. Cf. below in d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2.

[8] In accord with the common sentence the divine attributes are distinguished in common ones *as common* or common ones simply speaking, which are the essentials, as to be, to live, (and) to understand; the common ones *as appropriated*, which are those essentials, which we grant to one Person before the others, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit; the

proper ones are paternity, filiation and spiration.
[9] We have supplied from very many codices and edition 1 the particle *both* [et], by which a more distinct reading is rendered. A little after this codex Z in place of *and/or* put *and* [et].

a. 2. et 3. — S. c. Gent. I. c. 13. — B. Albert., hic. a. 2. et 3; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1 et a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 24. q. 6. — Durand., hic. p. I. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., et Biel sicut in praec. quest.

a. 2 and 3. — Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 13. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 2 and 3; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 24, q. 6. — Durandus, here in p. I, q. 1. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, and (Gabriel) Biel as in the preceding question.

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St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. I.
ARTCULUS UNICUS.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART I
ARTICLE SOLE

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 74-75.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 74-75.
Notes by the Quarrachi Editors.

QUAESTIO III.
Utrum homo in omni statu cognoscat Deum

QUESTION 3
Whether man in every state cognizes God

per creaturas.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum cognitio Dei per creaturas sit hominis quantum ad omnem statum. Quod sit hominis quantum ad *primum statum*, sic ostenditur.

1. Homo in statu innocentiae non cognoscebat Deum facie ad faciem: ergo si cognoscebat Deum, cognoscebat per effectum, ergo per vestigium, ergo per creaturam.

2. Item, in homine in statu innocentiae cognitio sensibilis non erat in impedimentum, sed in adminiculum cognitionis intellectivae; sed intellectiva cognito, propter quam factus est homo, est cognitio Dei: ergo omnis cognitio sensibilis in primo homine ordinabatur ad hanc; sed cognitio Dei per adminiculum sensibilium est cognitio per creaturam: ergo etc.

Item, quod sit hominis quantum ad *statum beatitudinis*, videtur:

1. Quia Beati cognoscunt creaturam, sed non sistunt in illa, sed referunt ad Deum: ergo cognoscunt Deum per creaturam.

2. Item, beatae[1] animae laudant Deum per creaturas; sed laudare Deum per creaturas est cognoscere per creaturas; ergo etc.

Sed contra: quod non sit *hominis instituti*, sic ostenditur.

1. Cognitio per vestigium est cognitio per medium; « sed mens, ut dicit Augustinus,[2] immediate ab ipsa veritate formatur »: ergo talis cognitio non convenit humanae naturae quantum ad illum statum, nec etiam quantum ad alium.

2. Item, non est rectus ordo, quod propinquius perveniat in finem per medium magis distans; sed homo in statu primo erat propinquior Deo ceteris aliis[3] creaturis: ergo non conveniebat ei pervenire in cognitionem Dei per alias creaturas.

Item, quod non sit hominis talis cognitio quantum ad statum *beatitudinis*, videtur.

through creatures.

Third it is asked, whether the cognition of God through creatures belongs to man as much as regards (his) every state. That it does belong to man as regards (his) *first state*, is shown thus:

1. Man in the state of innocence did not use to cognize God face to face: therefore if he used to cognize God, he used to cognize (Him) through an effect, therefore through a vestige, therefore through a creature.

2. Likewise, in man in the state of innocence sensible cognition was not as [in] an impediment, but as a support [adminiculum] for intellective cognition; but intellective cognition, on account of which man was made, is a cognition of God: therefore every sensible cognition in the first man was ordained for this; but cognition of God through a sensible support is cognition through a creature: ergo etc..

Likewise, that it belongs to man as much as regards (his) *state of beatitude*, it does seem:

1. Because the Blessed cognize a Creature [i.e. the Humanity of Christ], but they do not stand still in it, but refer (it) to God: therefore they cognize God through a creature.

2. Likewise, the blessed[1] souls praise God through creatures; but to praise God through creatures is to cognize (Him) through creatures; ergo etc..

On the contrary: that it did not belong to *man as instituted*, is shown thus:

1. Cognition through a vestige is cognition through a medium; « but the mind », as (St.) Augustine says,[2] « is immediately formed by the Truth itself »: therefore such a cognition does not agree [convenit] with human nature as much as regards that state, nor even as much as regards another (state).

2. Likewise, it is not a right order, which the nearer arrives at the end through a more distant medium; but man in the first state was nearer to God that the rest of other[3] creatures: therefore it did not use to be agreeable to him to arrive at the cognition of God through other creatures.

Likewise, that such a cognition did not belong to man as much as regards (his)

state of *beatitude*, it does seem:

1. Quia cognitio per vestigium est cognitio per manuductionem: ergo non est cognitio perfecta, ergo est ex parte:[4] ergo non manet in Beatis, quia in ipsis evacuabitur quod est ex parte.

1. Because cognition through a vestige is cognition through a being-lead-by-hand [manuductionem]: therefore it is not a perfect cognition, therefore it is partial [ex parte]:[4] therefore it does not remain among the Blessed, because among them is emptied out [evacuabitur] what is partial.

2. Item, vestigium sive creatura est sicut scala ad ascendendum vel sicut via ad perveniendum ad Deum; sed cum perventum est ad terminum, non est usus viae ulterius:[5] ergo similiter, cum homo sit sursum, non indiget scala; sed cognitio Beatorum immediate est in Deum: ergo non est per creaturas.

2. Likewise, the vestige or creature is as a stair to ascend and/or as a way to arrive at God; but when one has arrived at the terminus, there is no use for an ulterior way:[5] therefore similarly, when man is on high, he does not need a stair; but the cognition of the Blessed is immediately upon [in] God: therefore it is not through creatures.

CONCLUSIO.

Deus in creaturis cognoscitur a comprehensoribus perfecte, a viatoribus semiplene; sed per creaturas proprie cognoscitur a viatoribus, aliter autem ante, aliter post lapsum.

CONCLUSION

God is cognized in creatures perfectly by comprehensors, semi-fully by wayfarers; but through creatures He is properly cognized by wayfarers, but one way before, another way after the Fall.

R**ESPONDEO**: Ad intelligentiam[6] praedictorum notandum, quod aliud est cognoscere Deum *in* creatura, aliud *per* creaturam. Cognoscere Deum *in* creatura est cognoscere ipsius praesentiam et influentiam in creatura.[7] Et hoc quidem est viatorum semiplene, sed comprehensorum perfecte; unde dicit Augustinus in fine libri de Civitate Dei,[8] quod tunc expresse Deus videbitur, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus. Cognoscere autem Deum *per* creaturam est elevari a cognitione creaturae ad cognitionem Dei quasi per scalam mediam. Et hoc est proprie viatorum, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium.[9]

I **RESPOND**: For an understanding[6] of the aforesaid things it must be noted, that cognizing God *in* a creature is one thing, *through* a creature another. To cognize God *in* a creature is to cognize His presence and influence in a creature.[7] And this indeed belongs to wayfarers in a semi-full manner, but to comprehensors in a perfect one; whence (St.) Augustine says at the end of the book On the City of God,[8] that God shall then be expressly seen, when God shall be all in all. But to cognize God *through* a creature is to be elevated by cognition of a creature to cognition of God as if through a middle stairway [scala mediam]. And this properly belongs to wayfarers, as (St.) Bernard says (in his letter) to (Pope) Eugenius.[9]

Aliter tamen convenit homini in statu naturae institutae, et[10] naturae lapsae: quia in statu primo cognoscebat Deum per creaturam tanquam per *speculum clarum*; sed post lapsum cognovit tanquam *per speculum et aenigma*, sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio,[11] propter obnubilationem intellectus et peiorationem rerum.

It another manner, however, it agrees with man in the state of instituted nature, and (in that)[10] of fallen nature: because in the first state he did use to cognized God through a creature as through a *clear mirror*; but after the Fall he cognized (Him) as *through a mirror and an enigma*, as the Apostle says in the thirteenth (chapter) of the First (Letter) to the Corinthians,[11] on account of the beclouding of the intellect and a worsening of things.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de statu *beatitudinis*; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, beatorum non est cognoscere *per* creaturas, sed potius *in* / creaturas.

To that, therefore, which is objected concerning the state of *beatitude*; it must be said, that, as has been said, it does not belong to the blessed to cognize *through* creatures, but rather *in* / creatures.

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[1] Sola Vat. praemittit *omnes*.
[2] Vide supra q. 2. ad 4. — In quo textu cod. Y post *ipsa* addit *prima*.
[3] Fide plurimorum codd. ut A C F H I K L N O S T U etc. et ed. 1 addidimus *aliis*, et mox post *pervenire* substituimus *in* loco *ad*.
[4] Praeferimus succintiorem lectionem mss. et ed. 1 lectioni Vat., in qua post *perfecta* additur *et si non est cognitio perfecta* et post *parte* adiungitur *et si est ex parte*. Argumentum hoc innititur verbis Apostolis I. Cor. 13, 10: cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est.
[5] Mendum Vat. *alterius* loco *ulterius* correximus ex mss. et ed. 1, sicut et paulo post substituimus *sit* pro *est* et *sed* pro *name*. — In hoc argumento alluditur ad verba S. Bernard., V. de Consid. c. 1: Sane hac scala cives non indigent, sed exules.
[6] Vat. contra mss. *intellectum*.
[7] Codd. L O *creaturam*. Mox cod. W post *quidem* addit *cognoscere*, ed. 1 autem post *est* addit *viatorum et comprehensorum*.
[8] Libr. 22. c. 30. n. 4: Vacabimus in aeternum, videntes quia ipse est Deus, quo pleni erimus, quando ipse erit omnia in omnibus. — In quo textu plures mss. ut A I T etc. cum ed. 1 *quomodo* pro *quando*.
[9] Libr. V. de Consid. c. 1.
[10] Cod. X *quam* loco *et*.
[11] Vers. 12.

[1] The Vatican text alone prefaces this with *all* [omnes].
[2] See above, q. 2 at n. 4. — In which text codex Y after *by the* adds *first*.
[3] Trusting in the very many codices as A C G H I K L N O S T U etc. and edition 1 we have added *other* [aliis], and then after *to arrive* we have substituted *at* [ad] with *at* [in, *to express an actual attainment, rather than merely a proximate approach*].
[4] We prefer the more succinct reading of the manuscripts and edition 1 to the reading of the Vatican text, in which after *perfect cognition* [cognitio perfecta] there is added *and if there is not a perfect cognition* and after *partial* [parte] there is adjoined *and if it is partial*. The argument here hints at the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 13:10 : But when what is perfect has come, what is partial shall be emptied out.
[5] The faulty reading of the Vatican text, placing *alternative* [alterius] for *ulterior* [ulterius], we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1, just as also a little afterwards we have substituted the subjunctive *is* [sit] for the indicative *is* [est] and *but* [sed] for *for* [nam]. — In this argument there is an allusion to the words of (St.) Bernard, On Considerations, Bk. V, ch. 1: Citizens do not need this healthful stairway, but exiles (do).
[6] The Vatican text against the manuscripts has *understanding* [intellectum] instead of *an understanding* [intelligentiam].
[7] Codices L and O have *upon the creature* [in creaturam].
[8] Book 22, c. 30, n. 4: We shall vacation for ever, seeing that He is God, by whom we shall be filled, when He will be all in all. — In which text very many of the manuscripts as A I T etc. together with edtion 1 have *in the manner* [quomodo] in place of *when* [quando].
[9] On Considerations, Bk. V, ch. 1.
[10] Codex X has *(more) than* [quam] in place of *and (in that)* [et].
[11] Verse 12.

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sed potius *in* / creaturis. Et rationes, quae videntur probare contarium, non probant, sed potius, quod cognoscatur ab eis *in* creaturis.

but rather *in* / creatures. And the reasons, which seem to prove the contrary, do not prove (it), but rather, that He used to be cognized by them *in* creatures.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de statu *innocentiae* quod mens immediate formatur etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est medium,

1. To that which is objected concerning the state of *innocence* that the mind is immediately formed etc.; it must be said,

scilicet *efficiens* et *disponens*. De primo medio debet intelligi quod dixit Augustinus, sed de secundo non;[1] quoniam Deus est medium efficiens et obiectum ipsius mentis. Illud autem verbum dicit Augustinus contra philosophos, quorum opinio erat, quod mens non coniungeretur primo[2] immediate, sed mediante aliqua intelligentia.

that twofold is the medium, that is *efficient* and *disposing*. Of the first medium there ought to be understood what (St.) Augustine said, but of the second not (so);[1] since God is an efficient medium and the object of the mind itself. Moreover (St.) Augustine says that [illud verbum] against the philosophers, whose opinion was, that the mind is not conjoined to the first (principle)[2] immediately, but by means of [mediante] some intelligence.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est rectus ordo; dicendum, quod dupliciter potest considerari homo: vel ens *in se*, vel *extra*. Primo modo non pervenit per creaturas a se in Deum, sed ens extra se per cognitionem creaturarum recolligitur in se et elevatur supra se.[3]

2. To that which is objected, that there is not a right order; it must be said, that man can be considered in a twofold manner: as a being *in itself* [ens in se], and/or *outside itself* [extra se]. In the first manner he does not arrive at God through creatures by himself, but being outside himself through cognition of creatures he is recollected in himself and elevated above himself.[3]

Vel dicendum, quod aliae creaturae possunt considerari ut res, vel ut signa. *Primo* modo sunt inferiores homine, *secundo* modo sunt media in deveniendo sive in via, non in termino, quia illae non perveniunt, sed per illas pervenit homo ad Deum, illis post se relicitis.

And/or it must be said, that other creatures can be considered as things, and/or as signs. In *the first* manner they are inferior to man, in *the second* manner they are means of departure [in deveniendo] or on the way, not in the terminus, because they do not arrive (there), but through them man does arrive at God, having left those thing behind him [illis post se relictis].

SCHOLION.

I. Quoad distinctionem inter cognoscere Deum *in* creatura et *per* creaturam, quae habetur in corp., cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5; Itinerar. mentis, c. 1. Consentiunt Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Item verba in fine corp. occurrentia: « obnubilationem intellectus et peiorationem rerum » approbantur et amplius explicantur a S. Thom., S. I. q. 94. q. 1 ad 3. et ab Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 2. a. 4.

De duplici medio, scil. efficiente et disponente (in solut. ad 2.), clarius mentem suam explicat Seraphicus II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. his verbis: « Augustinus vult, quod inter mentem et Deum non cadit medium, scil. in ratione causae efficientis

SCHOLIUM

I. In regard to the distinction between cognizing God *in* a creature and *through* a creature, which is had in the body (of the question), cf. Sent., Bk. III, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1 ad n. 5; Itinerarium mentis, ch. 1. (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise agrees, here in q. 4; and so does Richard of Middletown, here in q. 2. q. 3. — Likewise the words occurring at the end of the body (of the question): « a beclouding of the intellect and a worsening of things » are approved and explained more amply by St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 94, a. 1 at n. 3 and by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 2, q. 4.

On the twofold medium, that is the efficient and disposing (in the solution to n. 2) the Seraphic (Doctor) explains his mind more clearly in Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2 at n. 6, with these words: « (St.) Augustine wants, that between the mind and God

vel influentis, cadit tamen medium manuductionis, quod tamen non habet rationem medii proprie, quia magis subservit potentiae cognoscenti, quam praesit ». Plura de triplici medio Deum videndi invenies II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3 ad 7. Concordant S. Thom., S. q. 94. a. 1 ad 3. et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. ad 3.

there not fall a medium, that is, in the reckoning of a efficient and/or influencing cause, however a medium of being-lead-by-hand [manuductionis] does fall, which, however, does not properly have the reckoning of a medium, because it is more subservient [subservit] to the cognizing power, than presiding over it [praesit] ». You will find very many things concerning the threefold medium of seeding God in Sent., Bk. II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 at n. 7. St. Thomas, Summa., q. 94, a. 1 at n. 3, agrees and so does Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1 at n. 3.

II. Quoad ordinem argumentorum et solutionem notandum, quod S. Doctor hic non tenet consuetum modum, quia pro triplici statu etiam triplex responsio datur, ita ut nonnulla argumenta respectu unius status sint vera, respectu aliorum falsa. Argumenta prima affirmativa recte probant illam conclusionem, quod homo in statu innocentiae cognovit Deum per creaturas; duo argg. sequentia ab ipso S. Doctore in solut. prima quoad beatos reprobantur; item argg. 1. et 2. sub *Contra* in solutione ultima refelluntur. Duo vero ultima vera sunt quoad beatos.

II. In regard to the order of the arguments and (their) solution it must be noted, that the Seraphic Doctor does not here hold to the customary manner, because a threefold response is give for the threefold state, so that not a few of the arguments in respect to one state are true, in respect to the others false. The first affirmative arguments rightly prove that conclusion, that man in the state of innocence did cognize God through creatures; the two arguments following are reproved by the Seraphic Doctor himself in the first solution (to the question) in regard to the Blessed; likewise arguments 1 and 2 in the *Contrary* are refuted in the last solution. But the two last ones are true in regard to the Blessed.

III. De tota quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 2. a. 4. et m. 3. a. 1. et p. II. q. 92. m. 2. a. 1 et 2. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 12. a. 11. et q. 94. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic. a. 13. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a. Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. (de beatis); II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. (de statu innocentiae); ibid. d. 24. a. 3. q. 5. (de presenti statu). — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. ulti.

III. On this whole question: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 2, a. 4, and m. 3, a. 1, and p. II, q. 92, m. 2, a. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 12, a. 11, and q. 94, a. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 13. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 2, q. 3 (concerning the Blessed); Sent., Bk II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 (concerning the state of innocence); ibid., d. 24, a. 3, q. 5 (concerning our present state). — Giles. R., here in a. 2 at the beginning of the last question.

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[1] Ita cod. F; Vat. autem, transpositis verbis *disponens et efficiens*, consequenter habet *De primo medio non debet intelligi quod dicit Augustinus, sed de secundo, quoniam*. Praeferimus lectionem cod. F, quia ceteri codd. et edd. 2, 3, 6 cum ipso F legunt *De primo medio debet . . . de secundo non*, licet cum Vat. in transpositione verborum *disponens et efficiens* conveniant; sed in lectione codd. sensus est falsus, uti tum ex subnexis tum ex aliis locis S. Doctoris in Scholio citatis colligitur.

[2] Supple: principio. — Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed.

[1] Thus codex F; but the Vatican text, having transposed the words *disposing and efficient*, consequently has *Of the first manner there ought not be understood what (St.) Augustine says, but of the second, that* [quoniam]. We prefer the reading of codex F, because all the other codices and editions 2, 3 and 5, together with F itself, read *Of the first manner . . . of the second not (so)*, though they do agree with the Vatican text in the transposition of the words *disposing and efficient*; but in the reading of the codices the sense is false, as is gathered both

1, *aeternae veritati* pro *primo*.
[3] Sensus est: homo consideratus ut *ens in se*, i. e. substantia, immediate refertur ad Deum eiusque cognitionem, quia, ut in praecedentis obiectionis solutione et supra q. 2 ad 4. dictum est, inter substantiam animae et Deum nullum cadit medium. Homo consideratus ut *ens extra se*, i. e. res exteriores percipiens, *recolligitur in se*, i. e. res exteriores percipiendo trahit ipsas intra se et ad reflexionem excitatur, et per mentales *suas* operationes tum respectu sui tum respectu rerum exteriorum cognitarum *elevatur supra se*, i. e. ad Dei cognitionem.

from the subjoined words and from the other places cited by the Seraphic Doctor in the Scholium.
[2] Supply: principle. — The Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has *to the eternal truth* [aeternae veritati] in place of *to the first (principle)* [primo].
[3] The sense is: man considered as a *being in itself*, i. e. a substance, is immediately referred to God and his cognition (likewise), because, as has been said in the solution of the preceding objection and above in q. 2 at n. 4, no medium falls between the substance of the soul and God. Man considered as a *being outside himself*, i. e. as one perceiving exterior things, *is recollected in himself*, i.e. by perceiving exterior things he draws these within himself and is stirred to reflection, and through *his own* mental operations both in respect to himself and in respect to exterior, cognized, things *he is elevated above himself*, i. e. toward the cognition of God.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. I.

ARTCULUS UNICUS.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 75-77.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum trinitas personarum cum unitate essentiae naturaliter per creaturas cognosci possit.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART I

ARTICLE SOLE

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 75-77.
Notes by the Quarrachi Editors.

QUESTION 4

Whether the Trinity of Persons with a unity of essence can be naturally cognized through creatures.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturas. Et dicit Apostolus,[4] quod *sempiterna virtus et divinitas*. Et quaeritur, utrum per creaturas possit cognosci personarum pluralitas. Et videtur quod sic.

Fourth and lastly it is asked, what of God is cognizable through creatures. And the Apostle says,[4] that (it is His) *sempiternal virtue and divinity*. And it is asked, whether through creatures the plurality of the Persons can be cognized. And it seems that thus (it can):

1. Quia philosophi non habuerunt cognitionem de Deo nisi per creaturas, et cognoverunt Trinitatem: ergo etc. *Minor* patet per Augustinum de Civitate Dei:[5] « Philosophi tripartitam dicunt esse philosophiam », in qua est cognitio Trinitatis.

1. Because philosophers did not have cognition of God except through creatures, and (yet) they cognized the Trinity: ergo etc.. The *minor* is patent through (St.) Augustine On the City of God:[5] « Philosophers say that there is a tripartite philosophy », in which is the cognition of the Trinity.

2. Item, magi defecerunt in *tertio signo*, Exodi octavo;[6] et exponitur, quod defecerunt in cognitione tertiae personae; aut ergo quantum ad *propra* aut quantum ad *appropriata*. Non quantum ad ap- / -propriata, quia bonitas maxime nobis relucet in creatura; . . .

2. Likewise, the magi failed at the *third sign*, in the eighth (chapter) of Exodus;[6] and it is explained [exponitur], that they failed in the cognition of the Third Person; therefore either as much as regards *things proper* [propria] or as much as regards *things appropriated*. Not as much as regards things / appropriated, because for us goodness glitters in the greatest manner [maxime] in a creature; . . .

[4] Rom. 1, 20.
[5] Libr. XI. c. 25: Hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripartitam esse voluerunt. — Ex cod. U adiungimus glossema dicta Augustini exponens: *cui hae sunt adscribenda, nisi creatori omnium creaturarum, datori intelligentiae, amorum inspiratori* (ex August. loc. cit.)*? Unde vult dicere, quod naturalis philosophia est de his quae pertinent ad conditionem naturae; rationalis de his quae pertinent ad rationem et intelligentiam; moralis de his quae pertinent ad amorem. Ideo naturalis adscribitur auctori Patri, rationalis sapientiae Filio, moralis amori seu bonitati Spiritus sancti*. [6] Vers. 10. Expositionem huius loci vide apud Lyranum et Magistrum, hic in fine c. 2.

[4] Rm. 1:20.
[5] Book XI, ch 25: Hence philosophers wanted there to be a tripartite discipline of wisdom. — From codex U we adjoin this gloss explaining the words of (St.) Augustine: *to whom are these to be ascribed, unless to the creator of all creatures, to the giver of intelligence, to the inspirer of love?* {from (St.) Augustine, loc. cit.} *Whence he wants to say, that natural philosophy concerns these things which pertain to the condition of nature; the "rational" concerns those things which pertain to reason and intelligence; "moral" concerns those things which pertain to love. For that reason "natural" is ascribed to the Father as Author, "rational" to the Son as Wisdom, "moral" to the love or goodness of the Holy Spirit*.
[6] Verse 18. See the exposition of this passage in the writings of (Nicholas) of Lyre and Master (Peter Lombard), here at the end of ch. 2.

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Non quantum ad ap- / -propriata, quia bonitas maxime nobis relucet in creatura: ergo quantum ad propria: ergo saltem duas personas cognoverunt.

Not as much as regards things / appropriated, because for us goodness glitters in the greatest manner [maxime] in a creature: therefore as much as regards things proper: therefore they cognized at

least two Persons.

3. Item, hoc idem[1] videtur per *rationem*: quia vestigium, cum dicat distinctionem, est ratio cognoscendi Deum distinctive sive in distinctione: sed non est in Deo nisi distinctio personarum: ergo per vestigium potuerunt cognoscere distinctionem personarum.

3. Likewise, this same (argument)[1] appears through *reason*: because the vestige, when it means "distinction," is a reason for cognizing God distinctively or in distinction: but there is no distinction in God except (that) of the Persons: therefore through a vestige they could cognize the distinction of the Persons.

4. Item, per imaginem est cognitio Trinitatis quantum ad ordinem, distinctionem et aequalitatem; sed cognitio per imaginem est cognitio per creaturam: ergo per creaturam potuerunt cognocere Trinitatem.

4. Likewise, through the image there is a cognition of the Trinity as much as regards order, distinction and equality; but cognition through an image is cognition through a creature: therefore through a creature they could cognize the Trinity.

5. Item, difficilior est cognitio propriatatum occultarum creaturae quam cognitio pluralitatis personarum, quia illa non capitur nisi a magnis et subtilibus, haec autem capitur etiam[2] a rudibus et insipientibus: ergo si potuerunt per propriatates creaturarum visibiles pervenire ad invisibiles, multo fortius ad cognoscendum, personas esse plures. Et hoc est quod dicitur Sapientiae decimo tertio:[3] *Si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent saeculum aestimare, quomodo huius Dominum non facilius invenerunt?*

5. Likewise, the cognition of the hidden properties of creatures is more difficult than the cognition of the plurality of the Persons, because the former [illa] is not seized except by the great and subtle, but the latter [haec] is seized even[2] by the rough [rudibus] and foolish: therefore if they could through the visible properties of creatures arrive at the invisible ones, much more strongly (did they arrive) at cognizing, that there are more Persons. And this is what is said in the thirteenth (chapter) of Wisdom:[3] *For if they could know so much, that they could estimate the age,* [saeculum aestimare] *why did they not more easily find its Lord?*

C**ONTRA**: 1. Cognitio Trinitatis est cognitio fidei: sed cognitio fidei est[4] de his quae sunt supra rationem; et quae sunt supra rationem non possunt cognosci per creaturas: ergo etc.

O**N THE CONTRARY**: 1. The cognition of the Trinity is a cognition of the Faith: but cognition of the Faith is[4] of these things which are above reason; and those which are above reason cannot be cognized through creatures: ergo etc..

2. Item, non est nisi duobus modis[5] de Deo cognoscere per creaturam, aut affirmando quod est in creatura vel simile, aut removendo; sed Trinitas non cognoscitur per remotionem, sed per positionem; sed in nulla creatura invenitur pluralitas suppositorum cum unitate essentiae: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, there is no cognizing of God through a creature except in two manners,[5] either by affirming what is in the creature and/or (its) like, or by removing; but the Trinity is not cognized through a removal, but through a positing; but in no creature is there found a plurality of supposits with a unity of essence: ergo etc..

3. Item, lex scripta est super[6] legem

3. Likewise, written law is above[6] the law of nature, or the book of Sacred Scripture

naturae, sive liber sacrae Scripturae super librum mundanae creaturae; sed nullus fide carens per sacram Scripturam venit in cognitionem pluralitatis personarum: ergo multo minus per librum mundanae creaturae.

above the book of created world [mundanae creaturae]; but no one lacking faith comes through Sacred Scripture unto the cognition of the plurality of the Persons: therefore much less through the book of the created world.

CONCLUSIO.

Trinitas personarum non est cognoscibilis per creaturas, sed tantum trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitas, veritas, bonitas.

CONCLUSION

The Trinity of Persons is not cognizable through creatures, but only a trinity of appropriated things, that is, unity, truth, (and) goodness.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod pluralitas personarum cum unitate essentiae est proprium divinae naturae solius, cuius simile nec reperitur in creatura nec potest reperiri nec rationabiliter cogitari: ideo nullo modo trinitas personarum est cognoscibilis per creaturam, rationabiliter ascendendo a creatura in[7] Deum. Sed licet non habeat omnino simile, habet tamen aliquod modo quod *creditur* simile in creatura. Unde dico, quod philosophi nunquam per rationem cognoverunt personarum trinitatem nec etiam[8] pluralitatem, nisi haberent aliquem habitum fidei, sicut habet aliqui haeretici; unde quae dixerunt, aut locuti sunt non intelligentes, aut fidei radio illustrati.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that a plurality of persons with a unity of essence is proper to the Divine Nature alone, the like of which is not discovered [reperitur] in a creature, neither can it be discovered nor be rationally thought: for that reason in no manner is the Trinity of the Persons cognizable through a creature, by ascending rationally from the creature into[7] God. But although It does not have (anything) entirely like (It), It does have, however, in some manner that which is *believed* (to be) its like in a creature. Whence I say, that the philosophers never through reason cognized the Trinity of the Persons nor even[8] (Their) plurality, unless they had some habit of faith, as some heretics have; whence what they said, either they spoke (as) ones not understanding, or (as) ones enlightened by a ray of faith.

Est alia trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis,[9] et hanc cognoverunt, quia habet simile.

There is another trinity of things appropriated, that is, of unity, of truth and of goodness,[9] and this they did cognize, because it has a like.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod per tripartitam philosophiam cognoverunt philosophi Trinitatem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod per illud et per alia venerunt in[10] cognitionem appropriatorum, credentes vero in cognitionem utriusque trinitatis.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that through a tripartite philosophy philosophers cognized the Trinity; it must be said, that it is true, that through that and through other things they came into[10] the cognition of things appropriated, but as ones believing into the cognition of each trinity.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *tertio signo*, dicitur et bene, quia sapientes ideo dicuntur defecisse in tertio signo, quia defecerunt in cognitione effectus potissimi[11] bonitatis, scilicet redemptionis.

2. To that which is objected concerning the *third sign*, it is also well said, that the wise for that reason are said to have failed at the third sign, because they failed in the cognition of the most powerful effect[11] of Goodness, that is, of the Redemption.

3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod vestigium dicit disctinctionem proprietatum essentialium,

3. To the other it must be said, that “vestige” means “a distinction of essential

et huic respondet trinitas appropriatorum, non propriorum sive personarum.

properties," and to this responds the trinity of things appropriated, not of things proper or of the Persons.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de imagine, dicendum, quod est cognoscere animam secundum id quod *est*; et cognitio ista est rationis; vel secundum[12] quod *imago*; et cognitio ista est solius fidei.

4. To that which is objected concerning the image, it must be said, that there is a cognizing of the soul according to that which *it is*; and that cognition belongs to reason; and/or according[12] to which (it is) *an image*; and that cognition belongs to the Faith alone.

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[1] Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit *idem*, pro quo cod. Z habet *ipsum*.
[2] Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, addidimus *etiam*, quod Vat. minus bene omittit. Mox cod. R post *si* adiungit *philosophi*, ac plurimi codd. ut A F G J I K S T Y etc. post *creaturarum* addunt *reru,*, in qua lectione *creaturarum* falso positum est loco *creatarum*.
[3] Vers. 9, ubi Vat. post *scire* ponit *quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo*.
[4] Ed. 1 hic repetit *cognitio*. — De hoc argumento cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 1 §. 2.
[5] Cod. K satis bene adiungit *aliquid*, cod. X *Deum* ponit loco *de Deo*. Mox plurimi codd. ut A C F C H I L O S T U X etc. *vel simile vel removendo*, pro quo Vat. *aut simile aut removendo*; sequimur codd. quoad primam partem ponendo *vel simile*, et Vat. quoad secundam retinendo *aut removendo*, quia in hac lectione membra divisionis et subdivisionis clarius exhibentur. Cod. Y omittit *vel* et ed. 1 loco *vel* ponit *ut* ante *simile*. — De hoc argumento vide Dionys., De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 2.
[6] Plures codd. ut B S bb et ed. 1 hic et paulo post *supra*.
[7] Ed. 1 *ad*. Cod. R paulo post loco *quod* habet *et* ac cod. T *cernitur* pro *creditur*.
[8] Desideratur in Vat. *etiam*, quod tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo post Vat. *unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut*; omnes codd. cum ed. 1 in eo conveniunt, quod omittant *hanc Trinitatem*, dissentiunt tamen inter se, quod alii cum Vat. habeant *qui dixerunt*, cod. I *qui hoc dixerunt*, alii ut O T etc. *quae dixerunt*, quos sequimur; ed. 1 tandem legit *qui aliquid inde dixerunt*.
[9] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte *veritas, unitas et bonitas* et paulo post *habent*.
[10] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *ad*.
[11] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *potissimae*. Mox cod. O ante *redemptionis* praemittit *incarnationis et*.
[12] Vat. contra plurimos codd. minus bene addit *id*.

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[1] The Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits *same (argument)* [idem], for which codex Z has *very (argument)* [ipsum].
[2] Favoring the manuscripts and edition 1, we have added *even* [etiam], which the Vatican text not so well omitts. Then codex R has *philosophers* after *if* and very many of the codices as A F G H I K S T Y etc. add *things* [rerum] after *of creatures*, in which reading *of creatures* [creaturarum] has been falsely put in place of *of created* [creatarum].
[3] Verse 9, where the Vatican text after *know so much* [tantum . . .scire] puts *that they could measure the age, why*.
[4] Edition 1 here repeats *a cognition*. — Concerning this argument cf. Dionysius (the Areopagite), <u>On the Divine Names</u>, ch. 1 § 2,
[5] Codex K, well enough, adds *something* [aliquid: which alters the reading to *to cognize something of God through creatures is not but in two manners*], codex X puts *God* in place of *of God* [which alters the reading to *to cognize God through . . .* etc.]. Then very many of the codices as A C F C H I L O S T U X etc. have *and/or (its) like, and/or by removing*; we follow the codices in regard to the first part by putting *and/or (its) like* [vel simile], and the Vatican text in regard to the second part by retaining *or by removing* [aut removendo], because in this reading the members of the division and subdivision are more clearly exhibited. Codec Y omits *and/or* [vel] and edition 1 in place of *and/or* puts *as* [ut] before *(its) like*. — Concerning this argument see Dionysius (the Areopagite), <u>On the Celestial Hierarchy</u>, ch. 2.
[6] Very many of the codices as B S and bb and edition 1 have here and a little afterwards *above* [supra].
[7] Edition 1 has *to* [ad]. Codex R a little afterwards in place of *that which* has *and* [trans. -- which alters the reading to *It does have (it), however, in some manner and (its) like believed (to be) in a creature*] and codex T has *is discerned* [cernitur] for *is believed*.
[8] There is wanting in the Vatican text *even* [etiam], which, however, is had in the manuscripts and edition 1. A little after this the Vatican text has *whence those who meant [dixerunt] this Trinity, either*; all the codices together with edition 1 agree in this, that they omit *this Trinity*, however they disagree among themselves, because some with the Vatican text have *those who said*, codex I *those who said this*, others as O T etc. *what they said*, which we follow; finally edition 1 reads *those who for that*

reason said anything.
[9] The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has less aptly *truth, unity and goodness* and a little after this *they have a like*.
[10] The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *to* [ad].
[11] The Vatican text, striving against the manuscripts and edition 1, has less well *of the effect of most powerful Goodness* [effectus potissimae bonitatis]. Then codex O prefaces *of the Redemption* with *of the Incarnation and*.
[12] The Vatican text against very many codices adds less well *that which (is)* [id quod].

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p. 77

5. Ad illud quod ultimo[1] obiicitur, quod difficilius est cognoscere mundum; dicendum, quod istud intelligitur, supposito divino adminiculo; simpliciter autem loquendo falsum est. Citius enim disponeretur homo ad fidem, quam acquireret[2] cogntionem philosophiae. Intellectus tamen noster plus potest in cognitionem rerum mundanarum quam Trinitatis; quia illa est supra rationem, et contrarium eius videt in sensu; et ideo indiget nova elevatione, utpote cognitione per infusionem.

5. To that which lastly[2] is objected, that it is more difficult to cognize the world; it must be said, that that is understood, with the Divine Assistance supposed [supposito divino adminiculo]; but simply speaking it is false. For more swiftly would a man be disposed to the Faith, than would he acquire[2] a cognition of philosophy. Our intellect, however, is more able for [plus potest in] the cognition of mundane things than (those) of the Trinity; because That is above reason, and it sees Its contrary in sensing; and for that reason it needs a new elevation, in the form of [utpote] a cognition through infusion.

SCHOLION.

I. Quoad propositionem in corp., quae attribuit haereticis aliquem habitum fidei, sciendum, quod duplex distinguitur habitus fidei, scil. infusus et acquisitus, et hic est ordinis naturalis. Acquisitum habitum vel ipsi haeretici formales habere possunt.

Recte dicitur in solut. ad 4, quod cognitio imaginis sit solius fidei. Imago enim, in quantum imago, dicit respectum ad id cuius est imago. Nullus autem respectus potest cognosci nisi cognito utroque extremo. Licet igitur cognoscatur fundamentum relationis *in anima*, i. e. imago *materialiter* intellecta, tamen non cognoscitur *formaliter* ut *imago*, quamdiu alter terminus relationis non cognoscitur, nempe tres personae divinae.

SCHOLIUM

I. In regard to the proposition in the body (of the question), which attributes to heretics some habit of faith, it must be known, that there is distinguished a twofold habit of faith, that is, infused and acquired, and the latter belongs to the natural order. Formal heretics themselves can also have the acquired habit.

It is rightly said in the solution to n. 4, that cognition of the image belongs to the Faith alone. For the image, inasmuch as (it is) an image, means “a looking back” [respectum] to that of which it is the image. But no “looking back” can be cognized unless each extreme has been cognized. Therefore although the foundation of the relation *in the soul* is cognized, i. e. the image understood *in a material sense* [materialiter], however (the soul) is not recognized *formally* as *an image*, so long as the other terminus of the relation is not

cognized, namely the Three Divine Persons.

II. S. Bonav., Breviloq. p. I. c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., Quodlib. q. 14. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 32. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 13. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. q. 4. n. 25. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

II. St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, p. I, ch. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 1, a. 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Quodlibetales, q. 14. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 4; Summa., I, q. 32, a. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 18; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 13, m. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 2, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in the first principle of q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 22, q. 4, n. 25. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 4.

[1] Ope mss. substituimus *ultimo* pro *ulterius* et immediate post adiunximus *quod*.
[2] Cod. Y *quam ad acquirendam*; lectio haud spernenda.

[1] With the help of the manuscripts we have substituted *lastly* [ultimo] for *further* [ulterius] and immediately afterwards we have adjoined *that* [quod].
[2] Codex Y has *than to acquire* [quam ad acquirendam]; a reading by no means to be spurned [trans. -- though it does alter the significance of the comparison, which is rather of the effort on the part of man, than of the goodness of the objects].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. I.

ARTCULUS UNICUS.

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART I

ARTICLE SOLE

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 77-80.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 77-80.
Notes by the Quarrachi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram de rationibus illis, quas ponit Magister quantum ad rationem probandi et vim[3] inferendi, quia videntur omnes vel non valere vel dubium supponere.

Prima namque ratio talis est.[4] Qui potest quod nulla creatura potest, est supra omnem creaturam; sed qui fecit mundum istum, fecit quod nulla potest creatura: ergo non est creatura, sed super omnem creaturam. Et incipit haec ratio ibi: *Nam sicut ait Ambrosius, ut Deus* etc. In ista ratione videtur supponi duplex[5] dubium, videlicet quod mundus iste sit factus, et quod creatura ipsum non possit facere, quorum utrumque est valde dubium.

Secunda ratio est haec.[6] Qui fecit corporalia et spiritus mutabiles, est super omnia corporalia et mutabilia: ergo est spirituale et immutabile. Hec similiter videtur supponi dubium, quod Deus fecerit spiritus. Et iterum, non sequitur ex hoc, quodsi fecit mutabilia, quod[7] sit immutabilis, immo potius videtur sequi oppositum, scilicet quod sit mutabilis.

Tertia ratio haec est. Qui fecit bona et meliora, est optimus; sed Deus fecit corporalia, quae sunt bona, et spiritualia, quae sunt meliora: ergo Deus est optimus. Haec similiter ratio videtur nullam habere apparentiam, quia tunc similiter quilibet artifex, qui facit bona et meliora, esset[8] optimus, quod falsum est.

Quarta ratio haec est. Qui fecit pulcra et pulcriora, est ipsa pulcritudo sive species, et hoc est speciosissimum; sed videmus, corporalia esse speciosa, et spiritualia esse speciosiora:[9] ergo qui fecit haec, est speciosissimus. Similiter videtur, quod nec ratio praedicta valeat propter praedictam instantiam.

Doubt I

In that part of his (text) there are doubts [dubitationes] about the text concerning those reasons, which Master (Peter) posits as much as regards the reason for proving and the force[3] of inferring, because all seem to not be valid [non valere] and/or to suppose a doubt [dubium].

And indeed the first reason is of such a kind.[4] He who can (make) what no creature can (make), is above every creature; but the One who made this world of ours, made what no creature can (make): therefore He is not a creature, but above every creature. And this reason starts there (where he says): *For as (St.) Ambrose says, that God* etc. In that reason of his a twofold[5] doubt seems to be supposed, namely that this world of ours has been made, and that a creature could not make it, each of which is very doubtful (valde dubium).

The second reason is this.[6] He who made corporal things and mutable spirits, is above all corporal and mutable things: therefore He is spiritual and immutable. This similarly seems to suppose a doubt, that God made spirits. And again, it does not follow from this, that if He made mutable things, that[7] He is immutable, nay rather the opposite seems to follow, that is, that He is mutable.

The third reason is this. He who made good things and better things, is the best; but God made corporal things, which are good, and spiritual things, which are better: therefore God is the best. This reason similarly seems not to be apparent [nullam habere apparentiam], because then any artisan, who makes good things and better things, would[8] similarly be the best, which is false.

The fourth reason is this. He who made beautiful things [pulcra] and more beautiful things, is Beauty [pucritudo] Itself or outward Beauty [species], and this One is most outwardly-beautiful [speciosissimum]; but we see, that corporal things are outwardly-beautiful, and spiritual things are more outwardly-beautiful:[9] therefore He

who made these, is most outwardly-beautiful. Similarly it seems, that neither aforesaid reason is valid on account of the aforesaid example [instantia].

Item quaeritur de differentia istarum rationum, et quomodo distinguuntur. *Si dicas*, sicut decunt aliqui, quod sunt quatuor penes quatuor genera causarum, hoc nihil est, quia genus causae materialis non cadit in Deo. *Si dicas*, quod penes modos cognoscendi; *contra*: non sunt nisi tres, scilicet in ratione causae, ablationis et excellentiae.[10]

Likewise there is asked concerning the difference of those reasons of his, and in what manner they are distinguished. *If you say*, as some say, that there are four from within [penes] the four genera of causes, this is nothing, because the genus of the material cause does not fall in God. *If you say*, that (they are) from within [penes] the manners of cognizing; *on the contrary*: there are not but three, that is, in the reckoning of cause, of ablation and of excellence.[10]

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnes istae rationes ad hoc,[11] ut probent et inferant, supponunt aliquod certum. Prima enim ratio supponit, quod productio rei de nihilo non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita. Hoc supposito, cum certum sit, nullam creaturam habere potentiam infinitam,[12] sequitur, quod / actus productionis rerum de nihilo sit eius, . . .

I respond: It must be said, that all those reasons of his suppose something certain for this (purpose), to prove and infer (the conclusion). For the first reason supposes, that the production of a thing from nothing cannot be except from an infinite potency. With this supposed, since it is certain, that no creature has an infinite potency,[12] it follows that / the act of production of a thing from nothing belongs to Him, . . .

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[3] Aliqui codd. ut X Y pro *vim* minus bene *verum*, codd. G I *inde*. Mox ex mss. et ed. 1 post *omnes* supplevimus *vel*.
[4] Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, omittit *namque* et *talis est*. Paulo infra post *nulla* bis fide textus Magistri expunximus *alia*, utpote distorquens sensum, lect primo loc etiam in mss. et ed. 1 inveniatur. Deinde verba *Et incipit* usque ad *Deus* desunt in Vat., sed extant in mss. et ed. 1.
[5] Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *duplex* loc *dupliciter*, quod Vat. minus bene habet. Cod. I *supponere*, supple: Magister.
[6] Vat. hic et deinceps post *ratio* omittit *est haec*; item, refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, mox post *mutabilia* legit *Deus est huiusmodi: ergo Deus est spirituale immutabile*.
[7] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *quod, quia fecit mutabilia, ideo sit*.
[8] Vat. *est*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1. Paulo ante cod. I *fecit* pro *facit*.
[9] Ita codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, sed Vat.: *Sed Deus fecit pulcra sive speciosa quia corporalia, et speciosiora quia spiritualia*; et paulo infra contra mss. et ed. 1 *videtur ratio ista non valere*.
[10] Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 7 §. 3: Via et ordine pro viribus ascendimus in ablatione et in superlatione omnium et in omnium causa. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. divisio textus. — Vat. hic addit: *Ad obiectiones contra quatuor rationes iam dictas respondetur*, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1.
[11] Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 verba *ad hoc*.

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[3] Some codices as X Y in place of *force* [vim] have less well *truth* [verum], codices G and I have *thence* [inde]. Then from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *and/or* [vel] after *valid*.
[4] The Vatican text, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, omits *And indeed* and *is of such a kind*. A little below this after *no*, we have twice expunged, trusting in the text of Master (Peter), the word *other* [alia], as it is able to distort the sense, though in the first place it is also found in the manuscripts and edition 1. Then the words *And this reason* up to *as God* are lacking in the Vatican text, but extant in the manuscripts and edition 1.
[5] From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *twofold* [duplex] in place of *in a twofold manner* [dupliciter], which the Vatican text has less well. Codex I has *(Master Peter) seems to suppose a twofold doubt* [videtur supponere etc.].
[6] The Vatican text here and hereafter omits *is this* after each *reason*; likewise, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, it then, after *mutable things* reads *God is of this kind: therefore God is an immutable spiritual.*
[7] The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has *that, because He made mutables, for that reason He is . . .*.
[8] The Vatican text has *is similarly the*, but the manuscripts and edition 1 oppose this. A little before this codex I has *made* in place of *makes*.
[9] Thus the codices together with editions 1, 2 and 3, but the Vatican text reads: *But God made beautiful things or outwardly-beautiful things because (they*

Immediate post codd. E Y *quod* loco *ut*, ac paulo infra plures codd. ut I R aa bb ff *tertium* pro *certum*.
12 Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 79. (c. ult.) iuxta ed. Venet. 1489: Non ergo finiti est potentia infinita. Forte cod. X hanc propositionem intendit, licet falso alleget *libr. IV. Phys.*. — Mox / post *nihilo* cod. K legit *non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita, et quod sit actus eius quod est super naturam et super onem creaturam*; deinde omittit cetera usque ad *In aliis*.

are) corporal, and more outwardly-beautiful things because (they are) spiritual; and a little below this, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, it has *that reason of his does not seem to be valid*.
10 Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 7, § 3: By a way and order (that is) in proportion to (our) strength we ascend in being-borne-away [ablatione] and in being-borne-above all [superlatione omnium] and in the cause of all. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 1. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I. division of the text. — The Vatican text here adds: *To the objections against the four reasons already stated there is responded*, which is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.
11 We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the words *for this purpose* [ad hoc]. Immediately after this codices E and Y have *which* [quod] in place of *to* [ut], and a little below this very many codices as I R aa bb and ff have *third* [tertium] in place of *certain* [certum].
12 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII, text 79 (last chapter) according to the Venetian edition of 1489: Therefore not to the finite does the infinite potency belong. Perhaps codex X intends this proposition, though it falsely references *Physics, Bk. IV*. — Then / after *nothing* [nihilo] codex K reads *cannot be except from an infinite potency, and that the act belongs to the One which is above nature and above every creature*; then it omits the rest up to *In the other* (p. 78).

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actus productionis rerum de nihilo sit eius, qui[1] est super omnem creaturam. Et ita ex hoc actu tanquam ex proprio cognoscitur Deus omnipotens, immensus. — In aliis tribus rationibus supponitur status, sicut in tota philosophia supponitur status in causis; et ideo omne mutabile reducitur ad immutabile, quia in mutabili non est status in genere efficientis nisi in movente non moto: omne enim quod movetur, ab alio movetur.[2] Similiter bonum et melius reducuntur ad optimum, quia non est status in genere finis nisi in optimo. Similiter pulcrum et puchrius ad pulcherrimum, quia non est status in genere speciei et formae, nisi in eo quod est ipsa species per essentiam.

the act of the production of a thing belongs to Him, who[1] is above every creature. And thus from this act as from what is proper to Him [ex proprio] there is cognized God the Omnipotent, the Immense. — In the other three reasons there is supposed a stability [status], just as in all of philosophy there is supposed a stability among causes; and for that reason every mutable is lead back [reducitur] to an immutable, because in the mutable there is not a stability in the genus of the efficient except in the non-moved mover: for everything which is moved, is moved by another.[2] Similarly the good and the better are lead back to the best, because stability is not in the genus of the end except in the best. Similarly the beautiful and more beautiful to the most beautiful, because stability is not in the genus of species and form, except in the one which is itself essentially [per essentiam] species.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de distinctione rationum, ex dictis iam patet responsio. Non enim possunt distingui penes genus causarum tantum, nec penes modos cognoscendi tantum, sed penes utrumque.[3] Prima enim ratio sumitur secundum rationem causae; aliae sumuntur penes rationem causae et excellentiae, quia considerant ordinem et distinguuntur secundum ordinem in triplici genere causae,[4] efficientis sive moventis, finientis et exemplaris.

To that which is asked concerning the distinction of the reasons, from what has been said the response is already clear. For they cannot be distinguished from within [penes] the genus of causes only, nor from within the manners of cognizing only, but (they can) from within both.[3] For the first reason is taken according the reckoning of the cause; the others are taken from within the reckoning of cause and excellence, because they consider the order and they are distinguished according to order in a threefold genus of cause,[4] the efficient or motive [moventis], the final [finientis] and the exemplar.

Dub. II.

Doubt II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod postea dicit Magister, quod *ex perpetuitate intelligitur Conditor aeternus*. Nihil enim valet: effectus est perpetuus,[5] ergo efficiens est aeternus.

Likewise is asked concerning this which Master (Peter) says afterwards, that *from the perpetuity . . . the eternal Founder is understood*. For it has no value (to say): the effect is perpetual,[5] therefore the efficient (cause) is eternal.

Item quaeritur similiter[6] de hoc quod dicit: *Ex magnitudine omnipotens*. Nihil enim valet: fecit magna, ergo est omnipotens vel potest facere omnia.

Likewise it is similarly[6] asked concerning this which he says: *From the magnitude . . . the omnipotent*. For it has no value (to say): it made great things, therefore it is omnipotent and/or it can make all things.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod tantum est quaedam persuasio per signum, non necessaria argumentatio. Dicunt enim, quod omnipotentia et aeternitas, cum sint infinitae, non possunt sufficienter probari per creaturas, quae sunt finitae.[7] — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod quamvis non sequatur in quolibet efficiente, tamen necessario sequitur in efficiente sive perpetuante primo. Impossibile enim est, quod creatura habeat esse et magnum esse[8] et hoc totum ab aliquo, qui non possit in totum; et qua ratione in hoc totum, et in quodlibet. Similiter, si est primum perpetuans, est omnino in actu et nihil in potentia; et si hoc, cum possit facere durare aliud in infinitum, ipsum est actu infinitum duratione: ergo aeternum.

I respond: To this some say, that there is only a certain persuasion through a sign, not a necessary argumentation. For they say, that omnipotence and eternity, since they are infinite, cannot be sufficiently proven through creatures, which are finite.[7] — However in another way it can be said, that although it does not follow in every efficient, however it necessarily follows in the efficient or first perpetuating. For it is impossible, that a creature have a being [esse] and a great being [magnum esse][8] and this whole from another, which cannot be in the whole; and by this reason in this whole, and in anything. Similarly, if there is a first perpetuating, it is entirely in act and none (of it is) in potency; and if this (is so), since it can make another endure unto the infinite, it is itself infinite in the duration of its act [actu duratione]: therefore eternal.

Dub. III.

Doubt III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Omnia quae arte divina condita*[9] *sunt, unitatem*

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *all . . . which have been* made *by the*

quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Videtur enim primo dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum haec tria condita sint, tunc habent *unitatem*, *speciem* et *ordinem*, et sic de aliis: ergo si est stare, tunc aliqua condita sunt, quae haec non habent.[10]

divine Art, show . . . a certain unity in themselves and an outward-beauty and order.. For he seems to say, first, (that it is) false, because if this (is so), since these three have been founded, then they have a *unity*, an *outward-beauty* [species], and an *order*, and thus concerning the others: therefore if it is to stand, then some have been founded, which do not have these.[10]

Item videtur male enumerare, quia Augustinus[11] ponit ista tria: *modum*, *species* et *ordinem*, et haec alia: *unitatem*, *veritatem*, *bonitatem*. Quaeritur ergo de diversis modis enumerandi, unde veniant.

Likewise he seems to badly enumerate, because (St.) Augustine[11] posits these three: *measure* [modum], *outward-beauty* and *order*, and these others: *unity*, *truth*, *goodness*. Therefore it is asked concerning the diverse manners of enumerating, whence do they come?

R**ESPONDEO**: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod hoc intelligitur de creaturis perfectis, vel si de omnibus,[12] tunc illa tria non dicunt conditiones in re creata, sed in exemplari increato. — Potest tamen dici, quod in primis intentionibus et generalibus[13] est reflexio et ideo status, nec est ultra procedendum.

I **RESPOND**: To this some say, that this is understood of perfect creatures, and/or if of all things,[12] then those three are not called conditions in the created thing, but in the uncreated exemplar. — However it can be said, that in the first and general intentions[13] there is reflection and for that reason stability [status], and one is not to proceed beyond (this).

Ad illud quod quaeritur de enumeratione illorum trium, quod non videtur conveniens; dicendum quod res creata habet tripliciter considerari: aut in / se, aut in comparatione ad alias creaturas . . .

To that which is asked concerning the enumeration of the other three, that it does not seem to be fitting [conveniens]; it must be said that a created thing has to be considered in a threefold manner: either in / itself, or in comparison to other creatures . . .

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[1] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *quae*. Paulo infra ed. 1 *primo* pro *proprio*.
[2] Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 4. et 3. — Mox cod. R post *quia* addit *in bono* et paulo infra cod. Y post *pulcrius* adiungut *reducuntur*.
[3] Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *utrumque* loco *utraque* et immediate post loco *autem* posuimus *enim*.
[4] Vat. hic addit *ut*, sed obstant mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. — Plura de his argumentis vide infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et Hexaëm. Serm. 5. et 10.
[5] Hoc est, qui licet habeat initium, non tamen habet finem. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittendo verba *Nihil enim valet*, obiectionem ita proponit: *Effectus non est perpetuus: ergo neque efficiens est aeternus*; sed minus ad rem, ut liquet ex responsione S. Doctoris ad obiectionem.
[6] Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 verbum *similiter*.
[7] Hanc sententiam defendit Scot., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. n. 6. et d. 42. q. unic. et Quodlib. q. 7.
[8] Depravatam lectionem Vat. *habeat ita magnum esse et ita dispositum, et hoc* emendavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.
[9] Plures codd. omittunt *divina*, omnes autem habent *condita* contra Vat., quae ponit *facta*.

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[1] The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and to edition 1 reads *that (power), which* [eius, quae]. A little below this edition 1 has *the first* in place of *its own*.
[2] Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VII, text 1 & 3. — Then codex R after *because* adds *in the good* [in bono] and a little below this codex Y after *more beautiful* inserts *are lead back* [reducuntur].
[3] Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted the neuter form of *from both* [utrumque] for the feminine form. and immediately after this we have put *for* [enim] in place of *but* [autem].
[4] The Vatican text here adds *(such) as* [ut], but the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 oppose this. — For more on these arguments see below in d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 2 and Hexaëmeron, Sermon 5 & 10.
[5] This is that, which though it has a start, does not have an end. — The Vatican text without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, by omitting the words *For it has no value (to say)*, proposes the objection thus: *The effect is not perpetual: therefore neither is the efficient (cause) eternal*; but this is less effective in clarifying the response of the Seraphic Doctor to the objection.
[6] We have restored from the manuscripts and edition

[10] Perturbata lectio Vat. *falsum, quod quae condita sunt sive facta, habeant ista tria, scilicet unitatem, speciem et ordinem: quia aliqua condita sunt quae haec non habent, sicut diabolus et reprobi* castigatur ope codd. et ed. 1, qui quoad substantiam lectionis in textum receptae consentiunt, licet quoad addicentalia devergantur; sic cod. A *qui similiter* loco *quia si hoc*, cod. O post *condita sunt* satis bene addit *haec*; codd. I K *ergo* pro *tunc*, cod. M *tunc haberent* loco *tunc habent*.
[11] Libr. de Natura boni, c. 3: Haec ergo tria: modus, species, ordo tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis sive in spiritu, sive in corpore. Similia habet V. de Cov. Dei, c. 11. De *unitate, veritate et bonitate* vide libr. de Vera Relig. c. 11, 35. et 55. — Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ponit* pro *enumerat* ac paulo infra post *veritatem* supplevimus *et*.
[12] Codd. V W hic addunt *et*.
[13] Hoc est, in transcendentalibus rationibus *unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis* unaquaeque potest de se et aliis praedicari, v. g. veritas est vera, una et bona; in aliis autem rationibus seu formis haec reflexio *proprie* non admittitur; sic improprie dicitur albedo est alba. Cfr. infra d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad ult. — Difficultas a Seraphico hic proposita tangitur et infra d. 33. q. 4. ad 1. et 2. Cfr. et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 1. ad 1. et p. III. q. 7. m. 2. ad 6. — Bl. Albert., hic a. 15. — Richard. a Med., hic circa lit. et d. 33. a. 3. q. 2.

1 the word *similarly* [similariter].
[7] (Bl. John Duns) Scotus defends this opinion in Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 6 and in d. 42, q. sole and in Quodlibetals, q. 7.
[8] The distorted reading of the Vatican text, *have so great a being and be so disposed, and this . . .*, we have emended from the manuscripts and edition 1.
[9] Many codices omit *divine*, but all have *founded* contrary to the Vatican text, which has *made*.
[10] The confused reading of the Vatican text: *false, because those things which have been founded or made, have those three, that is unity, outward beauty* [species] *and order: because some have been founded which do not have these, such as the devil and the reprobate*, is corrected with the help of the codices and edition 1, which in regard to the substance of the reading agree in the text of the (passage) received, though in regard to accidentals diverge; thus codex A has *because similarly* in place of *because if this (is so)*, codex O into *some have been founded* inserts well enough *(of) these* [haec]; codices I and K have *therefore* [ergo] in place of *then*, codex M has *would not have* [non haberent] in place of *do not have* [non habent].
[11] Book on the Nature of the Good, ch. 3: Therefore these three: manner, species, order as general goods are in things made by God, either in spirit, or in body. Similar (words) has The City of God, Bk. V, ch. 11. On *unity, truth and goodness* see the book On the True Religion, ch. 11, nn. 36 and 55. — With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *posits* [ponit] in place of *enumerates* [enumerat] and a little below this we have supplied *and* [et] after *truth*.
[12] Codices V and W here add *and* [et].
[13] That is, among the transcendental reasons *of unity, of truth, and of goodness* each one can be predicated of itself and of the others, e. g. the truth is true, one and good; but among the other reasons or forms this reflection is *properly* not admitted; thus improperly is whiteness said to be white. Cf. below in d. 17, p. I, q. 2 at the end. — The difficulty proposed here by the Seraphic (Doctor) is touched upon also below in d. 33, q. 4, at nn. 1 and 2. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 18, m. 1 at n. 1 and p. II, q. 7, m. 2 at n. 6. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 15. — Richard of Middletown, here on the text (of Master Peter) and in d. 33, a. 3, q. 2.

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aut in / se, aut in comparatione ad alias creaturas, aut in comparatione ad causam primam. Et secundum hos omnes modos contingit reperire trinitatem dupliciter.

either in / itself, or in comparison to other creatures, or in comparison to the first cause. And according to all these manners it happens that one finds a twofold trinity.

Si enim consideretur quantum in se vel quantum ad se, hoc est, aut quantum ad *substantiam principiorum*; et sic est illa trinitas; materia, forma, compositio, quae

For if it is considered as much as (it is) in itself and/or as much as (it is) for itself, that this, either as much as regards *the substance of its principles*; and thus there is

ponitur in libro de Regula fidei;[1] aut quantum ad *habitudines*; et sic est illa, Sapientiae undecimo:[2] *Omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti*. In *numero* enim intelligitur principiorum distinctio, in *pondere* propria ipsorum inclinatio, in *mensura* eorum[3] ad invicem proportio.

that trinity: matter, form, composition, which is posited in (that) book on the Rule of faith;[1] or as much as regards (its) *habitudes*; and thus it is that (trinity spoken of), in the eleventh (chapter) of Wisdom:[2] *Thou has disposed all thing in number, weight and measure*. For in *number* there is understood a distinction of principles, in *weight* their proper inclination, in *measure* their[3] proportion to one another.

Item, si consideretur una creatura *in comparatione ad alias creaturas*, hoc potest esse[4] aut in quantum agit actione *naturali*; et sic sumitur illa trinitas Dionysii,[5] *substantia*, *virtus* et *operatio*; aut in quantum agit actione *spirituali*; et sic illa Augustini, de octoginta tribus Quaestionibus,[6] « *quo constat, quo congruit, quo discernitur* », et ultimum refertur ad animam.

Likewise, if one creature is considered *in comparison to other creatures*, this can be[4] either inasmuch as it acts by *natural* action; and thus is taken that trinity of Dionysius (the Areopagite),[5] *substance*, *virtue* and *operation*; or inasmuch as it acts by *spiritual* action; and thus that (trinity) of (St.) Augustine, On the Eighty-three Questions,[6] « *that whereby it is established, that to which it is suitable, that whereby it is distinguished* », and the last is referred to the soul.

Si autem considerentur[7] in *comparatione ad Deum*, hoc potest esse duplicitur: aut in quantum referuntur tantum; et sic est illa, *modus*, *species* et *ordo*; aut in quantum referuntur et assimiliantur; et sic est illa, *unitas*, *veritas* et[8] *bonitas*.

But if (creatures) are considered[7] in *comparison to God*, this can be in a twofold manner: either inasmuch as they are referred only; and thus is there is that (trinity of), *manner*, *species* and *order*; or inasmuch as they are referred and assimilated; and thus there is that (trinity of), *unity*, *truth* and[8] *goodness*.

Quoniam ergo vestigium attenditur in comparatione ad Deum proprie, ideo in his ultimis conditionibus proprie accipitur vestigium. Et quia magna est inter istas comparationes convenientia, ideo Magister miscet haec ad invicem propter multam convenientiam et correspondentiam;[9] quia *unitas* respondet *modo*, qui respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; *veritas speciei*, quae respicit ipsum ut exemplar; *bonitas ordini*, qui[10] respicit Deum ut finem.

Therefore since the vestige is attained in comparison to God properly (speaking), for this reason in this last conditions the vestige is accepted properly. And because there is a great fittingness among those comparisons of his, for that reason Master (Peter) mingles these together [ad invicem] on account of much fittingness and correspondence;[9] because *unity* responds to the *manner*, which looks back to God as efficient cause; *truth to the species*, which looks back to Him as exemplar; *goodness to the order*, which looks back to God as end.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod appropriat veritatem Filio dicens: *Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris*. Sed contra Augustinus in Soliloquio:[11]

Doubt IV

Likewise is asked concerning that saying which appropriates the truth to the Son: *The most perfect beauty is understood* (to be) *the Son, that is the Truth of the Father*. But

« Veritas est id quod est »; sed ens nulli personae appropriatur: ergo nec veritas.

against (this speaks St.) Augustine in the Soliloquies:[11] « The truth is that which is »; but being is appropriated to no Person: therefore neither truth.

Item videtur male appropriare *ordinem* Spiritui sancto, quia in praecedenti capitulo dicit, quod ex ordine intelligitur sapiens;[12] sed *sapientia* appropriatur Filio: ergo et *ordo*.

Likewise it seems that *order* is badly appropriated to the Holy Spirit, because in the preceding chapter he says, that from order the wise is understood;[12] but *wisdom* is appropriated to the Son: therefore also *order*.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod veritas potest dupliciter considerari, sicut et[13] color. Nam uno modo color consideratur secundum *id in quo est*; et sic definitur in libro de Sensu et sensato:[14] « Color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato ». Alio modo in comparatione *ad visum*, quem movet; et sic definitur in libro de Anima:[15] « Color est motivum visus secundum actum lucidi ».

I RESPOND: It must be said, that truth can be considered in a twofold manner, just as also[13] color. For in one manner color is considered according to *that in which it is*; and thus it is defined in the book On Sensing and the sensed:[14] « Color is the extremity of the evident in a bounded body ». In another manner in comparison *to the seeing*, which it moves; and thus is it defined in the book On the Soul:[15] « Color is a motive of seeing according to the act of the lucid thing ».

Similiter *veritas* potest considerari in compartione ad id *in quo est*; et sic verum est[16] id quod est; alio modo per comparationem *ad intellectum*, quem movet; et sic veritas, ut dicit Philosophus in secundo Metaphysicae,[17] « est finis intelligentiae speculativae ». Secundum primum modum dicit Anselmus:[18] « Veritas Patris est essentia Patris ». Quantum ad secundum modum dicit Hilarius,[19] quod « veritas est delcarativum esse ». Et quoniam Filius[20] procedit ut Verbum, cui appropriatur ratio decla- / -randi, . . .

Similarly *truth* can be considered in comparison to that *in which it is*; and thus the truth is[16] that which is; in another manner through a comparison *to the intellect*, which it moves; and thus truth, as the Philosopher says in the second (Book) of Metaphysics,[17] « is the end of speculative intelligence ». According to the first manner (St.) Anselm says:[18] « The truth of the Father is the essence of the Father ». As much as regard the second manner (St.) Hilary says,[19] that « truth is declarative being [esse] ». And since the Son[20] proceeds as the Word, to whom is appropriated the reckoning of the one decla - / -ring, . . .

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[1] Alanus ab Insulis, de Arte seu Articulis catholicae fidei, a. 24: Materia et forma earumque compago tria prorsus diversa sunt. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus convenienter *ponuntur*. Cod V *compositum* loco *compositio*.
[2] Vers. 21. — Paulo ante post *habitudines* Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, omittit *et*.
[3] Cod. W. *propria eorum*.
[4] Cod. X adiungit *dupliciter*.
[5] De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11: In tria dividuntur secundum se supermundana ratione omnes divini intellectus: in essentiam et virtutem et operationem.
[6] Quaest. 18: Aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit. — In quo textu multi mss. cum sex primis edd. loco *quo* habent *quod*, sed inepte. Cod. X glossando: *quod constat ex suis principiis, quod congruit in ordine cum creaturis aliis, quod discernitur ab aliis creaturis per rationem*

[1] Alain de l'Isle, On the Art or Articles of the Catholic Faith, a. 24: Matter and form and their joining-together are three utterly diverse (things). — The Vatican text against the manuscripts and edition 1 has less conveniently *are posited*. Codex V has *composite* in place of *composition*.
[2] Verse 21. — A little before this after *habitudes* the Vatican text, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, omits *and*.
[3] Codex W has *their own their* [propria eorum]. [4] Codex X inserts *in a twofold manner (,)* [dupliciter].
[5] On the Celestial Hierarchies, ch. 11: All divine intellects are divided into three (categories) according to themselves: into essence and virtue and operation.
[6] Question 18: One is that whereby it is established, another that whereby it is distinguished, another that for which it is suitable. — In which text many

imaginis.
[7] Supple: creaturae.
[8] Ex codd. suplevimus *et*.
[9] Vat. praeter fidem mss. *respondentiam*.
[10] Mendum Vat. *quae* correximus ex mss. — Quamvis in propositione principali, quod scil. in omni creatura sit vestigium Trinitatis, omnes scholastici conveniant, tamen in enumeratione et explicatione partium huius vestigii est aliqua inter ipsos differentia, ut videre licet apud Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. Cfr. et B. Albert., S. I. tract. 3. q. 15. m. 2 et hic a. 13. seqq.; ac S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; et S. I. q. 45. a. 7. ac q. 93. a. 6.
[11] Libr. II. c. 5: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.
[12] Cod. V X cum edd. 2, 3 *sapientia*, sed contra textum Magistri.
[13] Restituimus ex mss. cum ed. 1 indebite omissam particulam *et*.
[14] Cap. 3: Quare color utique erit perspicui extremitas in determinato corpore (ed. Venet. 1489).
[15] Libr. II. de Anima, text. 67. (c. 7): Omnis enim color movens est eius quod secundum actum diaphani (ed. Venet. 1489).
[16] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic minus apte addit: *quod dicit Augustinus: Veritas est id*.
[17] Text. 3, secundum ed. Venet. 1489: Finis enim scientiae speculativae est veritas.
[18] Verba citata videntur esse desumta ex Monolog. c. 46, ubi ostendit, quod Filius sit veritas et ipsa essentia paternae substantiae.
[19] Colligitur ex V. de Trin. n. 3. seq., ubi exponit, quod « veritas ex natura et ex virtute est », sive ut paulo infra habetur, quod « naturae virtus praestat veritatem ».
[20] Fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus *est qui*, quod Vat. hic addit.

manuscripts together with the six first editions have *what* [quod] in place of *whereby / for which* [quo], but ineptly. Codex X by glossing (reads): *that which is established from its own principles, that which is suitable in an order with other creatures, that which is discerned by other creatures through a reckoning of image*.
[7] Supply: creatures.
[8] From the codices we have supplied *and*.
[9] The Vatican text not trusting the manuscripts has *resemblance* [respondentiam].
[10] The faulty reading of the Vatican text, *which (goodness)*, we have corrected from the manuscripts. — Although in the principle proposition, that namely in every creature there is a vestige of the Trinity, all the Scholastics agree, however in the enumeration and explanation of the parts of this vestige there is some different among them, as on may see with (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 4. Cf. also Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., I, tract 3, q. 15, m. 2 and here at a. 13 ff.; and St. Thomas, here at q. 2, a. 3; and in the Summa., I, q. 45, a. 7, and at q. 93, a. 6.
[11] Book II, ch. 5: The true seem to me to be that which is.
[12] Codex V and X together with editions 2 and 3 read *wisdom* [sapientia], but contrary to the text of Master (Peter).
[13] We have restored from the manuscripts together with edition 1 the undue omission of the particle *also* [et].
[14] Chapter 3: Wherefore color as it is [utique] will be the extremity of the evident [perspicui] in a determinate body (Venetian edition of 1498).
[15] On the Soul, Book II, text 67 (ch. 7): For its every color is something moving according to the act of the diaphanous (Venetian edition of 1489).
[16] The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 here adds less aptly: *which (St.) Augustine says: The truth is that*.
[17] Text 4, according to the Venetian edition of 1489: For the end of speculative science is truth.
[18] The words cited seem to be taken from the Monologium, ch. 46, where he shows, that the Son is the Truth and the essence itself of the paternal substance.
[19] This is gathered from On the Trinity, Bk. V, n. 3 ff., where he expounds, that « truth is from nature and from virtue », or as is had a little below this, that « the virtue of nature stands before truth ».
[20] On the faith of many codices and edition 1 we have expunged *is He who*, which the Vatican text here adds.

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ratio decla - / -randi, ideo ei appropriatur ratio exemplaris et per consequens ratio veritatis, quantum ad secundum modum veritatis; ipse autem accipit primo modo.[1]

reckoning of the one decla- / -ring, for that reason there is appropriated to Him the reckoning of the exemplar and consequently the reckoning of the truth, as

much as it regards the second manner of truth; but He accepts it in the first manner.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de *ordine*, dicendum, quod est ordo rerum in universo; et hic appropriatur sapientiae; et est ordo rerum in finem; et hic appropriatur bonitati; et sic patet, quod non est contrarietas.

To that which is objected concerning *order*, it must be said, that there is an order of things in the universe; and this is appropriated to wisdom; and there is an order of things to the end; and this is appropriated to goodness; and thus it is clear, that there is no contrariety.

[1] De veritate plura vide infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

[1] Concerning truth, see the many things (said) below at d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.